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THE BRIDGES AND DIVIDES BETWEEN POLITICS 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The Case of Kosovo 
 
 
 
CHRISTIAN J. JEANBART 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
The present thesis analyzes the circumstances and fate of Kosovo‟s February 2008 
unilateral declaration of independence, as an experimental case for the assertion of the 
relationship between politics and international law. 
 
The event which brought up the question is the fact that most of the countries that had 
recognized the independence of Kosovo did not oppose an October 2008 Russo/Serbian 
referral of the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) through the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (first legal variable). The second legal variable 
considered is of course the ICJ‟s July 2010 opinion. 
 
The working procedure exposes first the generalities of the relationship between politics 
and international law, determining this latter‟s origins and prospects, and thereafter 
checks whether the case of Kosovo can help either confirming the prevalence of such 
relationship or invalidating it. 
 
After exposing such generalities, the follow-up on the analysis takes essentially into 
consideration two political grand variables: 
(i) the current Euro-Balkan geopolitical map after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and 
(ii) the foreign policy change of the Obama administration vis-à-vis Russia as 
compared to that of the Bush Administration. 
 
A close comparison of the legal variables (in particular, the formulation of the ICJ‟s 
award) to the circumstances of the moment evidenced by the abovementioned political 
variables leads to the conclusion that there is indeed an extent of interplay between 
politics and international law. And this is proved by specific developments that took 
place after the ICJ rendered its opinion. 
 
 
Keywords: Kosovo, Serbia, Balkans, Yugoslav, international law, international relations, 
oil, International Court of Justice, ICJ, Europe, Caucasus, Asia. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
On the 17
th
 of February 2008, backed by the United States and the majority of the 
members of the European Union, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence against 
the will of Serbia and Russia.
1
 Just 8 months later, on the 8
th
 of October 2008, at the 
request of Serbia backed by Russia, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) 
adopted a resolution to seek the advice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 
legality of Kosovo‟s unilaterally declared independence.2 
Such a request would look quite normal had Serbia and Russia been the only entities to 
be in its favor with not so little opposition and no meaningful neutral positions recorded. 
But the fact is that, out of the 48 counties which had recognized the independence of 
Kosovo from the outset, only 6 countries (including the United States) voted against the 
UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/3; conversely there were as many as 77 approvals and 74 
abstentions. It also merits to be noted that the 74 abstentions were inclusive of 22 
members of the European Union (out of the 27) which were among the 48 countries that 
                                                 
1
 Note: 
It merits here to point out that the Kosovar aspiration for independence is neither a novelty nor an issue that 
emerged from vacuum. First of all, the Serbs lost the province of Kosovo as they were defeated by the 
Turks on the 28
th
 of June 1389, at the famous Kosovo Polje battle. Thereafter, all the Balkans fell to the 
Ottomans whose agelong occupation of the peninsula left its latent footprints in the region and has thus a 
lot to do with today‟s developments. Here is a very simple example: in 1648, when the Europeans 
concluded the peace of Westphalia which was the historical foundation of the nation-state, the Balkans 
were under Turkish tutelage and were thus unable to participate to Westphalia. Therefore, unlike other 
Europeans, they were not allowed to emancipate and let their own historical constituents be formalized as 
nation-states. We will revert to the accumulation of circumstances that led to Kosovo‟s unilateral 
declaration of independence in our discussion of Euro-Balkan issues, in Chapter 3 of the present work.  
 
2
  See UNGA Resolution A/RES/63/3. (2008, October 8). For our subsequent analysis, it is important to 
note how the question was literally formulated: 
“Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo 
in accordance with international law?” 
 
2 
recognized the independence at once when it was declared.
3
 It should be noted that by 
July 2010, when the ICJ rendered its opinion, the number of countries which had 
recognized Kosovo‟s unilaterally declared independence had increased to 69, as 
compared to 48 in October 2008 when the ICJ‟s advice was solicited. 4 But first, it is 
unclear whether those 21 subsequent recognitions would have generated just as many 
oppositions to soliciting the ICJ‟s advice, had they taken place earlier than such request, 
since only 6 countries out of the whole international community had expressed their 
opposition to such solicitation, second, it doesn‟t alter the singularity of the fact that only 
a small proportion of the international community was opposed to requesting the ICJ‟s 
advice.
 
This is a telling indicator which definitely calls for the following questions : First, 
had everything turned around politically smooth for Kosovo and its supporters, why 
would not those 42 countries (out of the initial 48) have stick coherently to their initial 
positions and thus voted against seeking the advice of the ICJ, along with the 6 other 
countries? Second, what advantage could the parties expect, or bet on, from such advice 
inasmuch as it is nonbinding? Indeed, the nonbinding nature of the advice implies that, 
rather than being totally relieved by an enforceable decision, the concerned parties will 
                                                 
3
 Serrier, T. (2008, October 10). Libération: 
“Si 48 pays ont jusqu‟ici reconnu cette indépendance, très contestée par Moscou, la résolution de l‟ONU, 
demandée par Belgrade, a été adoptée par 77 voix contre 6 (dont les Etats-Unis). … 
…Sur 74 abstentions, on compte 22 des 27 membres de l’UE, qui avait pourtant reconnu l’indépendance 
du Kosovo. ” 
Translation : 
“If 48 countries have so far recognized this independence, very much contested by Moscow, the UN 
resolution, requested by Belgrade, has been adopted by 77 votes against 6 (the United States among 
them). .. 
… Out of 74 abstentions, there are 22 of the 27 members of the EU, which had yet recognized the 
independence of Kosovo”. 
 
4
 Reuters. (2010, July 22). World court Kosovo ruling could have global impact. The New York Times: 
“Kosovo hopes the court will accept that it is well along the path towards statehood, recognized by 69 
nations and already functioning as an independent republic with a constitution and elections”. 
 
3 
still have to decide either by maintaining their anterior position or by backing up and, 
depending on what they are targeting, this may be more an advantage than an 
inconvenience. In answering the above question, any rational mind may be tempted to put 
into question the absoluteness of independence between politics and international law 
because the present stalemate on the issue leaves only one step to hint that such non-
opposed recourse would aim at seeking a “honorable exist”, one way or the other, rather 
than a genuine abandonment to the legal wisdom of the ICJ. It amounts indeed to obtain a 
politically acceptable moral relief for retracting a past engagement, or else its 
confirmation, however legal is the mean selected to reach such objective. To avoid any 
confusion, it should importantly be pointed out that we are not measuring here the risks 
of hampering international justice by political interference; it is not the independence of 
the ICJ itself which is explored as the purpose of this thesis is not to put into question the 
unbiased nature of the ICJ‟s decisions and advices. Our concern is rather relating to the 
reverse situations whereby recourses, which appear to be absolutely legal in their 
procedural mechanism, should be qualified in what they aim to as, in reality, they would 
only be driven by purely political motives and would not have been issued for justice 
alone in the absence of a determinate un-avowed political mobile; in other words, making 
advantage of international law for political dividends.
5
 Indeed, if the ICJ was structured 
                                                 
5
 Note: It is not intended here to blame Serbia for having tried to win the case by having recourse to 
international justice; this was expectable; although, as much as it was, it does not preclude a Serbian hope 
for an ensuing political settlement, as we will see later. Nevertheless, our concentration goes rather on 
questioning the objectives of the States (which had hastily recognized the independence of Kosovo) as they 
did not oppose the consultation of the ICJ on the legality of such independence. Was their direct or indirect 
acceptance to consult the ICJ purely driven by concerns about justice or by concerns about a political 
stalemate?  
In technical terms, political motives are evidently the independent variables which led to Kosovo‟s 
unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008; while Serbia‟s judicial recourse and, most of all, 
the express or tacit acceptance of such recourse by those States which recognized Kosovo‟s independence,  
is obviously a dependent variable. 
 
4 
to only issue binding decisions and if none of the parties which had recognized the 
independence of Kosovo dared thereafter to leave the door open for consulting the ICJ on 
the legality of their own decision, or if those same parties had studied such legality and 
asserted it before taking position, the case studied herein would virtually avail no 
watermarks for any such interference of politics with international law as described above. 
But the facts speak for themselves in that (i) the huge majority of the countries which 
rushed to recognize Kosovo‟s independence (42/48 = 87%) were very shortly afterwards, 
it should be emphasized, either directly or indirectly one may argue, questioning the ICJ 
on the issue, and (ii) this questioning was being processed with full knowledge that, 
notwithstanding the moral weight of the ICJ, its said advice will remain nonbinding.
6
 
Consequently to the concurrence of those two facts, the possibility of intercourse in the 
sense referred to above can no longer be categorically excluded without going deeper into 
the analysis. 
Conversely, one may also ask what effect or weight would such consultation have had if 
Russia was favorable, along with most Western nations, to Kosovo‟s independence? 
Would Serbia‟s request by itself have been able to mobilize the international community 
or would it have fallen on deaf ears? 
                                                 
6
 The ratio of the parties favoring the consultation of the ICJ remains high even if the figures of July 2010 
are taken into consideration instead of those of October 2008, and assuming that all the 21 additional 
countries would have voted against the consultation of the ICJ, which is far from being certain as explained 
above. Indeed, let us suppose that the 21 extra recognitions had taken place from the outset, and let us also 
suppose that those 21 countries would have sided with the 6 which were opposed to the consultation of the 
ICJ. This assumption would increase the number of recognitions of Kosovo‟s independence from the outset 
up to 48+21=69 ; and it would have yielded a number of oppositions to the consultation of the ICJ equal to 
69-21-6= 42. Hence, if such assumption was factual, the abovementioned ratio would be 42/69=61% 
instead of 87%. This obviously is still high in terms of inconsistency between two fundamental positions 
separated by only a short period of time (February 2008 – October 2008), as under normal circumstances, 
this ratio would have logically been very low, if not close to zero. 
 
5 
In due consideration to past circumstances in connection with the matter and to the 
resulting situation at present, the above questions lead us to hypothesize that there are 
some instances where politics and international law may be not totally unrelated to each 
other. We will thus observe the facts in the next chapters and analyze them in order to 
enable ourselves to conclude on such assumption either by confirming it or invalidating it. 
The above having been introduced, it would be a truism to insist on the indefectible 
support to Kosovo‟s independence from some reference parties like the former Finnish 
President Martti Ahtisaari and Secretary Geir Lundestad of the Nobel Committee, or 
some countries like France and the United States.
7
 Nevertheless, the position of Serbia, 
                                                 
7
 References : 
 
 Lasserre I. (2008, October 10). Reconnaissance du Kosovo : le pouvoir serbe ne décolère pas 
[Recognition of Kosovo : the Serbian government is still in a temper]. Le Figaro :  
“Une décision jugée inutile par l‟ambassadeur de France à l‟ONU, Jean-Maurice Ripert, 
«car la situation du Kosovo indépendant nous paraît dépourvue d‟incertitude juridique», et 
inopportune «parce qu‟elle ne contribue pas au nécessaire apaisement des tensions et risque 
de compliquer la perspective européenne des Balkans occidentaux». La saisine n‟a guère de 
chance d‟aboutir à un résultat concret, puisque l‟opinion de la CIJ est consultative. Le 
gouvernement serbe le sait bien. Voyant dans ses dernières initiatives un moyen «de défendre 
sa souveraineté et son intégrité territoriale en recourant à la diplomatie et au droit 
international», il n‟a pas l‟intention de remettre en cause, pour le Kosovo, son 
rapprochement avec l‟Europe”. 
Translation : 
“A decision judged useless by Ambassador of France to the UNO, Jean-Maurice Ripert, 
« because the situation of the independent Kosovo seems to us devoid of legal uncertainty », 
and inopportune « because it does not contribute to the necessary appeasement of tensions 
and it risks to complicate the European perspective of the Western Balkans». The legal 
recourse has no chance to yield a concrete result, insofar as the opinion of the ICJ is 
consultative. The Serbian government is well aware of it. Perceiving in its recent initiatives a 
mean «to defend its sovereignty and its territorial integrity in resorting to diplomacy and to 
international law», it has no intention to put into question, for Kosovo, its rapprochement 
towards Europe”. 
 
 Despic-Popovic, H. (2008, October 11). Le finlandais Martti Ahtisaari couronné pour sa 
médiation au Kosovo [The Finnish Martti Aftisaari awarded for his mediation in Kosovo]. 
Libération: 
“Rejeté, le plan Ahtisaari est à la base de la Constitution adoptée cet été par le nouveau 
Kosovo. Et l‟attribution du prix Nobel à son auteur, l‟année même de cette proclamation 
d‟indépendant, n‟est pas le fait du hasard. «Il n‟y a pas d‟alternative à un Kosovo 
indépendant», a déclaré à l‟AFP le secrétaire du comité Nobel, Geir Lundestad… ” 
Translation : 
6 
early and clearly expressed (October 2008) by its Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremic, cannot 
but suggest that the result originally hoped by Serbia‟s recourse to the ICJ is far more 
political than strictly legal.
8
 Indeed, if Mr. Jeremic‟s expectation that – by referring the 
case to the ICJ‟s nonbinding advice – some of the countries which had approved 
Kosovo‟s independence would reconsider their position and most other countries would 
be discouraged from recognizing it, how can anyone underestimate the contingency of a 
fine interplay between politics and international law in the sense of our above 
assumption?
9
 The question is all the more comforted by the fact that other Serbian 
officials have subsequently made statements whose reasoning appears to be of similar 
inspiration, as a legal advice of unenforceable nature is hoped to bring back the 
antagonists to sit down around the negotiating table; notwithstanding Kosovo‟s rejection 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Rejected, the Ahtisaari plan is at the basis of the Constitution adopted this summer by the 
new Kosovo. And the attribution of the Nobel prize to its author, the very same year of this 
proclamation of independence, is not a fact of hazard. Geir Lundestad ,the Secretary of the 
Nobel Committee, told AFP that «There is no alternative for an independent Kosovo»”. 
 
8
 References: 
 Bilefsky, D. (2008, October 8). Gates, in Kosovo, highlights U.S. balancing act on Russia. 
The New York Times: 
“Vuk Jeremic, the Serbian foreign minister, expressed his hope in a recent interview that if 
the case were sent to the International Court of Justice, other countries would be discouraged 
from recognizing Kosovo, and nations that had recognized Kosovo would reconsider”. 
 
 MacFarquhar, N. (2008, October 9). Serbia wins bid to review Independence of Kosovo. The 
New York Times: 
“Serbia‟s foreign minister, Vuk Jeremic, said the nonbinding decision from the court «will 
serve to reduce tensions in the region and facilitate our efforts at reconciliation» by 
transferring the dispute to a judicial arena. Serbia, calling Kosovo a breakaway province, 
believes that it acted illegally by announcing what Serbia considers a unilateral declaration 
of independence, and that the court case will make the states hesitate before extending 
diplomatic recognition”. 
 
9
 Note : Mr. Jeremic may be right in his reasoning since several parties who had recognized the 
independence of Kosovo agreed to submit the legality of such unilaterally declared independence to the ICJ. 
This is a fundamental step toward reconsidering ultimately their position. 
 
7 
of such suggestion.
10
 Likewise, the July 22
nd
 2010 advice of the ICJ – which amounted to 
the fact that Kosovo was free to claim independence, however without taking position on 
whether its statehood was a reality or not – may push forward to more and more 
recognitions by states that were still hesitant, but would still need to be buckled with a 
minimal number of recognitions and a global reputation as such.
11
 This would probably 
necessitate a political settlement between the West and the leading opponent that Russia 
is Eastward.
12
 Conversely, if Kosovo‟s independence is just a fair cause, and if at the 
                                                 
10
 Portes, T. (2009, December 2). A La Haye, la Serbie plaide pour le retour du Kosovo [In The Hague, 
Serbia pleads for the return of Kosovo]. Le Figaro: 
“Le président serbe, Boris Tadic, dont le gouvernement est à l‟origine de cette plainte devant la CIJ, se 
voulait «très optimiste», estimant, dans un entretien au quotidien Vecemje Novosti, qu‟une décision de la 
cour en faveur de la Serbie «ouvrirait la voie à la poursuite des négociations». 
A La Haye, devant la CIJ, le ministre Kosovar des Affaires étrangères, Skender Hyseni, s‟est chargé de 
répondre que « l‟indépendance du Kosovo est irréversible. Nous ne pouvons pas participer à des 
négociations qui remettraient en question notre statut en tant qu‟Etat indépendant et souverain : il ne peut 
pas  y avoir de retour en arrière », a affirmé M. Hyseni.” 
Translation : 
“In an interview with the daily Vecemje Novosti, The Serbian President, Boris Tadic, whose government is 
at the origin of this complaint before the ICJ, was «very optimistic», considering that a Court decision in 
favor of Serbia «would clear-up the way for resuming negotiations». 
In The Hague, before the ICJ, the Kosovar Minister of Foreign Affairs, Skender Hyseni, has taken care to 
answer that « the independence of Kosovo is irreversible. We cannot participate to negotiations which 
would put again into question our status as independent and sovereign state : there can be no return 
backward », has asserted Mr. Hyseni.” 
 
11
 We will revert later to the wording of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, showing its limitation, as well as 
to the fundamental principle qualifying for statehood and to the UN Charter‟s conditions for admittance of 
membership to the UN.  
 
12
 Note: although the heavy weight opponents are Easterners, it may be worth to precise here that the 
opposition to Kosovo‟s independence is not an Eastern monopoly in the absolute. As relevantly pointed out 
by Thierry Portes (2009, Op-cit) of the French daily Le Figaro, among the recalcitrant countries there are 
some Westerners having ethnic difficulties themselves, and they are consequently concerned about any 
transshipment of similar claims within their own environment. In Portes‟ own words: 
“Jusqu‟au 11 décembre, vingt-neuf Etats membres des Nations unies vont présenter leurs arguments. 
Quinze de ces pays, dont les Etats-Unis et la France, ont reconnu l‟indépendance du Kosovo ; quatorze, 
comme la Russie, l‟Espagne ou la Chine, s‟y opposent toujours. ... ... L’Espagne, soucieuse de ne pas 
donner d’arguments aux Basques ou aux Catalans, n’a pas reconnu l’indépendance du Kosovo, à 
l’instar, au sein de l’UE, de la Slovaquie, la Roumanie, la Grèce et Chypre.” 
Translation : 
“Until the 11th of December, twenty nine member States of the United Nations will present their arguments. 
Fifteen of those States, among them the United States and France, have recognized the independence of 
Kosovo; fourteen like Russia, Spain or China, are still opposed to it. ... ... Spain, which is concerned about 
giving arguments to the Basques or the Catalans, has not recognized the independence of Kosovo, just 
like Slovakia, Romania, Greece and Cyprus, within the EU.” 
8 
same time Russia stumbles on rejecting it until it makes enough advantage of the 
situation in the hope of gaining the time needed to turn out the balance in its favor in the 
Caucasus, or even elsewhere in its areas of interest around the world, before engaging in 
any type of negotiation, how can anyone thus overlook such particular instances where 
politics may have an impact on international law?
13
 And here comes justly the challenge 
as the main actors still have to take position now that such nonbinding advice has been 
issued. The subtlety hence would be to assess the different possible outcomes, given due 
consideration to the leading actors‟ positions and interests, and thus – through the case of 
Kosovo – either comfort the assumption of the existence of an interplay between politics 
and international law or invalidate such assumption. This is precisely the exercise 
proposed in this work. 
But at this stage, before moving further in our analysis, let us observe or try to figure out 
the extent of interaction, if any, between international relations and international law.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
13
  Semo, M. (2008, August 16). Belgrade tente une offensive juridique contre le Kosovo [Belgrade tries a 
legal offensive against Kosovo]. Libération:  
“Une decision des juges de la CIJ n‟aurait pas un caractère juridiquement contraignant mais cela 
compliquerait singulièrement la donne. Le nouvel Etat n‟a été jusqu‟ici reconnu que par 45 pays, dont 20 
des 27 membres de l‟UE. «Au moins ceux qui n‟ont pas reconnu cette indépendance unilatérale ne le feront 
pas tant que la CIJ n‟aura pas examiné la question», a expliqué le ministre serbe des Affaires étrangères, 
Vuk Jeremic, reconnaissant qu’il sera difficile d’avoir une majorité à  l’ONU. Mais sur fond de crise 
caucasienne cela n’est pas impossible. «Avec la séparation du Kosovo, la Russie a obtenu une forte 
justification pour son action en Géorgie» clame ainsi le président tchèque, Vaclav Klaus. Rien 
d’étonnant si déjà certains s’inquiètent à Washington et Bruxelles, et que les pressions commencent 
pour faire renoncer Belgrade à cette idée‖. 
Translation: 
“A decision from the judges of the ICJ would not have a legally constraining status but would singularly 
complicate the deal. The new State has so far been recognized only by 45 countries, of which 20 of the 27 
members of the EU. «At least those who have not recognized this unilateral independence will not do so as 
long as the ICJ will not have examined the question», has explained the Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk 
Jeremic, while admitting that it will be difficult to have a majority at the UNO. But with a background of 
Georgian crisis this is not impossible. «With the separation of Kosovo, Russia has obtained a strong 
justification for its action in Georgia», thus stated the Czech president, Vaclav Klaus. There is nothing to 
be surprised about if some people in Washington and Brussels get already concerned, and that pressures 
start to be exerted on Belgrade to renounce on this idea‖. 
9 
Chapter 2 
Compatibility of International Law with Politics 
In assessing the compatibility of international law with politics, it is imperative to have 
an overview of the theories of international relations and compare them to one another in 
order to find which one of them fits best, or even more or less satisfactorily, for 
promoting international law. One may also wonder whether there is a theory which is 
rather distant from the principles of international law. And thus, to which extent such 
theory prevails over the others, if ever? And consequently, how strong is its influence in 
hampering the independent course of international law? 
An adequate survey would therefore necessitate for us to draw up likewise an “inventory” 
of international law showing how far it has now progressed, in an effort to determine all 
of its areas of consistency and interactivity with international politics and to reduce the 
risk of overlooking some of the most relevant aspects in this regard.  
But before going into this exercise, it would help recalling, as pertinently pointed out by 
the realist writers Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, that states are either 
sovereign or not.
 
Sovereignty cannot be partial, and there are some sorts of gaps between 
international law and international politics as there are discrepancies between the 
pretended status of their interconnection on one side and reality on the other side; an 
interesting statement indeed which calls for more exploration on our part before taking 
position.
 14
 But in turn, this raises the question: what is sovereignty? Given consideration 
to the world‟s move toward development, the question is not so obvious to answer; but let 
                                                 
14
 See Morgenthau, H. J. & Thompson, K.W. (1985). Part VI, Limitation of national power : international 
law, Chapter 19, Sovereignty, p. 341.  
The authors maintain that sovereignty is indivisible, and that any consideration for its divisibility rather 
reveals a “discrepancy between actual and pretended relations” between politics and international law.  
10 
us try a beginning by focusing on two other assertions of Morgenthau and Thompson. 
The first assertion is that sovereignty is a political issue expressed in legal terms, and that 
it may be subject or vulnerable to shifts in political power from one government to 
another.
 15
 The said shifts may occur either after a forceful action – like a Coup d‟état or 
the invasion of a country by another one or the signature of a treaty under duress – or 
peacefully through a democratic process of power transfer. Secondly, in order to avoid 
any confusion however, an important qualification should be made about the effect of 
treaties on sovereignty; and in this regard, Morgenthau and Thompson make the valuable 
precision that sovereignty – as far as its conventional realist concept is meant – is not lost 
by just signing agreements and treaties.
 16
 It depends on what is provided for in the texts 
of those treaties; and sovereignty would thus only be lost inasmuch as such texts make 
the relevant government lose its political control over the management of the affairs of 
the country for which it was empowered to do so.
17
 
The reference to sovereignty brings about imperatively the subject of decentralization of 
international legislation, but not only so; sovereignty has also to do with the 
decentralization of the judicial function as well; and in turn it has to do with the issue of 
how to enforce awards.
18
 Let us proceed therefore in this respect with an overview of the 
current progress of international law. 
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 Ibid, p. 337. 
 
16
 Ibid, p. 338. 
 
17
 Note : 
The traditional realist concept of sovereignty should be qualified today with the advance of globalization. 
We will revert to it later in this work. 
 
18
 Morgenthau & Thompson. Op-cit, p. 330. 
11 
2.1 Current progress of International Law – Guidelines of International Law 
focusing on the role of the International Court of Justice 
 
Perhaps should we first recall that international law started developing from a variety of 
sources such as customs, morality, treaties, general principles like equity, national and 
international judicial decisions, experts‟ writings in various fields, pronouncements made 
by statesmen, etc... . But before getting onto the heart of the subject, it would definitely 
help outlining today‟s fundamental principle that, consistently with the UN Charter, 
international law prevails over customs and municipal laws on all issues amenable to 
international jurisdiction either by specific decisions of States formally taken, or as a 
result of their membership to the UN, or also – with regard to some of those issues – by 
general acceptance from the concert of nations as pertaining to basic and common sense 
principles.
19
 Here below are some examples: 
• The signing and ratification of new instruments of supranational or international 
concern; this involves States that sign and ratify a treaty before its entry into force; 
for example, the number of ratifications of the Rome Statute of the ICC has enabled 
its entry into force.
20
 Likewise, the 1982 Law of the Sea entered into force in 1994 as 
a result of the number of parties having ratified it.
21
  
• Official engagement with respect to multilateral treaties or treaties of international 
concern already under way; this involves States which had neither signed nor ratified 
                                                 
19
 It would be relevant to note here that resolutions of the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, are binding on all States, regardless of whether they are members of the UN or not. 
 
20
 See Annex 1 to the present work about this Statute. 
 
21
 The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) of the 10
th
 of December 1982 entered into force on the 16
th
 of 
November 1994 in accordance with its Article 308 which stipulates that: 
“1. This Convention shall enter into force 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
2. ... ...” 
 
12 
a treaty but which acceded to such treaty after its entry into force; the Rome Statute of 
the ICC again is an example of treaty having been accepted by some States after its 
entry into force.
22
 Likewise, after the 1994 entry into force of the Law of the Sea, 
about one hundred States not yet involved have accepted such treaty.
23
 
• UNGA resolutions which ultimately end up as binding treaties; it being understood 
that the UNGA promotes the development of international law and its codification 
without becoming a world legislature for so much of a function, and therefore it 
cannot enact legislation in the way a parliament would do.
24
 
• UNSC decisions by which all members of the United Nations are bound in 
accordance with the UN Charter. 
25
 Here is an example: when South Africa was at the 
threshold of producing nuclear weapons, the UNSC adopted resolution number 418 
(the 4
th
 of November 1977), acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, whereby it 
                                                 
22
 It may be relevant to precise here that the said States are bound by the Rome Statute of the ICC because 
of their express engagement and not because of their membership to the UN. This being said, in extreme 
situations, the UNSC can refer to the ICC a criminal matter involving a State which is unbound by the 
Rome Statute or even non-member of the UN. This possibility is discussed in Annex 1 to the present work. 
 
23
 As we saw above, the LOST entered into force one year after the 60
th
 ratification occurred; but there has 
been about 100 additional ratifications and/or acceptances afterwards. By the 27
th
 of October 2010, the 
number of States bound by the LOST had increased to161. 
See the table recapitulating the status of signatures and ratifications of the LOST, available on: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf . 
 
24
 See Slomanson, W.R. (1995). (2
nd
 ed.). Chapter 3: International Organizations, p.117. 
In referring to the UNGA‟s functions and power (promotion of international law but not as a legislative 
body), Slomanson stresses on the non-definite property of the terms used in Articles 10 through 17 of the 
UN Charter, like «the General Assembly may discuss», «may consider», «shall ... ». 
 
25
 This is explicit in Article 25 of the UN Charter which reads as follows: 
“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.” 
It should further be noted in this regard that: 
• When the UNSC is acting under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (pacific settlement of disputes), its 
decisions are binding provided there is a prior agreement of the parties involved; 
• As mentioned earlier, when the UNSC is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (threats and 
aggressions having to do with international peace and security), its decisions are binding on all States 
without any prior agreement and – as specifically stated in Article 42 of the Charter – the UNSC may 
opt for the use of force if it deems necessary. 
 
13 
decided that States should refrain from dealing with South Africa in a way that would 
directly or indirectly support its nuclear program.
26
 More specifically, UNSC 
resolution number 473 of the 13
th
 of June 1980 has requested States to enact national 
legislations for the purpose of implementing resolution number 418 (1977). 
27
 These 
resolutions bear obviously force of international law; and they supersede any 
contradictory local law. 
• Common sense basic principles having obtained a worldwide global acceptance as 
such, and which thus bind all nations regardless of the individual consent of their 
governments. Examples of such principles are the rules delimiting jurisdictions of 
individual States, short of which there would be neither a state system nor a related 
international law.
28
 Some other examples of such fundaments of international law are 
                                                 
26
 Below are excerpts from UNSC Resolution number 418 (1977): 
“The Security Council, 
... ... 
Gravely concerned that South Africa is at the threshold of producing nuclear weapons, 
... ... 
Acting therefore under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
... ... 
1.  Calls upon all States to review, having regard to the objectives of the present resolution, all 
existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted to South Africa relating to the 
manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and 
vehicles, with a view to terminating them; 
2. Further decides that all States shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the 
manufacture and development of nuclear weapons; 
3. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in 
accordance with the provisions of the present resolution; 
... ...” 
 
27
 Below is an excerpt from United Nations Security Council Resolution number 473 (1980): 
“The Security Council,  
... ... 
10.  Calls upon all States strictly and scrupulously to implement resolution 418 (1977) and enact, 
as appropriate, effective national legislation for that purpose; 
... ...” 
 
28
 Morgenthau & Thompson. Op-cit. Part VI, Limitation of national power : international law, Chapter 19, 
Sovereignty, pp. 329-330. 
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the Grotius pioneered sanctity of treaties (Pacta sunt servanda) referred to above and 
the customary rules of diplomatic intercourse.
29
  
As it so happens, States can no longer oppose the competence of their domestic 
jurisdictions, with the exception of subjects where reservations were made possible.
30
 
In furtherance to the above, the United Nations not only advocates that all principles of 
international law should really be incorporated in municipal laws (notwithstanding the 
limited reticence of some States), but with the same spirit it also advocates that 
international treaties should have precedence over international customs.
31
  
Thus, in line with the above advocacy, international agreements concluded by States 
supersede both international customs and States‟ respective municipal laws. This being 
said, the UN Charter comes on top of all because it also supersedes those international 
agreements inasmuch as they contain provisions that are inconsistent with its own 
provisions.
32
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 Slomanson. (1995). (2
nd
 ed.). Op-cit. Chapter 3: International Organizations, p.115. 
 
30
 As an example, reservations are possible under the so-called “Optional Clause” of the ICJ Statute, to 
which we will revert a little later in this same chapter. 
 
31
 This advocacy is made evident in Article 38.1 of the ICJ Statute. And according to Chapter XIV of the 
UN Charter (Article 92), the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN and its Statute is annexed to the 
Charter. So, Article 38.1 of the ICJ Statute says that: 
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. ..., judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 
 
32
 This is explicit in Article 103 of the UN Charter which reads as follows: 
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present 
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.” 
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Now, there is certainly room for debate on the philosophy of the term “civilized nations” 
(please see the footnote above about Article 38.1 of the ICJ Statute); but this is beyond 
the scope of our work. The interesting point however is to note that those “general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are not necessarily exclusively 
“international” (emphasis added) since that latter word has been avoided in the sentence; 
it being the case, those general principles of law would be national as well; in other 
words, municipal laws. 
Hence, the reference order for regulating international relations becomes in short: (1) UN 
Charter, (2) international agreements, (3) internationally recognized customs, (4) 
municipal laws, and (5) judicial decisions and scholars‟ teachings. 
The above having been introduced, let us now move to the discussion of issues related to 
our subject with a more direct concern. In a recent television program about the 
globalization of justice on the French channel ARTE, broadcasted in two sessions, Jean-
Christophe Victor has performed an interesting overview of the subject.
33
 That same 
subject is also very well covered by William R. Slomanson in his book titled 
“Fundamental perspectives on international law.”34 Victor globally sums up today‟s 
international jurisdictions into essentially three types; two of them are permanent and are 
based in The Hague in the Netherlands, whereas the third type is non-permanent and has 
no predetermined seat.
35
 The first two are : (i) the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
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 Victor J-C. (2010, July 10 & 17. 
 
34
 Slomanson W.R. (2007). (5
th
 ed.). Chapter 9: Arbitration and adjudication, pp.389-426. 
 
35
 Notwithstanding the relevancy of Victor‟s summary, it should be noted that there is also a number of 
legal structures and resources having an international concern, whether regarding individuals or States. 
However, our focus in the present thesis is not on individuals under international law but on international 
law governing political relations among States. Besides, not all of those structures and resources are 
16 
created by the United Nations in the aftermath of WWII (1946), which succeeded to the 
1920 Permanent Court of International Justice for adjudicating conflicts among states, 
and (ii) the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in accordance with the Treaty 
of Rome concluded in Rome on the 17
th
 of July 1998 and entered into force on the 1
st
 of 
July 2002, as the minimum number of ratifications required for the purpose was then 
                                                                                                                                                 
interesting for our work, particularly if their span does not evidently permit the establishment or the 
negation of an interplay between politics and international law; below are some examples: 
1. Individuals and companies under international law 
If individuals are victim of a prejudice of international concern having a political or governmental 
aspect, their home State (but not themselves) can be plaintiff for the wrong done to them. The 
adjudication of certain specific crimes perpetrated by individuals (becoming thus defendants) – like 
piracy, harming diplomats, hijacking aircrafts, slave trading, engaging in certain wartime activities, 
committing genocide (Slomanson, 1995, 2
nd
 ed., p.204) – is of the competence of any nation‟s legal 
structure for they are considered as crimes against all mankind; this is the so-called Universal 
Jurisdiction. 
Without prejudice to the principle that individuals cannot personally be plaintiffs under international 
law, they can nevertheless appeal to the UN Committee on Human Rights (which is however not a 
Court) in accordance with Article 1 of the March 23
rd
, 1976 Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights which entered into force the same date. This is in fact a resultant of the December 
16
th
, 1966 adoption by the UNGA of treaties relevant to the “international bill of rights” in the form of 
Human Rights Covenants, originally contemplated by the December 10
th
 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. These instruments – along with a number of others relating to Human Rights, like 
children rights and all sorts of discrimination (our purpose here is not enumerate them all) – are 
qualified by Gerhard Von Glahn (1996) as somehow affording the individual the faculty of becoming a 
subject of international law. 
Thus, Article 6 of the Optional Protocol provides that “The Committee shall include in its annual 
report under article 45 of the Covenant a summary of its activities under the present Protocol.” And 
Article 45 of the Covenant provides that “The Committee shall submit to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, through the Economic and Social Council, an annual report on its activities.” 
Accordingly, an individual‟s complaint can theoretically make its way to reach the UNGA which – 
depending on the nature of the facts complained about – can refer the matter to the UNSC. If the crime 
is of the nature of one of those listed in Article 5 of the Statute of the ICC, this latter may in turn refer 
the case to the ICC; please refer to Annex 1 to the present work. 
If companies are involved in a commercial issue against a State different than their own, they can 
either be plaintiff or defendant. As it so happens, there are cases where bilateral treaties among States 
provide for the resolution of such kind of disputes by international arbitration. In this respect, the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is a reference UN body 
involved in international law and having set rules and procedures for such adjudications. 
2. States and international organizations under international law 
States and international organizations can either be defendants or plaintiffs whether the conflict is of 
political nature or of commercial nature, and cases can be decided by the ICJ. International arbitration 
is also possible for the resolution of commercial disputes among States (like in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL rules again). But as stated above, we will concentrate on interstate conflicts of political 
nature. 
 
17 
reached.
36
 The third type is the ad hoc tribunals with globally the same object than the 
ICC, but which have duration and territorial limits. 
All these jurisdictions are rightly qualified by Victor as actors of international relations. 
But the said qualification obviously leaves a question mark on a potential interconnection 
between international justice and worldwide politics. As it may so happen for certain 
cases, the challenge would be to assess how much and under what conditions such actors 
are independent from influential states and from pressures from within the state. We will 
concentrate nevertheless on the ICJ as it is the type of international jurisdiction which is 
relevant with the case of our subject.
37
 
However, it may be useful at this point and for other subsequent references to summarize 
the veto working mechanism. Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations reads as 
follows: 
“Voting 
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by 
an affirmative vote of nine members. 
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an 
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurrent votes of the 
permanent members; .....” 
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 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court established the ICC in accordance with its Article 
1, which reads as follows: 
“An International Criminal Court (“the Court”) is hereby established. It shall be a permanent 
institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions. ... ...” 
It entered into force on the 1
st
 of July 2002 in accordance with its Article 126, which reads as follows: 
“This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the 
date of the deposit of the 60
th
 instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
... ...”  
 
37
 Still, the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals in international law are outlined in Annex 1 to the present work. 
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Article 23 of the Charter has determined that the Security Council is composed of 15 
members, of which 10 are non-permanent (elected by the General Assembly on a two-
year rotational basis) and 5 are permanent members; those latter are the United States, 
Russia, China, France and Great Britain. Thus a negative vote of anyone of those five 
countries is enough by itself to block a UNSC decision even if the 14 other votes are 
favorable. 
The above having been introduced, let us proceed now with our discussion of the ICJ. Its 
role is best described in its own website : “The Court has a twofold role: to settle, in 
accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States (Contentious 
cases) and to give advisory opinions (Advisory proceedings) on legal questions referred 
to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.”38 
As an example of an issue for which the ICJ‟s advice was solicited (2003), both 
Slomanson and Victor have made reference to the construction of a wall by the Israelis to 
separate themselves from the Palestinians of the West Bank. Slomanson refers to the 
«Charter based authority» of the UNGA to solicit the ICJ‟s advisory opinion on the 
legality of the Israeli wall. 
39
 In July 2004, the Court‟s conclusion was that the wall was 
illegal, but that was to no avail says Victor since the Israelis proceeded with the 
construction of the wall.
40
 This exemplifies the significance of a consultative advice of 
the ICJ in terms of practical capacity, and it comforts us in our determination to assess 
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 This description can be read by clicking on “Cases” in the ICJ‟s website : http://www.icj-cij.org.  
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 Slomanson. (2007). (5
th
 ed.). Op-cit. Chapter 6: Range of sovereignty, p.273. 
Note: In his reference to the “Charter-based authority” here, Slomanson means Article 96.1 of the Charter 
of the United Nations which reads as follows: 
“The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an 
advisory opinion on any legal question.” 
 
40
 Victor. (2010, July 10). Op-cit. Part 1 of 2. 
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how much and under what conditions justice among peoples and societies is independent 
of politics and of the power ratios among nations. So far thus, may we say, part of the 
role of the ICJ appears to be restricted to that of a moral authority which, in no practical 
way, can bind the party to which the responsibility of a prejudice is attributed to modify 
its conduct and remedy such prejudice.  
Another major aspect of the ICJ‟s incapacity (this time theoretical) is the so-called 
“Optional Clause” which is a different issue than its advisory role but whose bottom line 
is comparable in that it enables either of the parties to short-circuit the ICJ. Such an 
appellation for that clause is a direct consequence of the wording of Article 36 of the 
Statute of the ICJ.
41
 As understandable – with such binding provisions on one side and 
the faculty to either accept (totally or partially) or reject the ipso facto compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ on the other side – when they deposited their declarations with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, most of the states have only signed the ICJ‟s 
Statute after having made substantial reservations affording them the possibility to 
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 Statute of the ICJ. Op-cit. Article 36 of the Statute reads as follows: 
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters 
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 
2. The states parties to the present statute may at any time declare that they recognize as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting 
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law; 
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligations; 
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity 
on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time. 
4. Such declarations will be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall 
transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present statute, to be 
acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of justice for the period 
which they still have to run and in accordance with their terms. 
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by 
the decision of the Court. 
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oppose the prevalence of their domestic jurisdictions over that of the ICJ in a wide range 
of circumstances either deemed to be of concern with their sovereignty or hampering 
their maneuvering margin in international relations.
42
 It is the above-mentioned faculty 
that owed Article 36 the label of “Optional Clause”.43 
One very significant option of this famous clause is the principle of reciprocity, provided 
for in Article 36.3 of the Statute. It may also be opposed by one of the parties to a dispute 
provided it had inserted it within its own reservations upon filing its declaration to the 
UN Secretary-General. The trick is that, when the effects of such principle (called upon 
by that first party) are combined with those of some different specific reservations made 
by the other party, that other party may be trumped by its own reservations on areas of 
competence of the ICJ, despite the fact that such other party would have brought up itself 
the matter before the ICJ. Indeed, according to this principle, both plaintiff and defendant 
should be amenable to the ICJ‟s jurisdiction under the same conditions of advantages and 
constraints. So if one of the parties had put more restrictions than the other one, the latter 
would not be liable for abiding by that portion of the rules on which it had consented and 
which is tougher than those rules by which the former is engaged; furthermore such latter 
party would similarly be permitted to argue with those very same limitations put forward 
by the former party.
44
 
A good example illustrating the effect of the principle of reciprocity is the Case of 
Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway); the related dispute was about the mode of 
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 Please refer to our discussion of “sovereignty” at the beginning of this chapter. 
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 Slomanson. (2007). (5
th
 ed.). Op-cit. Chapter 9: Arbitration and adjudication. 
On page 403, Slomanson gives some examples of the functioning of the Optional Clause and the resulting 
range (from narrow to wide) of possible exclusions from the ICJ‟s jurisdiction.  
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 Ibid. Chapter 9: Arbitration and adjudication, pp.402-404. 
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repayment of a series of French loans granted to Norway between 1885 and 1909.
45
 It 
was France which brought up the case before the ICJ but the distinctive element is that, in 
its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on the 1
st
 of March 1949, France 
excluded matters which it saw within its domestic jurisdiction; while Norway did not 
make any such exclusion in its November 16
th
, 1946 acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ. But both France and Norway had expressly laid down the 
condition of reciprocity in their respective reservations. And therefore, Norway argued 
that the condition of reciprocity imposed such an equality of treatment that both parties 
should be subject to exactly the same restrictions and entitlements; thus if France had 
excluded matters falling within its domestic jurisdictions from the ICJ‟s competence, so 
Finland should be able to exclude such kind of issues regardless of its failure to express 
this particular reservation from the outset.
 46
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 Ibid. Chapter 9: Arbitration and adjudication, p.405.  
See Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), International Court of Justice, 1957 ICJ Reports 
9 (1957).  
 
46
 See the ICJ‟s judgment of the 6th of July 1957 available on http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/29/4773.pdf; excerpts, pp. 22, 23 & 27: 
“After presenting the first ground of its first Preliminary Objection on the basis that the loan contracts are 
governed by municipal law, the Norwegian Government continues in its Preliminary Objections: 
« There can be no possible doubt on this point. If, however, there should still be some doubt, the 
Norwegian Government would rely upon the reservations made by the French Government in 
its Declaration of March 1
st
, 1949. By virtue of the principle of reciprocity, which is embodied in 
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and which has been clearly expressed in the 
Norwegian Declaration of November 16
th
, 1946, the Norwegian Government cannot be bound, 
vis-à-vis the French Government, by undertakings which are either broader or stricter than 
those given by the latter government.» 
... ... 
In the Preliminary Objections filed by the Norwegian Government it is stated: 
« The Norwegian Government did not insert any such reservation in its own Declaration. But it 
has the right to rely upon the restrictions placed by France upon her own undertakings. 
Convinced that the dispute, which has been brought before the Court by the Application of July 6
th
, 
1955, is within the domestic jurisdiction, the Norwegian Government considers itself fully 
entitled to rely on this right. Accordingly, it requests the Court to decline, on grounds that it lacks 
jurisdiction, the function which the French Government would have it assume. » 
... ... 
The Court considers that the Norwegian Government is entitled, by virtue of the condition of reciprocity, 
to invoke the reservation contained in the French Declaration of March 1
st
, 1949; that this reservation 
22 
And Slomanson concludes therefore that the principle of reciprocity enabled Norway to 
make advantage of a reservation put forward solely by its opponent in order to plead 
successfully against the competence of the ICJ in the above case.
 47
 
So far we have seen two examples; the first one images the inability of the ICJ to process 
a decision or a recommendation toward execution, and the second one illustrates the 
inertia of the ICJ. It should however be made clear that such “paralysis” of the ICJ is not 
always absolute; there are indeed cases where decisions or advises are complied with, but 
only after long periods of procrastination; in most of those instances however, it is not the 
care for justice which compels the wrongdoer to abide by an ICJ decision but either an 
international determination to command respect for international law or a change of 
political circumstances and balances that exerts a crescendo of pressures on such party 
and deprives it from the power necessary to proceed with the prejudice it was causing to 
the victim, or even both at a time. This fact is very well illustrated by the Namibia Case, 
on which the ICJ rendered an advisory opinion that was ignored by South Africa for 
about 20 years. A brief history of the case is exposed in Annex 2 of the present work and 
it shows how much effort and time it took the United Nations and the international 
community to bring South Africa to leave Namibia alone.
48
 But not only so : South 
                                                                                                                                                 
excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court the dispute which has been referred to it by the Application of 
the French Government; that consequently the Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the Application. 
... ... 
THE COURT, 
by twelve votes to three, 
finds that it is without jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute which has been brought before it by the 
Application of the Government of the French Republic of July 6
th
, 1955.” 
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 Slomanson. (2007). (5
th
 ed.). Op-cit. Chapter 9: Arbitration and adjudication, p. 405. 
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 There has been a plethora of UNSC resolutions (more than 35) after the ICJ rendered its June 1971 
opinion. All resolutions aimed ultimately at the independence of Namibia and the abolition of apartheid; 
such two issues were explicitly recalled in most of those resolutions. Examples of other issues 
interconnected with the abovementioned two are the following: arm embargoes, banning deals with South 
23 
Africa was blamed by the international community for its apartheid policy, and in the 
1970s all the way through to the 1988 ceasefire, riots were frequently taking place here 
and there in the South African territory and they contributed to increase the volume of 
political prisoners and political trials ending up with death sentences of very questionable 
fairness. As a consequence, South Africa was getting little by little isolated and the then 
Administration (an ethnic minority) was losing control of the affairs of the country, of 
which the ethnic majority had been excluded for centuries. It was getting clearer and 
clearer that the Administration had no choice but to change its policy not only in Namibia 
but in South Africa itself as well.
49
 Indeed, when Frederik De Klerk took over office from 
Pieter W. Botha in 1989, he initiated the changes; and so, in 1990, Nelson Mandela was 
liberated, the racial segregation was abolished and Namibia acceded at last to 
independence.
50
 Therefore, one may legitimately ask what would have happened if South 
Africa was not back then so weakened by the circumstances and by the international 
community‟s determination.  
In our above discussion we have tried to explain both the absolute and relative “paralyses” 
of the ICJ. In opposition to the above examples, there are circumstances where ICJ 
                                                                                                                                                 
Africa in many fields, banning foreign investments in South Africa, condemning racial discrimination and 
repressive laws, condemning political trials, requesting the release of political prisoners, demanding to stay 
execution of death sentences and to commute them, condemning South Africa‟s defiance of UN resolutions, 
etc..., etc... . Our purpose here is not to list them all but to make evident the overwhelming pressure exerted 
on South Africa‟s regime back then. 
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advises and awards go all the way through to execution in a smooth manner; but it should 
be made clear that most of those cases fall outside areas of exclusions and reservations 
made by States on issues either deemed to be of concern with their sovereignty or 
colliding with their national aspirations. As a matter of fact, if the Optional Clause did 
not exist, the Statute of the ICJ and most probably the Charter of the UN would have 
remained unsigned or at least signed with a modified text. The said Optional Clause has 
thus considerably reduced the significance of the Court‟s competence and this is one 
more argument legitimating our putting into question the independence of international 
law from worldwide politics.
51
 
Logically therefore, our above hypothesis raises a fundamental question on how 
international law came about altogether? And the answer is pertinently found in the 
discipline of international relations. Indeed, our discussion of the issue in the next section 
will not only answer the question but it will also relevantly demonstrate how such 
interplay between politics and international law may be positively seen from one 
perspective and negatively from another one.   
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2.2 Theories of International Relations – Analyzing the Schools of International 
Relations that are relevant with International Law 
 
There are essentially three schools of thought in international relations, of which derive a 
number of variances; those three major schools are: realism, pluralism and globalism. As 
this latter has a declared inclination to changes neither by democratic processes nor by 
freely taken positions but rather by opting for radical measures and resorting to 
revolutions, it does not offer much room for international law in its professions. We will 
therefore not give such school of thought any further consideration in our study, except 
the fact of outlining its philosophy in Annex 4 to the present work. 
2.2.1 Realism 
In world politics, the mainstream of contemporary realist thought appears to best 
approximate the concept of international system, which is viewed as consisting of 
independent political units called states and living in anarchy. Their power is a potential 
danger to each other as anyone of them can never be sure about the intentions of the 
others. The basic motives for states are survival and the maintenance of sovereignty; and 
there is an interactivity between them since, in order to survive, states are supposed to be 
externally independent from each other and internally sovereign within their 
boundaries.
52
 The reverse of the medal is interdependence; a term which “horripilates” 
realists and on which we will further expand. Realism thus theorizes that the state 
represents the key unit of analysis and is a unitary actor. Such latter characteristic further 
qualifies the state to be a rational actor; and the combination of both is a particularly 
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important factor in connection with security.
53
 Realism also postulates that national 
security tops the hierarchical list of international issues. Power is therefore a key concept, 
and realists make clear the distinction between high politics factors and low politics 
factors, whereby the former relate to strategy, to military and security issues and the latter 
relate to socioeconomic matters.
 54
  
Measuring the power or capabilities of states is therefore a critical step in explaining the 
functioning of the international system. Power is the sum of a state‟s capabilities; it is 
better perceived when compared to that of other states. Such capabilities of power for 
anyone state are its military strength, its economy, its technological advance, its 
diplomacy, its political influence or control over issues, etc..., and they are usually not 
independent of one another. Military alliances and conflicts among states certainly impact 
their economic relations; likewise, military capabilities of states are tributary of their 
economies.
55
  
In the realist philosophy, the repartition of states‟ capabilities leads to the setting up of an 
equilibrium among them in terms of power; and such equilibrium is the relevant 
reference in the international system, precisely because of the fact that those states are 
living together in a world which lacks a central authority safeguarding the rights of each 
and guarantying the execution of its obligations toward the rest of them. In other words, 
distrust and anarchy are the defining characteristics of the environment within which 
sovereign states interact. 
56
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Given such international anarchy and lack of trust, each state has to secure its protection 
either by its own means or by strategic alliances, or else by a combination of both. As a 
result, interstate relations are burdened with a so-called security dilemma which compels 
states to engage in an endless spiral of arms race, often against their will, no matter if 
they sincerely desire peace and even if their purposes were only defensive from the outset. 
They engage in such a race just because they don‟t necessarily know their rivals‟ 
intentions and they cannot be sure of their built up arsenal. 
57
 
Anarchy renders cooperation among states difficult to realize not only over security 
matters, but also on any type of interest. The resulting conduct for actors is a rational 
decision-making approach in situations of competition, and whereby such actors are 
supposed to handle situations in the most advantageous way for them under conditions of 
uncertainty and incomplete information about the others‟ intention. This is known as the 
game theory and it has the same basic principle than the security dilemma; and perhaps is 
it best illustrated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau‟s allegory of the stag hunt which pictures 5 
individuals hunting altogether for a stag with the temptation for each individual to 
abandon the group and go for a hare, since this latter is an easier target. The stag hunt 
requires the imperative and faithful collaboration of all 5, but the easiest for each one 
separately is to go for the hare as it serves the immediate short-term self-interests; but it 
only does so at the detriment of long-term common interests. Furthermore, the lack of 
knowledge about each one‟s intention induces anyone hunter to opt for the most certain 
gain for him, i.e. the hare. Likewise in international relations, according to the realist 
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philosophy, in any kind of doubtful circumstances the rational decision for a state would 
be to defect instead of cooperating on whatever subject.58 
As a result of the distrust, the ultimate risk associated with the anarchical nature of the 
international system is of course the outburst of international conflicts. It becomes 
therefore imperative for states to secure themselves in such an environment, in particular 
when one state or group of states gathers a disproportionate amount of power, thus 
threatening to dominate the former ones. Those former states are consequently compelled 
to balance against the dominant power, sometimes by banding together or pooling their 
capabilities. After major wars or crises, balances of power generally stabilize until some 
other element disrupts the existing equilibrium and necessitates the setting up of a new 
order. Indeed, (i) after the peace of Westphalia in 1648 there was a period of relative rest, 
(ii) in the aftermath of WWI a multipolar equilibrium took place, (iii) in the aftermath of 
WWII a bipolar balance took place, and (iv) after the Cold War era a unipolar order was 
set; although such unipolar order has now lost ground with the reemergence of Russia 
and the growing strength of China.
59
 
Now, back to interdependence, it is a status which is viewed by realists as deriving from 
power in the international system. It is however interesting to note that pluralists attach 
also an importance to the concept of interdependence but with a positive aspect as it 
refers to exchanges (commercial, social, cultural, communication, transportation, etc...) 
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benefiting all parties involved. Globalists for their part approach power and exchanges 
through the concept of dependence of the Southern countries to the North.
60
 
For realists, interdependence has a negative connotation. It is a relationship between 2 
parties whereby the weakest one of them is vulnerable and tributary of the choices of the 
strongest one. In this context, interdependence is thus a source of power of one state over 
another. Realists believe that there should be no interdependency on high politics factors 
in order not to jeopardize the security of the state. Since the oil embargo however, realists 
have qualified their view as they no longer see economy as an exclusively low politics 
element. Indeed, oil supply became a strategic issue and, as such, its classification shifted 
from a low politics element to a high politics element.
 61
 
The realist tradition has started way back in history with Thucydides (471-400 B.C.) and 
has evolved through the ages up to contemporary views like those of Kenneth Waltz and 
Edward Hallett Carr. In short, we may summarize such evolution as follows: 
(i) According to Thucydides, fear associated with the shift in the balance of power is the 
underlying cause of war. Thucydides is unquestionably the ancestor of the realist 
scholars.
62
 But he perceived power as a double-edged sword because the misuse of power 
would ruin the party holding it.
63
 
(ii) Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) concentrated his work on Realpolitik, focusing on 
what the world is rather than on what it ought to be and concluding thus that rulers should 
behave with morality toward the external environment as long as the national security of 
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their own state is not jeopardized or threatened, in which case any decision or measure 
taken, no matter how immoral it is toward foreign communities, is justified for the 
fulfillment of their responsibilities in terms of national security or interest.
64
 
(iii) Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) emphasized on both anarchy and human nature; as 
explained by Jack Donnelly, he focused on Great Powers (also referred to as “Hobbesian 
equals”) without giving much consideration for weaker states; this is known as classical 
realism.
65
 His famous book “Leviathan” calls for the establishment of an authority with a 
higher level than that of the state to end up the anarchy in the state of nature. Hobbes‟ 
philosophy was also called human realism because of his stressing on statesmen 
diffidence and their search for glory.
66
 In Hobbes‟ own words: 
“There must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance 
of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they 
expect by the breach of their covenants. 
... ... 
In all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their 
independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of 
gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; 
that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and 
continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war”.67 
 
(iv) Hugo Grotius (a Dutch scholar, 1583-1645) is very interesting for our case study as 
in addition to his predecessors, he called for the establishment of international laws, 
elaborated inter-alia, through treaties among states. Hence the sanctity of treaties, 
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expressed in the Latin words : Pacta sunt servanda. Such call owed Grotius the claim by 
pluralists to be one of their own.
68
 
(v) Edward Hallett Carr has suggested that politics is made of 2 elements, “inextricably 
intertwined” as put forward by Viotti and Kauppi: utopia (idealism, values) and reality 
(realism, power). For Carr there is a kind of balance between idealism and realism; his 
work transcends narrow classification in that he has also been influential, as has Grotius, 
on the thinking of pluralists. His book “The Twenty Years‟ Crisis, 1919-1939” was a 
synthesis of the thinking of his most important predecessors, focusing on the underlying 
roots of war rather than on its immediate causes. Consistently with Thucydides, he 
asserted that fear has a major role in triggering conflicts. He also quoted Machiavelli and 
Hobbes on the fact that the exercise of power begets more appetite for more power.
69
 
Carr owes also a lot to Grotius as – in Viotti and Kauppi‟s own words – he expanded on 
“morality in international relations, the foundation of law, the sanctity of treaties, the 
judicial settlement of international disputes, peaceful change, and the prospect for a new 
international order”.70 This is indeed interesting as well for our study. 
(vi) Kenneth Waltz‟s distinctive contribution was his expansion on what is known as the 
balance of power whereby, instead of concentrating like Hobbes on human nature and 
strong states, a larger account is reserved for weaker states as units in a globally 
balancing system. The most powerful units set the scene of action for others and for 
themselves as well. These major powers are referred to as poles or cores; and depending 
on the circumstances of the moment, the international system may either be characterized 
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as unipolar, bipolar or even multipolar, as we saw above. In opposition to Hobbes‟ 
classical realism Waltz‟s concept won the label of neorealism or structural realism, 
whereby poles are concerned with power building and their followers (bandwagons) are 
concerned with survival. Another way of illustrating the concept is to picture neorealism 
as a two-dimensional structure. If Hobbes‟ classical realism is schematized as the 
anarchical horizontal relationship among equal powers (Hobbesian equals), structural 
realism could be schematized as encompassing both (a) the anarchical relationship among 
powers of more or less equal capabilities and (b) the hierarchical vertical relationship 
among unequal powers, which is a relationship of functional nature between a core and 
its bandwagons. 
71
 In comparison to the works of other realist scholars like Hobbes, 
Grotius and Carr, Waltz‟s neorealist image of the inevitability of a power balance 
structure among states is the reverse of the medal not only for the lack of a regulatory 
authority superseding states but also, as he infers it, for the necessity of giving further 
such authority, once established, the power and means to execute its decisions; in other 
words, to avail the international system with (i) a frame of international rules and 
regulations, (ii) a super ordinate authority, and (iii) an enforcement body.
72
 And this is 
one more interesting element for our present work. 
(vii) Morgenthau‟s (and Thompson‟s) perception of the basic nature of human beings – 
whereby they endeavor to maximize their power – and the resulting power pursuit 
propensity of states has complemented Hobbes‟ classical perspective.73 
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But specifically as theorists of repute in the field of international relations, Morgenthau‟s 
and Thompson‟s extensive coverage of international law is by far the most interesting 
part of their work for our case study. They say that “where there is neither community of 
interest nor balance of power, there is no international law”.74 Quoting L. Oppenheim, a 
reference teacher of international law, they proceed : “L. Oppenheim calls the balance of 
power «an indispensable condition of the very existence of International Law». He states: 
«Six morals ... can be said to be deduced from the history of the development of 
the Law of Nations: 
1) The first and principal moral is that a Law of Nations can exist only if 
there be an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the members of the Family 
of Nations. If the Powers cannot keep one another in check, no rules of law will 
have any force, since an overpowerful State will naturally try to act according to 
discretion and disobey the law.»”75  
 
Thus, according to Morgenthau (and Thompson) and Oppenheim, there should be a 
balance of power in the state system for the prevalence of international law. For a 
moment, the reader may be confused with the impression of depicting a contradiction 
with Waltz‟s position, as this latter only made inference about the need for a balance of 
power to establish international law (without being much explicit on it) but was 
conversely stressing on the reverse reasoning; i.e., that the balance of power was a 
necessary equilibrium in the absence of worldwide regulation. But the confusion is 
dissipated by a closer look at Waltz‟s assertion that in the absence of a regulatory 
authority and an enforcement body, the system should be close to perfection in order to 
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maintain justice; and that force is therefore definitely needed for the establishment of 
provisions and means to enforce decisions.
 76
 
Thus by stating that force is needed to complete the process of establishment of 
international rules through the adding up of enforcement provisions, Waltz recognizes – 
directly or indirectly, one may argue – a role for the balance of power in this regard. 
Morgenthau and Thompson proceed in their quotation of Oppenheim: 
«As there is not and never can be a central political authority above the 
Sovereign States that could enforce the rules of the Law of Nations, a balance of 
power must prevent any member of the Family of Nations from becoming 
omnipotent.»
77
 
 
Such statement compares to Waltz‟s assertion that in the absence of international 
regulation, of super ordinate authority and of an enforcement body, the balance of power 
remains unavoidable in any matter or form of competition. 
78
 
Thus for Waltz, if there were those instruments and structures like international 
regulation, central authority and enforcement apparatus, the balance of power would not 
be exclusively the outcome of the power ratios among states in terms of military 
capabilities, but would also result from the rights and obligations of those states 
stemming from both the theory and the applicability of the said rules. And by the same 
logic, Morgenthau and Thompson say that since those instruments and structures are 
inexistent, a balance of power based on the military concept of force – as opposed to law 
and rights – is unavoidable. 
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In other words, the balance of power in the state system is indispensable for enabling 
nations to convene on a set of rules called “international law”, otherwise, an omnipotent 
party will impose its own rules without care for any understanding with its peers in this 
respect. But conversely, once established, this set of rules cannot produce autonomously 
its intended effects and nullify the need for a balance of power. Whether or not there 
exists an international law, the state system cannot rest in equilibrium without a balance 
of power, as there is no super-ordinate law enforcing authority capable of processing the 
execution of decisions with absolutely no risk of contest or even challenge by any 
significant power of the world.  
Regarded as such, it becomes clear that for contemporary realists, one of the most 
important keys to the mystery is the inexistence of a central authority, willfully vested by 
the actors of international relations with the power to enforce the rule of law 
indiscriminately on individual states in the international realm. 
2.2.2 Pluralism 
Pluralism is opposed to the realist vision of the centrality of the state and its qualification 
as unitary actor in world politics. The pluralistic view of international relations 
apportions much more consideration to the role of non-state actors like individuals, 
bureaucracies, institutions, groups of common interest, multinational corporations and 
transnational organizations, etc..., given consideration to how much the choices of such 
parties affect the course of world politics. Consequently, competition, coalition building, 
and compromise between those non-state actors will take place and lead to the forging of 
a decision accordingly but ultimately engaging the state itself.
 79 
Consistently with the 
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above assumptions, pluralists disagree with realists on the rationality of the state; 
precisely because of those competing interests, alongside with misperceptions and 
pressure resulting from periods of crises. Furthermore, another outcome of the above 
concept is that – without neglecting security imperatives – the pluralists heavily theorize 
on the fact that interdependence among states and among societies is increasing; and as 
such, they spare more weight to the positive aspects of exchanges related to trade, finance, 
transportation, communication and technology, as well as social, ecological and 
environmental issues having to do with such growth of interdependence.  The importance 
of socioeconomic matters in the pluralist approach, as compared to military concerns, 
does not favor such classification like high politics factors and low politics factors which 
is so “cherished” by realists. Pluralism thus contends with realism on an exclusively 
military conception of power.
80
 
In due consideration for the pluralists‟ disaggregation of the state whereby they attribute 
a substantial role to non-state actors, it is commonly observed that their ideology derives 
essentially from liberalism, which in turn is a major development of idealism.
81
 
Idealists believe in the possibility of controlling human factors like selfishness, diffidence 
and the search for glory, to promote instead morality in politics and build national and 
international norms of behavior which open the way for peace, prosperity, cooperation 
and justice.
82
 The idealist suggestion that a more peaceful world order could be created 
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by making foreign policy elites accountable to public opinion and by democratizing 
international relations is a parent concept to neo-liberals‟ democratic peace.83 Indeed, in 
international relations, liberalism covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from 
Wilsonian idealism to the contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic peace 
thesis.
84
 Liberalism is thus indebted to idealism for the assumption that a political system 
could be based on morality and norms of behavior; but it complemented such assumption 
by determining that humans had the potential for it through their natural goodness and 
through their individual autonomy enabling them to opt for a moral conduct.
85
 The 
pluralist promotion of states‟ interdependence and their assertion that institutions and 
transnational corporations – like the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations 
– are important actors alongside with the state is thus a fundamental resultant of the 
liberal thought.
86
 As a matter of fact, such thought has influenced the pluralist image of 
international politics in even more aspects, in that (i) leaders learn from past historical 
mistakes and disasters, a learning which largely derives from the guidance provided to 
state officials by public opinion, and (ii) concurrently with such decision makers‟ 
accountability to their electoral popular base within the state itself, international law is 
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important to manage interstate relations.
 87
 This latter observation is obviously of utmost 
importance for our study.  
Liberalism as an ideology was preponderant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
particularly in Western countries. However, the industrial revolution eventually altered 
the liberal doctrine which, by then, still remained attached to the input of individuals and 
organizations but apportioned a larger role for the state in order to reduce the detrimental 
effects of uncontrolled economic competition.
88
 Regarded as such, the state would 
become simply one actor among others, and just as there could be a harmony of interests 
among individuals and organizations within a given state, harmony of interests among 
states was possible as well.
89
 This introduction of other actors alongside with the state 
foreruns much of the pluralist thought on the decision-making and on transnationalism, 
which is a technical word assigned by theorists to designate inter-societal ties involving 
much more than a strictly state-to-state approach of international relations. 
It should however be noted that the realist thought regained preponderance by the end of 
WWII, as the Cold War era jeopardized almost all the work of contemporary idealist 
scholars to determine ways of avoiding conflicts after WWI, which most of them 
faithfully wanted to be the “war to end all wars”.90 But such regain of preponderance did 
not sweep out the legacy of liberalism which appears today in terms of (i) economic 
interdependence, (ii) the reliance on democracy, public opinion, international 
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organizations and international law (however non-absolute and imperfect) to alleviate 
international confrontations and peacefully settle disputes among states. 
91
 
Consistently with our above discussion, the pluralists contend that understanding the 
nature of relations among states requires an analysis of both the decision making process 
at different levels within the state itself on one side, and transnationalism on the other 
side. 
In short, an analysis of the decision making process has shown that an individual‟s beliefs 
and perceptions differ from others‟ beliefs and perceptions inasmuch as his responses to 
particular events are divergent from those other individuals‟ reactions, given due 
consideration to the environment where such former individual lives in terms of 
bureaucracy and organizational routines, as well as to his different life experiences, his 
expectations, his predispositions, his biases, his emotional states, his interpretation of 
historical events, the uncertainty associated with circumstances of the moment, the risk 
for misperception under stressful situations, etc... . Graham Allison, Max Weber, Robert 
Keohane, Joseph Nye, Richard Snyder, Alexander George, Ole Holsti, Robert Jervis and 
Irving Janis are all pluralists of repute, and the consolidated balance of their works 
undermines the rationality of the decision making process.
92
 
Transnationalism has been defined by James Rosenau as “the processes whereby 
international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations 
among private individuals, groups, and societies that can and do have important 
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consequences for the course of events.” 93  Consistently with our above discussion 
therefore, the pluralist image of transnationalism is an extension of politics beyond state 
borders characterized not only by interdependence – which has a positive pluralist 
connotation and which raises a negative realist concern in terms of vulnerability – but 
also modernization, integration and the reduction of nationalism.
94
  
Modernization has been defined by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi as “the social, 
political, and economic prerequisites for, and consequences of, industrialization and 
technological development”; it has changed the nature of international relations in such a 
way that national autonomy became tributary of economic activities spilling over borders, 
whose porosity increases as ideas, capital, people, technology, goods and services move 
from one area to another.
95
 
There is hence an obvious degree of interrelation between all these aspects of the pluralist 
image, as anyone can easily observe. For example, one of the best known theorists of 
regional integration, Ernst Haas defined integration as a process “whereby political 
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.”96 This definition undoubtedly 
offers one more pluralist insight into international law. It further suggests that a reduction 
of extreme nationalism goes along with integration and leaves a wider open door for the 
establishment of international peace.  In fact, Haas‟ theory of regional integration was a 
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precursor element of the general theory of interdependence, which is fundamental in the 
pluralist philosophy.
97
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 Ibid, p. 214. As reported by the authors, “Haas concluded that his earlier « theory of regional 
integration ought to be subordinated to a general theory of interdependence ».” 
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2.3 The real world and International Law – The relationship between International 
Relations and International Law 
 
Our discussion above has enabled us to find positive pluralist predispositions for 
international law and we even established that some of its fundaments have in reality 
originated in realism, however with differing philosophies. 
In the pluralist advocacy indeed, interdependence and transnationalism are of essence in 
the promotion of international law by the very fact that they result from an increasing 
commonality of interests closely related to socioeconomic developments, like 
globalization and transnational corporations; also of essence are values like morality and 
norms of behavior that are associated with the idealist heritage of pluralism as we saw 
earlier. This evidently creates a need for more and more regulations in the handling and 
managing of the consequent inter-societal activities. 
Whereas the concern about sovereignty in the pluralist school is moderated by a positive 
understanding of interdependence which is growing commensurately with worldwide 
development, the realist perspective of interdependence is limited to a kind of red line 
which self-justifies the recourse to any available mean (of course beyond international 
justice) to squarely prevent foreign international actors from trespassing the private 
hunting grounds of the state.  
Thus, far from being looked upon positively by realists, interdependence constitutes in 
their tradition a dangerous threat to the sovereignty of the state as a unitary and rational 
actor, which consequently induces a permanent power race among major actors of the 
international system to reduce the risk of being increasingly tributary of each others‟ 
foreign policies, and thus impose their own options rather than sustain those of rivals. 
This evidence is comparable to an endless power pursuit spiral and has a sizable share of 
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responsibility for the perenniality of the centuries old anarchical nature of the 
international system which is still largely mortgaged by the realist orthodoxy, as we saw 
earlier. 
Paradoxically however, with heavy weights like Thomas Hobbes and Hugo Grotius in the 
seventeenth century and contemporary others like Edward Carr, Kenneth Waltz and Hans 
Morgenthau, one may not overlook those important fundaments of international law 
rooted in realism despite its diametrical opposition to pluralism on this latter‟s view of 
interdependence as a promotive factor of international law. 
Today‟s concert of nations is therefore indebted on one hand to realism for some old 
principles and ideas like : 
(i) the need for some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of 
their covenants, in Hobbes‟ own words as we saw above (Viotti. & Kauppi. Op-
cit. pp. 60-61), 
(ii) the sanctity of treaties (Grotius), 
(iii) the foundation of law and the judicial settlement of international disputes (Carr), 
and 
(iv) the need for a frame of international rules and regulations, as well as for a super 
ordinate authority and for an enforcement body (Waltz and Morgenthau). 
On the other hand,  in connection with later developments related to industry, technology, 
communications, trade, banking, finance, etc..., contemporary generations are becoming 
indebted to the pluralist approach of the need for updating appropriately the standards of 
conduct and of international exchanges involving state and non-state actors (emphasis 
added), either among themselves or among each others, in an effort to safeguard the 
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viability of the modernizing world system; and the effect of globalization is increasing 
the trend in this direction. 
So there are past and present factors favoring the establishment of international law, as 
well as prospects. 
But if realists have an appreciable share in the foundation of international law, they 
nevertheless are constrained by their understanding of sovereignty, by their focus on the 
balance of power and by their conception of power in terms of high politics factors 
(military strength) as opposed to low politics factors (socioeconomic issues). Accordingly, 
one may reasonably suggest that, if the pluralist approach of international relations is 
futuristic in its pushing forward the establishment of international law, this latter‟s 
progress is unfortunately retarded by the realists‟ gambling on giving priority to power 
build up and one-sided interests‟ criteria over international justice. 
The above discussion raises almost inevitably the following questions: 
(i) How much the realists‟ preference for power build-up and one-sided interests 
criteria in international relations, to the detriment of basic principles and ideas 
pioneered by some of their own scholars, will retard the progress of 
international law? 
(ii) How fast will the establishment of international law move forward as a result 
of the pluralists profession regarding international relations? 
(iii) Where do we stand now? 
The answers are not likely to be straightforward because, due to the complexity of the 
states‟ system, it would rather be experimental than purely theoretical. Thus every single 
event having an international dimension is an example enriching our knowledge by 
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enabling us to conclude either way, among others of course, the circumstances and the 
fate of Kosovo‟s unilateral declaration of independence. 
In the next chapters, our analysis of the case in conjunction with regional and 
international balances enables us to assert that a lot of progress has been made in the 
implementation of international law, but there is still a long way to go in order to reach 
acceptable results, as the current status of international relations is still heavily marked by 
realism. 
We will proceed first by observing the Euro-Balkan geopolitical map after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union; we will next analyze the foreign policy change of the Obama 
Administration as compared to that of the Bush Administration; and thereafter, we will 
evaluate the impact of the circumstances so observed over the issue of Kosovo to draw 
our conclusion on how much the answers to the abovementioned questions are contingent 
on the tug-of-war between realism and pluralism. 
Our discussion in the very next chapter will depict Serbia‟s isolation in being an area 
totally surrounded now by members of the European Union; and it will clarify the 
following: 
(i) The dilemma for Serbia to content itself of integrating the Union being 
amputated from Kosovo. 
(ii) In connection with item (i) above, Serbia‟s artifice of calling upon the ICJ as an 
attempt to cut a political Gordian knot in which the giant actors of the world are 
involved.
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(iii) The evident limitations of Kosovo‟s prospective membership to the Union if it 
fails to gather a global Eastern recognition consolidating its claim for 
independence. 
99
 
The subsequent chapter will highlight events of international dimension signaling that: 
(i) It would be too late for Kosovo, in its fight for independence, to still bet on the 
Eastern paralysis that followed the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union. 
(ii) The Western expansion policy Eastward had to be revised. 
Finally, our discussion in the said two chapters will enable us to conclude on the 
circumstances and fate of Kosovo‟s unilateral declaration of independence as an 
experimental case confirming or invalidating the suggested interplay between politics and 
international law and, by implication, identifying the bridges linking them and the divides 
separating them. 
Let us therefore proceed now with our study by first discussing Euro-Balkan issues. 
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Chapter 3 
The Present Regional Context 
Euro-Balkan issues 
Before engaging in the heart of the analysis, it does help taking an overview of the 
current geopolitical layout identifying the main actors presently dealing with Kosovo‟s 
issue, their objectives and the stake involved in connection with any bargain relevant to 
the debated question. If we take a panoramic view of the forces in motion around the 
world for about two or three years behind, we would identify that the units of analysis 
relevant with the issue of Kosovo‟s independence are : (i) Kosovo, (ii) Serbia, (iii) the 
United States, (iv) Russia, (v) the European Union, (vi) Albania, (vii) Montenegro and 
(viii) The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia). If we further 
contemplate the overview from a structural realist perspective, like that of Kenneth Waltz, 
we would rapidly observe that the core units are the United States, Russia and the 
European Union balancing horizontally among each other; while the vertical bandwagons 
are Kosovo and Serbia at a first level, followed by Montenegro and Albania at a second 
level, and by Macedonia at a third level. Among the bandwagons Serbia has traditionally 
exercised a regional hegemony over its Yugoslav neighbors and throughout the last two 
decades it has helplessly endeavored to patch up under its tutelage every piece of the 
remains of the former Balkan puzzle, left by the death of Tito, one more decade behind, 
and which he had laboriously safeguarded and maintained globally under Serbian 
primogeniture by centralizing the decision making apparatus and mechanism of the 2
nd
 
Yugoslavia in Belgrade, as it was before WWII under the monarchical Orthodox regime 
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of the 1
st
 Yugoslavia.
100
 Serbia lost the pieces not only due to its poor handling of the 
challenges that had emerged with Tito‟s departure, but also due to the foreign policies of 
the Western core actors and the limitation of Russia‟s capacities after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Among the lower level bandwagons, the most visible actors seem to be 
Montenegro and Albania as we will see further in this section. In terms of importance 
however, we may consider the cores and the first level bandwagons as “major” actors due 
to the immediate concern of Serbia and Kosovo with the issue as compared with that of 
Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia. 
Now back to the foreign policies of the core actors, in February 2008 under the Bush 
Administration, there was indeed a US dynamics to expand the Western concept of 
democracy as much as possible around the world and among others, in particular, in old 
areas of influence of the former Soviet Union and in the Middle East. This policy was 
globally supported by the European Union with regard to the Balkans and to the Baltic 
States – a number of which have even integrated into the European Union after the 
collapse of the Soviet Empire – and also to a certain extent with regard to the Caucasus, 
but not with regard to Iraq upon which there were some notorious divergences from the 
side of Europe. 
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 Notes : 
(i). Scholars and historians refer to the monarchical interwar period (WWI-WWII) as the 1st 
Yugoslavia and to the communist federation‟s epoch from the end of WWII to the 1992‟s 
secessions (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) as the 2
nd
 Yugoslavia. 
(ii). See Annex 5 to this thesis about Tito‟s ruling policy, his succession and the impact of his legacy 
on Kosovo. 
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But most importantly, what was imaged as an effort to expand democracy by one side 
was perceived from the other side as nothing else than a unipolar guidance of the world; 
and thus it was fiercely resisted by Putin‟s Russia.101    
And in the heart of the resulting arm-wrestle among giants, there is a tiny Kosovo (i) 
having an ancestral contention over sovereignty with its “parent” land Serbia, (ii) 
remaining as a leftover after the recent settlement which divided Yugoslavia into its 
historical constituents, and (iii) which struggles to validate its independence by the whole 
international community and to safeguard the support of the most influent Western actors  
which it had won – without much difficulty, one has to admit – right upon its unilateral 
declaration of independence; a present that, most evidently, Russia is not ready to freely 
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 Abi Ramia, J. (2008, August 29). L‟Hebdo Magazine, p.40: 
• “C‟est le10 février 2007, devant une quarantaine de ministres de la Défense et des Affaires étrangères 
participant à la 43
ème
 conférence de Munich sur la sécurité, que l‟ancien président et désormais 
Premier ministre russe, Vladimir Poutine a proclamé le retour de la Russie sur le devant de la scène 
internationale… ˮ 
Translation 
“It was on the 10th of February 2007, at the 43rd Conference of Munich on Security, which was 
attended by about forty ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, that former president and now Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin announced the return of Russia on the front of the international scene. …ˮ 
• Now quoting directly President Putin: 
“Le monde unipolaire n’a rien à voir avec la démocratie, qui veut que la majorité prenne aussi en 
compte l‟opinion de la minorité. Il y a des gens qui n‟arrêtent pas de nous donner des leçons de 
démocratie qu‟ils ne suivent pas eux-mêmes. Plus personne ne se sent en sécurité car plus personne 
ne peut se prévaloir des règles du droit international. Les Etats-Unis sortent de leurs frontières 
nationales dans tous les domaines et cela est très dangereuxˮ. 
Translation: 
“The unipolar world has nothing to do with democracy, which advocates that the majority takes into 
consideration the opinion of the minority. There are people who do not stop giving us lessons of 
democracy by which they do not abide themselves. Nobody feels any longer in security because 
nobody can boast any longer about the rules of international law. The United States move beyond 
their national borders in all fields, and this is very dangerous.” 
• “En quelques secondes, Poutine a rompu l‟ordre des relations internationales qui prévalait depuis la 
chute de l‟Union Soviétique, en 1991, et plus particulièrement depuis le 11 septembre 2001… … dans 
le pays où le rideau de fer est tombé, la superpuissance russe nargue et avertit l’hyper puissance 
américaine.” 
Translation : 
“In a few seconds, Putin broke the order of international relations which was prevailing since the fall 
of the Soviet Union, in 1991, and more particularly since the 11
th
 of September 2001… .... in the 
country where the iron curtain has fallen, the Russian superpower scorns and warns the American 
hyper-power.” 
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concede to the West.
102
 In this context, Russia is making full use of its “parental” 
relationship with Serbia to resist what it sees as a Western policy of expansion to its 
detriment. As a matter of fact, one should pertinently note here that there is no more dry 
land linking Russia with its “adoptive daughter” Serbia as all the surrounding states 
(Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria), which were 
former “clients” of the Soviet Union have fled to take refuge under the umbrella of the 
European Union as soon as they were turned loose when their Soviet “patron‟s” structure 
fell apart. As a consequence, there is a land belt separating Russia from Serbia, for which, 
until June 2006, Montenegro was an important outlet to the Mediterranean Sea through 
the Ionian Sea.
103
 Thus, by June 2006, on top of the geographical North/East land barrier, 
as Montenegro split with Serbia, there remained for Russia not even a sea access to 
Serbia. As a result, Russia had lost by then not only its global patronage over the Balkans 
but also all direct accesses to the homeland of its only trump card left in the region.
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 It should importantly be made clear here that in the 8 to 9 year time span under UN administration (June 
1999 until February 2008), the province of Kosovo rapidly developed the necessary infrastructure for any 
independent entity (institutions, Government, Parliament, Justice, Police, etc…, etc…) and Serbia had no 
longer exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. Martti Ahtisaari, the special envoy of the Secretary-
General of the UN, has referred to this matter in his report of the 26
th
 of March 2007 on Kosovo‟s future 
status : 
“For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The 
establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and 
its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a 
situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one 
cannot deny; it is irreversible. …… 
…… Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have 
increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic 
political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more 
ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs.” 
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 See United Nations Member States in http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml :  
On the 3
rd
 of June 2006, as a result of a referendum held on the 21
st
 of May 2006, Montenegro declared 
itself independent from Serbia. Thereafter, on the 28
th
 of June 2006, Montenegro was admitted as a member 
of the United Nations. 
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Russia‟s support to Serbia could therefore just be nothing less than indefectible and 
unconditional in opposing Kosovo‟s independence. 
As Montenegro broke away from Serbia, on top of the fact that Serbia was getting 
encircled, the resolve for the march toward Kosovo‟s independence increased and moved 
closer to reality, however pacific was the separation process between Serbia and 
Montenegro.
105
 Indeed, around two years later, to the great displeasure of Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia had recognized the unilaterally declared independence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
It should importantly for our analysis be remembered that, until 2006, Montenegro was a member State of 
the Yugoslav Federation and has never been a province of any federal State, unlike Kosovo which was and 
still is a province of the State of Serbia. 
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 References: 
• See Annex 5 to this thesis: cycles of violence had accompanied the chain of independencies of the 
early 1990s. With the involvement of the international community (among other examples, NATO‟s 
1999 air strikes against Serbian forces), the cycles of violence all around the place had reduced, but 
evidently not the momentum created by the newly independent States (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Macedonia) which kept the dynamics for the remaining separatists (Montenegro) and ultranationalists 
(Kosovo) to claim for independence as well; and the result materialized some years later, in 2006 for 
Montenegro and in 2008 for Kosovo. 
 
• AFP. (2006, May 22). Un nouveau test pour les Européens [A new test for the Europeans]. Le Figaro:  
“Les spécialistes soulignent toutefois que la mort de l’union serbo-monténégrine relance la question 
beaucoup plus conflictuelle du Kosovo, province de Serbie dont la majorité albanaise lorgne vers 
l’indépendance.ˮ 
Translation : 
“Specialists however underline that the death of the Serbo-Montenegrin union raises again the 
question much more antagonistic of Kosovo, a province of Serbia whose Albanian majority is eying 
up toward independence.ˮ 
 
• Lasserre, I. (2007, October 15). L‟indépendance du Monténégro pourrait avoir un effet stabilisateur sur 
les Balkans [The independence of Montenegro could have a stabilizing effect over the Balkans]. Le 
Figaro: 
“Cette nouvelle rupture dans l‟espace ex-yougoslave possède cependant par rapport aux autres un 
caractère vertueux. Alors que la Croatie et la Bosnie ont arraché leur liberté par les armes, au prix 
de nombreux morts, celle du Monténégro a été obtenue pacifiquement. Sans un coup de feu. Et avec 
un encadrement international. C‟est une première dans les Balkans. Selon le think-tank «Iternational 
Crisis Group», l’indépendance du Monténégro pourrait même avoir un «effet stabilisateur» sur la 
région.ˮ 
Translation : 
“This new splitting in the ex-Yugoslav space, in comparison with other splits, has got however a 
virtuous character. While Croatia and Bosnia dragged out their freedom by the force of weapons, at 
the cost of numerous deaths, that of Montenegro was peacefully obtained, without a single shot, and 
was covered by an international frame. It‟s a Balkan première. According to the think-tank 
«International Crisis Group», the independence of Montenegro could even have a «stabilizing 
effect» over the region.ˮ 
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Kosovo.
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 Notwithstanding the relatively low profile imposed on Serbia in this regard 
by the current balance and circumstances, this latter was especially upset from 
Montenegro‟s position which it saw as a second betrayal after its June 2006 defection; a 
betrayal which was further consolidated by the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Kosovo.
107
 But was it relevant for the Orthodox little Montenegro, after having split with 
its Orthodox “big sister” Serbia, to reject the right for another entity ethnically different, 
like the Muslim Kosovo, to do the same?
108
 One should also look here at the European 
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 Lasserre, I. (the 10
th
 of October 2008). Op-cit. Reconnaissance du Kosovo : le pouvoir serbe ne décolère 
pas [Recognition of Kosovo : the Serbian government is still in a temper]. Le Figaro:  
―La réaction de Belgrade à la reconnaissance de l’indépendance du Kosovo par le Monténégro et la 
Macédoine jeudi [09 octobre 2008] a été presque instantanée. 
L’ambassadeur serbe à Podgorica a été rappelé et son homologue macédonien en Serbie, expulsé. Le 
pouvoir a déploré les «très mauvaises» décisions de ces deux anciennes républiques yougoslaves, qui 
s’apparentent à «un coup de poignard dans le dos». 
… … 
Davantage qu’envers la Macédoine, qui a quitté la fédération yougoslave au début des années 1990, la 
colère de Belgrade est dirigée contre le Monténégro, qui fût intimement lié à la Serbie jusqu‟au 
référendum d‟indépendance en 2006. A l‟époque, le départ du Monténégro, minutieusement préparé par 
Podgorica, s‟était pourtant passé sans violence. Mais de nombreux réseaux, notamment dans l’entourage 
de l’ancien premier ministre nationaliste serbe Vojislav Kostunica, n’ont jamais digéré cette 
indépendance, considérée comme une  «trahison».ˮ 
Translation : 
―Belgrade’s reaction to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Montenegro and Macedonia 
Thursday [09
th
 of October 2008] has been almost instantaneous. 
The Serbian Ambassador in Podgorica has been recalled and his Macedonian counterpart in Serbia, 
expelled. The central government has deplored the «very bad» decisions of those two former republics of 
Yugoslavia, which are like «stabs in the back». 
… …  
The rage of Belgrade is more directed toward Montenegro than Macedonia, as the former had intimate 
ties with Serbia until the 2006 independence referendum, while the latter had left the federation in the early 
1990s.  Back then, Montenegro‟s split, meticulously prepared by Podgorica, had however occurred without 
violence. But numerous networks, particularly in the entourage of the Serbian nationalist former Prime 
Minister Vojislav Kostunica, have never digested this independence, considered as a «betrayal». ˮ 
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 AFP. (2010, January 15). Kosovo/Monténégro: la Serbie proteste [Kosovo/Montenegro: Serbia protests]. 
Le Figaro: 
“La Serbie a décidé de rappeler son ambassadeur à Podgorica, pour protester contre l‟établissement de 
relations diplomatiques entre le Monténégro et le Kosovo”. 
Translation : 
“Serbia has decided to recall its ambassador at podgorica,, to protest against the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Montenegro and Kosovo”. 
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 Lasserre I. (2007, October 15). Op-cit. L‟indépendance du Monténégro pourrait avoir un effet 
stabilisateur sur les Balkans [The independence of Montenegro could have a stabilizing effect over the 
Balkans]. Le Figaro : 
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perspective for Montenegro which wanted (and still wants) to adhere to the Union as its 
growth and dynamics offer more advantages than a paralyzed fragmented East; and this is 
one of the main reasons for rushing ahead its Westward defection from Serbia which was 
precisely not in favor with the European Union.
109
 Back then however, there were 
apprehensions in Europe about a domino effect which would hit inevitably Kosovo (and 
even the Caucasus) like that which swept out the federation in the early 1990s, as very 
                                                                                                                                                 
“… … les questions qui se posent aujourd‟hui. Celles qui concernent la viabilité du Monténégro, … … . Et 
celles relatives aux conséquences régionales que ne manquera pas de provoquer l’indépendance du 
Monténégro. 
D‟abord sur le Kosovo, … … .Mais avant l’indépendance du Monténégro, il était déjà difficile de 
concevoir un rétablissement de la souveraineté de Belgrade sur le Kosovo après les exactions commises 
par les forces serbes sur les Albanais. Comment imaginer aujourd’hui qu’on puisse refuser aux uns ce 
que l’on vient d’accorder aux autres ?ˮ 
Translation : 
“… … the questions which are being asked today. Those about the viability of Montenegro, … … . And 
those relative to the regional consequences which will unavoidably result from the independence of 
Montenegro. 
First regarding Kosovo, … … . But before Montenegro’s independence, it was already difficult to 
conceive a reestablishment of Belgrade’s sovereignty over Kosovo after the acts of violence committed by 
the Serbian forces on the Albanians. How could it be imagined today that what was just granted to some 
people is denied to others?” 
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 References 
• Lasserre, I. (2008, October 10). Op-cit. Reconnaissance du Kosovo : le pouvoir serbe ne décolère pas 
[Recognition of Kosovo : the Serbian government is still in a temper]. Le Figaro:  
“… … Voisins directs de la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Macédoine avaient volontairement tardé à le 
faire, afin de ne pas irriter le gouvernement serbe. Mais entre pressions exercées par Belgrade et 
celles de leurs minorités albanaises, Podgorica et Skopje ont choisi le pragmatisme politique. «A 
Monténégro et en Macédoine, on sait qu‟il n‟y a pas d‟alternative à l‟indépendance du Kosovo, que la 
province a été perdue par Slobodan Miloševic en 1999, et qu’il serait stupide d’aller contre la 
politique de l’Union européenne sur le sujet», explique un spécialiste. D’autant que Podgorica 
ambitionne de se rapprocher rapidement de l’UE.ˮ 
Translation : 
“…… As direct neighbors to Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia had willfully been late to do it 
[recognize Kosovo‟s independence] in order to avoid irritating the Serbian Government. But between 
the pressures exerted by Belgrade and those exerted by their Albanian minorities, Podgorica and 
Skopje have chosen political pragmatism. «In Montenegro and in Macedonia, it is known that there is 
no alternative to Kosovo‟s independence, that the province has been lost by Slobodan Miloševic in 
1999, and that it would be stupid to oppose the policy of the European Union on this subject», a 
specialist explains. All the more that Podgorica’s ambition is to get rapidly closer to the EU.ˮ 
 
• See also footnote below « Jaulmes, A. (2006, May 20). Le Monténégro vote sur son indépendance 
[Montenegro votes on its independence], Le Figaro » about the European sanctions on Serbia. 
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well explained by Pierre Rousselin, of the French daily Le Figaro.
110
 So the Europeans 
requested a casting majority of over 55% to recognize Montenegro‟s independence; a 
way to either adjourn the issue or to make sure that it has to be.
111
 When this was 
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 Rousselin, P. (2006, May 23). Monténégro : attention à l‟effet domino [Montenegro : one should be 
careful about the domino effect]. Le Figaro: 
“Dernière incarnation de la défunte Yougoslavie, La Fédération de Serbie-et-Monténégro n‟est, en fait, 
qu‟une construction fictive dont la raison d‟être a maintenant disparu. Cette entité, qui ne dispose même 
plus d’un Parlement légitime, n’a été maintenue artificiellement en vie que parce que l’Union 
européenne voulait retarder l’émergence d’un nouvel Etat balkanique, craignant que cela ne déstabilise 
la région au moment où il faut régler la question du statut du Kosovo. 
… … 
Plus encore que les Monténégrins, les Kosovars sont les grands bénéficiaires du référendum. Maintenant 
que leurs voisins voient leur rêve d‟indépendance se réaliser, qui osera les priver d‟un même destin ? 
L‟argument a du poids. Il ne faudrait pas qu’il se développe sans limites et devienne le moteur d’un effet 
domino ayant pour effet de balkaniser encore davantage la région. Avec les Serbes de Bosnie et les 
Albanais de Macédoine, la cohabitation reste fragile et l‟unité nationale en péril. Jusque dans le Caucase, 
les tenants de l’indépendance de l’Abkhazie, de l’Ossétie du Sud ou du Nagorno-Karabakh sont tentés 
de se prévaloir des exemples monténégrin ou kosovar.ˮ 
Translation : 
“Last incarnation of the late Yugoslavia, the Federation of Serbia-and-Montenegro is, in fact, just a 
fictitious construction whose raison d‟être has now disappeared. This entity which has even no longer a 
legitimate Parliament, has been kept alive only artificially because the European Union wanted to defer 
the emergence of a new Balkan State, fearing that such measure destabilizes the region at a time where 
the question of the status of Kosovo had to be settled. 
… … 
More than Montenegrins, Kosovars are the great beneficiaries of the referendum. Now that their neighbors 
see their dream of independence getting to be realized, who will dare depriving them of the same fate ? The 
argument has weight. It should not develop without limitation and become the engine of a domino effect 
whose result would be to balkanize even more the region. With the Serbs of Bosnia and the Albanians of 
Macedonia, the cohabitation is still fragile and the national unity still in peril. Up to the Caucasus, the 
supporters of Abkhazia’s independence, or also of Southern Ossetia’s or of Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
independence are tempted to take advantage of the Montenegrin or Kosovar examples. ˮ 
 
111
 Jaulmes, A. (2006, May 20). Le Monténégro vote sur son indépendance [Montenegro votes on its 
independence). Le Figaro: 
“… … la campagne du référendum monténégrin s‟est déroulée dans un calme exemplaire. Le processus 
lui-même est conforme à l‟accord de Belgrade, qui a créé en 2002 l‟étrange Etat de Serbie-et-Monténégro 
et prévoit la possibilité d‟un référendum au bout de trois ans. L’Union européenne, qui s’était investie 
dans le maintien de cette association entre Belgrade et son petit voisin, notamment pour éviter de 
fragiliser le statut ambigu du Kosovo, s’est contentée d’exiger un seuil de 55% des suffrages en faveur 
du oui pour reconnaître le nouvel Etat. 
«Les derniers sondages donnent aux indépendantistes un score de 56,3%», dit le professeur Srdjan 
Darmanovic, qui préside le Centre pour la démocratie et les droits de l‟homme à l‟université de Podgorica. 
«Le seuil de 55% devrait accroître la légitimité du processus et faciliter notre adhésion à l’Europe, 
actuellement bloquée par les sanctions prises contre la Serbie».ˮ 
Translation : 
“… … the Montenegrin referendum campaign took place in an exemplary calm. The process itself is 
consistent with Belgrade‟s agreement which created in 2002 the strange State of Serbia-and-Montenegro 
and provides for the possibility of a referendum after 3 years. The European Union, which throwed itself 
heart and soul in maintaining this association between Belgrade and its little neighbor, specially to avoid 
55 
achieved in the polls of the 21
st
 of May 2006, Europe had an even lesser excuse left to 
deny Kosovo what it granted Montenegro; and this places Montenegro‟s position as a 
bandwagon at a higher level (2
nd
) than that of Macedonia (3
rd
), as introduced earlier and 
further explained below. Thus from this point onward, it was politically normal for 
Montenegro not to contradict the European Union and stay aligned with this latter‟s 
options if it was to become one of its members. And as there was an increasing European 
support for Kosovo‟s independence after Montenegro‟s defection from Serbia and its 
acceptance as member of the United Nations in June 2006, it was expectable that, as from 
such date, Montenegro‟s pragmatic choice would be not to adopt a different position than 
the Europeans‟ with regard to Kosovo‟s independence; hence its support for Kosovo‟s 
February 2008 declaration. 
Montenegro‟s desertion from Serbia‟s ranks is not a new phenomenon in politics and 
international relations. At the era of the Peloponnesian War for example, as the power of 
Athens was waning, it needed to reassert itself not only in facing its enemies but also in 
keeping its allies on its side.
112
 Serbia‟s case today is roughly comparable to that of 
Athens, some 2500 years ago. As evidenced from its weakening, Serbia was in a position 
to safeguard its patronage neither over opposing dependents like Kosovo, nor even over 
friendly dependents like Montenegro. And thus, Montenegro‟s play was close to that of 
the Game Theory as it rationally swapped between Serbian patronage and the perspective 
                                                                                                                                                 
weakening the ambiguous status of Kosovo, has contented itself with the fact of requesting a 55% 
threshold of the votes in favor of the YES to recognize the new State. 
«According to the last surveys the separatists would score 56.3%», says Professor Srdjan Darmanovic who 
presides the Center for Democracy and Human Rights at the University of Podgorica. «The threshold of 
55% should increase the legitimacy of the process and facilitate our adhesion to Europe, which is 
presently blocked by the sanctions against Serbia.»ˮ 
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 Lebow Richard Ned, (winter, 1984), The Paranoia of the Powerful : Thucydides on World War III, PS 
[published by American Political Science Association], Vol. 17, No.1, p.11. 
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for European membership, without much regard for any loyalty owed to Serbia with 
which it has had however a long time alliance.
113
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 References : 
 
• Library of Congress. (Data as of December 1990). Yugoslavia – Montenegrins: 
“… The Montenegrins and the Serbs shared strong political and cultural ties, including the Eastern 
Orthodox faith, the Cyrillic alphabet, the Serbo-Croatian language…, and a history of bloody struggle 
against the Ottoman Turks. Many historians maintain that the Montenegrins are Serbs. 
… 
…the Montenegrins stubbornly defended their independence against incursions by the Ottoman 
Turks…. 
… and in censuses taken during the interwar period Montenegrins were classified as Serbs. 
Montenegrins played a significant role in the defense forces of the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
…Montenegrins remained overrepresented in the Yugoslav bureaucratic and military services. In 
the early 1970s, Montenegrins made up roughly 5 percent of the population. But about 15 percent of 
the leaders of the federal administrative bodies were Montenegrins, nearly 20 percent of the 
generals in the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) were Montenegrin, and their presence in the overall 
officer corps was also disproportionately high… The Montenegrins’ postwar loyalty to the CPY 
[Communist Party of Yugoslavia] yielded plentiful development funds for their republic.” 
 
• History of Montenegro - Montenegro in Yugoslavia, 1918-1992. (Last updated August 1997). 
Montenet: 
“…the area‟s [Montenegro‟s] remoteness and difficult terrain made it an important refuge for Tito’s 
Partisan forces during the most difficult stage of their struggle [WWII], …… 
The Montenegrins‟ traditional Pan-Slavism and inherited bravery made them natural allies with the 
communist project of the reunification of Yugoslavia. Consequently, after the war many 
Montenegrins found themselves in high positions within the military, political, and economic 
administration - … … 
The communist strategy of attempting to unify Yugoslavia through a federal structure elevated 
Montenegro to the status of a republic, thus securing Montenegrin loyalty to the federation. 
Montenegro became a regular recipient of large quantities of federal aid, which enabled it to 
embark for the first time upon a process of industrialization. … … 
The breakup of the Yugoslav federation after 1989 left Montenegro in an acutely precarious position. 
The first multiparty elections in 1990 returned the reformed League of Communists to power, 
confirming Montenegrin support for the disintegrating federation. The Republic therefore joined 
Serbia efforts to preserve the federation and in 1992 it acceded to the «Third Yugoslavia», a federal 
republic comprising only it and Serbia. … … … United Nations economic sanctions against 
Yugoslavia (1992) damaged Montenegro seriously, especially by undermining its lucrative tourist 
trade. ˮ 
 
• AFP. (2006, May 22). Op-cit. Un nouveau test pour les Européens [A new test for the Europeans]. Le 
Figaro:  
“Pour Sabina Wölkner, spécialiste de l‟Europe de l‟Est à la Société allemande de politique étrangère 
(DGAP), les Monténégrins, dont la volonté d’indépendance est largement alimentée par le désir 
d’intégrer l’UE, «risquent de devoir être patients». «C’est l’intérêt des jeunes générations pour une 
perspective européenne, jugée plombée par l’union avec la Serbie, qui s’est exprimé dans ce 
vote»,….ˮ 
Translation : 
“For Sabina Wölkner , specialist of Eastern Europe at the German Society of foreign Politics (DGAP), 
Montenegrins, whose will for independence is largely nourished by the desire to integrate the EU, 
«may have to be patient». «It is the interest of young generations for a European perspective, judged 
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Conversely, one may pose the problem from the side of Kosovo; how would this latter 
accept a perpetual Serbian tutelage when two groups of similar ethnicity, like Serbians 
and Montenegrins, were allowed to become independent from each other? 
Now what about Albania and Macedonia, and why would Albania be a second level 
bandwagon and Macedonia be a third level bandwagon? Geographically, Albania, 
Montenegro and Macedonia are of course units of analysis having one common property 
in that they share borders with Kosovo. But they are units of analysis of lesser importance 
for a simple reason: they would not be able to play their role in tilting the balance either 
side if Kosovo and Serbia were at rest and if the three cores had remained idle. If all the 
international community was opposed to Kosovo‟s independence, Kosovo could not 
claim for it nor could its neighbors‟ respective positions be decisive, regardless of any 
will. In turn, among the second and third level units there are orders of interest as well, 
irrespective of Macedonia‟s and Montenegro‟s alignment with the European Union. For 
the Orthodox Macedonia (assuming it had no European aspirations), Kosovo‟s 
independence would only be interesting inasmuch as it helps justifying Macedonia‟s 
emancipation not only from historical Serbian hegemony, but also from Greek parental 
claims.
114
 Likewise for the Orthodox Montenegro (assuming it also had no European 
aspirations), a Muslim Kosovo with which it has had ancestral ethnic conflicts should not 
necessarily be amputated from its historical Serbian ally with which it has evident ethnic 
ties.
115
 But the case with Albania has more variables to account for, namely a sea outlet 
                                                                                                                                                 
as being of difficult access due to the sealed union with Serbia, which was expressed in this 
vote»,…ˮ 
 
114
 It is because of Greek‟s opposition that Macedonia could not just be named Macedonia but “The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. 
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 Library of Congress. (Data as of December 1990). Yugoslavia – Montenegro: 
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on top of ethnicity. Indeed, adding up ethnic considerations to the analysis would suggest 
that a Muslim Albania would be far more inclined than an Orthodox Macedonia and an 
Orthodox Montenegro to be actively implicated in effectively consolidating the 
independence of a Muslim Kosovo rather than remaining neutral or even just expressing 
an infertile support. The second variable which enhances Albania‟s role is the sea outlet. 
Indeed, an aerial picture of the region shows that neither Kosovo nor Macedonia has an 
outlet on the Adriatic Sea, while Albania does; and this adds up to the first variable 
(ethnicity) for Albania. Montenegro does have a common border with Kosovo and an 
outlet to the Adriatic Sea, but Montenegro is ethnically different; while Macedonia 
neither has ethnic ties with Kosovo nor does it have a sea access; hence its position as a 
third level bandwagon. As a result, this analysis of levels of interest shows that Albania is 
not only the ethnic ancestor of Kosovo but is geographically located in such a way to 
become the preferred “lung” for Kosovo. Thus we will assume for the time being, under 
the present balance and circumstances that, in terms of reliability, Albania would be a 
first choice route for Kosovo in securing a channel of supplies linking it to the Adriatic 
Sea, while Montenegro would be next choice as a route for supplies. As any analyst can 
therefore observe, if Montenegro is a 2
nd
 level bandwagon for having played a role in 
accelerating Kosovo‟s independence, Albania is a 2nd level bandwagon as well but for the 
potential it has in order to maintain and consolidate such independence from Serbia, 
however with more than that, since it has enough common background and affinities with 
                                                                                                                                                 
“In the divisive late 1980s, the political position of Montenegro remained closer to that of Serbia than 
did that of any other republic. This was because of a close ethnic connection between the Serbs and the 
Montenegrin majority of the population, and because Montenegrins were the second Slavic minority 
«persecuted» in Kosovo—giving them an anti-Albanian nationalist cause similar to that of the Serbs……. 
Montenegro was a strong supporter of Serbian constitutional amendments limiting provincial autonomy 
in 1989, and party speakers consistently criticized Slovenia’s independent stance and its position on 
Kosovo.” 
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Kosovo for closer cooperation subsequently. Would that mean that ultimately there may 
be merging projects between Albania and Kosovo? Perhaps! But apparently it is not a 
priority as compared to the integration of Kosovo in the European Union.
116
 And in such 
a case anyway, Serbia might very well cease to hold the monopoly of the opposition to 
Kosovo‟s independence. Besides, would such merging give Russia more pretexts to 
oppose Kosovo‟s independence? Most logically yes since Russia doesn‟t even recognize 
its split with Serbia! What is sure nevertheless is that it will not help easing Russia‟s stiff 
position; and in any case, it will expectedly not be endorsed by Russia before this latter 
approves Kosovo‟s unilaterally declared independence from Serbia.  
In furtherance to the above analysis, the European integration of Kosovo seems to be 
fundamental not only as an assertion of its independence but also for facilitating its 
viability as such. The Serbs for their part are conversely divided into 2 currents : (i) one 
European oriented, favoring Serbia‟s integration in the Union, and (ii) another one East 
oriented, rather reluctant to such integration at the price of being amputated from 
Kosovo.
117
 The Serbian Administration is rather aware of the benefits to integrate the 
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 Lasserre, I. (2008, February 21). Les Kosovars se reprennent à rêver de la grande Albanie [Kosovars are 
dreaming again of Great Albania]. Le Figaro: 
“«La grande Albanie fait partie des rêves de tous les Albanais. Mais on sait aussi, au Kosovo, qu‟il est trop 
tôt pour l'évoquer», résume une enseignante de la faculté de Pristina. Le sujet reste pour l‟instant tabou. Et 
comme le dit Bajram Kosumi : «Ce nouveau pays se forme avec beaucoup d‟idées et de concepts différents. 
Les choses ne sont pas simples. Elles ne peuvent pas se résoudre en une nuit. Le Kosovo doit d’abord 
avancer dans l’intégration européenne. Dans dix ans, une fois que les conflits nationaux se seront apaisés 
dans les Balkans, on pourra remettre tout à plat pour clarifier les choses s‟il le faut. Mais pas avant.»ˮ 
Translation : 
“«The Great Albania is part of all Albanians‟ dreams. But it is also known, in Kosovo, that it is too early to 
be evoked», summarizes a teacher of the faculty of Pristina. For the time being, the subject is still taboo. 
And as Bajram Kosumi says: «This new country is forming up with a lot of differing  ideas and concepts. 
Things are not simple. They cannot be resolved overnight. Kosovo must first advance in the process of 
European integration. Ten years from now, once the national conflicts in the Balkans will be appeased, it 
will be possible to put everything back down in order to examine them from all angles and  clarify the 
matters if necessary; but not before.»” 
117
 Note: The trend opposed to President Boris Tadic is unfavorable to integrating the E.U. at the price of 
loosing Kosovo. Indeed, on the 27
th
 of December 2007, the Serbian Parliament took a resolution which 
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Union, but its maneuvering margin is limited not only by the Serbian opposition but also 
– one has to admit – by the global Serbian nationalism with regard to the question of 
Kosovo, given proper consideration for how much this area is loaded with affective 
memory and history for Serbia, in particular, that part of history related to its secular 
struggle against the Ottomans.
118
 It will thus be difficult for Serbia to “swallow” the 
independence of Kosovo and stay at the same time “very excited and happy” to integrate 
the European Union being amputated of this sample region as a fundament of its history, 
                                                                                                                                                 
complicates Tadic‟s life in his effort to let Serbia join the Union. One of the main articles of the resolution 
underlines the fact that: 
“Les accords internationaux que la Serbie signe, y compris l‟accord de stabilisation et 
association avec l‟UE, doivent tenir compte du maintien de souveraineté et de l‟intégrité 
territoriale du pays”, ... ... 
Translation : 
“The international agreements that Serbia signs, including the Association and Stabilization 
Agreement with the European Union, must take into account the prevalence of the sovereignty and 
of the territorial integrity of the country”, ... ... 
For his part, President Tadic is convinced of the necessity for Serbia to join the E.U., and is thus trying to 
conciliate the diverging positions, as he stated: 
“Notre Etat fera tout pour que le Kosovo reste au sein de la Serbie et pour que la Serbie reste sur 
sa voie européenne”, ... ... 
Translation : 
“Our State will do everything for Kosovo to stay within Serbia and for Serbia to keep progressing 
on its European way”, ... ... 
See the following article: 
AFP & Reuters. (2007, December 27). La Serbie prête à renoncer à adhérer à l‟Union européenne en cas 
d‟indépendance du Kosovo [Serbia ready to renounce to adhere to the European Union in case of 
independence of Kosovo]. Le Monde.   
 
118
 Reuters. (2010, July 22). Serbia defiant on Kosovo ruling, opposition critical. The New York Times: 
“Serbs consider Kosovo, home to dozens of Orthodox Church monasteries, as the cradle of medieval 
Serbian religion and culture, and control of the territory is an important issue.” 
 
Note: For a better understanding of Reuter‟s remark here above, one has to take into consideration 
how fiercely the Serbs defended Kosovo against the Ottomans before they lost it in the fourteenth 
Century. Indeed, Serbia (the “elder girl” of the Balkans) was the regional spearhead of the 
resistance to the Ottomans‟ conquest before their empire further expands North-West at the 
detriment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the battle for Kosovo in 1389, the Turks defeated 
the Serbs; this is known as the famous Kosovo Polje battle. The anniversary of this battle is Saint 
Vitus‟ Day, on the 28th of June, and it is still celebrated with much importance by the Serbs. By 
1459, all of Serbia fell to the Ottomans; then Bosnia fell in 1463, followed by Herzegovina in 
1482, and by Croatia in 1526. While after the Ottoman invasion Croatia remained predominantly 
Catholic and Serbia predominantly Orthodox, under the Turkish influence the populations of 
Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina embraced Islam in majority. There remained Serbian Orthodox 
minorities in all of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a Croatian Catholic minority in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as well.  
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no matter how necessary such integration is for its future. But the fact is that the 
Europeans were fast to approve Kosovo‟s independence, creating thus a dilemma for 
Serbia which is torn out between its nationalistic sentiment and its ancestral alliance with 
Russia on one side and, on the other side, the awareness that its relations with its close 
European environment are essential for its survival.
119
 This explains in large part Serbia‟s 
original hope that the ICJ expresses a favorable opinion to its cause insofar as such fact 
would open the way for negotiations with the Kosovars, favoring Serbia with a strong 
bargaining position. Such Serbian wish undoubtedly nurtures the hypothesis of the 
existence of interplay between politics and international law.
120
 This being said, there 
would be no inconsistency from the part of the European Union if it agrees on Kosovo‟s 
integration as it is now, even though it prefers to drag out from Serbia a settlement with 
Kosovo on its present status and integrate both at a time with no troubles.
121
 As a matter 
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 The particularity of the relationship between Russia and Serbia dates back to ancient history. Being both 
populated by Orthodox and Slavs (the Russians are Eastern Slavs and the Serbs are Southern Slavs), they 
were always aligned together whether under the Orthodox tsarist Russia or under the communist rule, when 
religion was considered as “peoples‟ opium” by Marxist philosophy, or now again under the present Russia 
which, amazingly, is neither monarchical nor communist. 
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 AFP. (2010, May 6). La Serbie pour une partition du Kosovo [Serbia in favor of partitioning Kosovo]. 
Le Figaro: 
“La Serbie espère que l‟opinion de la Cour contraindra les autorités Kosovares à revenir à la table des 
négociations pour évoquer leur statut, une option catégoriquement rejetée par Pristina”. 
Translation : 
“Serbia hopes that the Court‟s opinion will compel the Kosovars authorities to come back to the 
negotiation table on their status, an option categorically rejected by Pristina”. 
 
121
 References: 
• AFP. (2010, March 2). Kosovo: un compromis “possible” [Kosovo : A “possible” compromise]. 
Le Figaro: 
“La Serbie ne reconnaîtra pas «indirectement ou directement» le Kosovo mais «un compromis 
historique est toujours possible», a déclaré Bozidar Djelic, vice-premier ministre serbe chargé du 
dossier européen, après son entretien avec le chef de la diplomatie française, Bernard 
Kouchner. ... ... 
... ... mais nous avons réitéré notre volonté de trouver des solutions. ... ... 
La réalité sur le terrain et la volonté de l’Union européenne à ce que l’ensemble des Balkans 
occidentaux fassent partie de l’UE nous mènent tous vers le chemin d’un compromis entre 
Belgrade et Pristina, ... ...” 
Translation : 
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of fact, there seems to be a Euro-Balkan dynamics in this sense as the newly independent 
Balkan states (Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia) are playing this card on every occasion, 
regardless of Serbia‟s hearty protests.122 
                                                                                                                                                 
“After his meeting with Bernard Kouchner, French Chief of Diplomacy, Bozidar Djelic, Serbian 
Vice-Prime Minister in charge of the European membership case, has declared that Serbia will 
not recognise «either directly or indirectly» Kosovo, but «a historic compromise is always 
possible». ... ... 
... ... but we have repeated our intention to find solution ... ... 
The reality on the ground and the European Union’s will to let all the Western Balkans become 
members of the EU leads us all to the way for a compromise between Belgrade and 
Pristina. ... ...” 
 
• AFP. (2010, May 3). Le Kosovo lance un appel à l‟UE [Kosovo calls on the EU]. Le Figaro: 
“Le ministre Kosovar des Affaires étrangères, Skender Hyseni, a confirmé qu‟il comptait 
participer à la réunion UE-Balkans début juin à Sarajevo (Bosnie), demandant aux Européens de 
ne pas commettre « l‟erreur fondamentale » de retarder le processus en vue de l‟adhésion du 
Kosovo. 
M. Kouchner s’est déclaré «optimiste» sur une réconciliation permettant un avenir européen à 
terme pour les deux Etats, car «les esprits ont changé des deux côtés» au Kosovo comme en 
Serbie, a-t-il dit. «S‟ils y a d‟autres paroles échangées» entre Serbes et Kosovars à Sarajevo, 
«j‟en serais heureux», a-t-il dit.” 
Translation : 
“The Kosovar Minister of Foreign Affairs, Skender Hyseni, has confirmed that he intended to 
participate to the EU-Balkans meeting at the beginning of June in Sarajevo (Bosnia), asking the 
Europeans not to commit « the fundamental mistake » of slowing down the process for Kosovo‟s 
adhesion. 
Mr. Kouchner [Bernard Kouchner, the Foreign Minister of France] has declared himself as 
being «optimistic» about a reconciliation enabling a European future in the end for both States, 
because, as he said,  «minds have changed on both sides», in Kosovo as in Serbia. He also said : 
«If there are other words exchanged» between Serbs and Kosovars in Sarajevo, «I would be glad 
of such fact»”. 
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 AFP. (2010, March 9). Sommet UE/Balkans: le Kosovo invité [EU/Balkan summit : Kosovo invited]. Le 
Figaro: 
“Le Kosovo a été invité à participer en tant qu‟Etat indépendant à un sommet prévu le 20 mars en Slovénie 
sur l‟intégration européenne des Balkans et qui vise à réunir tous les pays de la région, a annoncé 
aujourd‟hui à Pristina le premier ministre kosovar Hashim Thaçi. 
... ... 
L‟initiative d‟organiser cette conférence, qui doit se tenir à Brdo pri Kranju, près de Ljubljana, se heurte 
au refus de Belgrade d‟admettre la présence du Kosovo autrement que sous la bannière de la Mission des 
Nations unies au Kosovo (Minuk). Le président serbe Boris Tadic avait répété vendredi qu‟il était hors de 
question pour Belgrade que le Kosovo se présente à cette conférence en tant qu‟Etat indépendant. 
... ... 
Hashim Thaçi avait fait savoir qu‟il entendait assister au sommet du 20 mars uniquement en tant que 
représentant du Kosovo indépendant. ... ... 
Le président Tadic avait boycotté le mois dernier l‟inauguration du président croate, Ivo Josipovic, en 
raison de la présence à la cérémonie du président Kosovar, Fatmir Sejdiu”. 
Translation : 
“The Kosovar Prime Minister, Hashim Thaçi, has announced today in Pristina that Kosovo has been 
invited to participate as an independent State to a summit scheduled on the 20
th
 of March in Slovenia about 
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Now, Kosovo‟s race for validating its independence is far from being over if it only 
integrates the European Union. While it is perfectly understandable that life may be 
easier for Kosovo when this happens, it should however be qualified with emphasis that 
such independence, being indeed de jure for some, remains de facto for others. 
Consequently, in order to cease to be imperatively and chronically tributary of Western 
unconditional support and thus acquire a comfortable legitimacy, Kosovo will still have 
to win Russia‟s recognition which has a preponderant word deriving from its veto right in 
its capacity as permanent member of the United Nations‟ Security Council (UNSC).123 
The advice of the ICJ, rendered on the 22
nd
 of July 2010, has comforted the above 
analysis as it strictly recognized the legality of the declaration itself (i.e. that Kosovo did 
not infringe international law by the only fact of declaring itself independent), but the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the European integration of the Balkans and which aims at grouping together all the countries of the 
region. 
... ... 
The initiative of organizing this conference, which should be held at Brdo pri Kranju, near Ljubljana, is 
facing Belgrade‟s refusal to accept the presence of Kosovo other than under the banner of the United 
Nations‟ Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Serbian President, Boris Tadic, had repeatedly stated on 
Friday that it was out of question for Belgrade that Kosovo comes in to this conference as an independent 
State. 
... ... 
Hashim Thaçi had made clear that he was looking forward to attend the 20
th
 of March summit only as a 
representative of the independent Kosovo. ... ... 
President Tadic had boycotted last month the inauguration of the Croatian President, Ivo Josipovic, 
because of the presence at the ceremony of the Kosovar President, Fatmir Sejdiu”. 
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 In fact the mechanism for admitting a State to UN membership comprises two important steps which are 
both still far from Kosovo‟s reach today; the Security Council of the UN has first to recommend the 
membership of any new comer to the General Assembly which, in turn, decides of such membership by a 
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. One can imagine thus that under the present 
circumstances, Russia would veto any such UNSC recommendation, which consequently would not even 
reach the General Assembly to process the matter in a second phase. 
Article 4.2 of the UN Charter reads as follows: 
“The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the 
General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.”  
And Article 18.2 of the UN Charter reads as follows: 
“Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the 
members present and voting. These questions shall include ... ... the admission of new Members to the 
United Nations, ...” 
 
64 
Court did not take position on the substance of such declaration (i.e. whether by so doing 
Kosovo effectively became independent in accordance with international law), arguing 
that such substance was not part of the question and that it saw “no reason to reformulate 
the scope of the question”.124 In other words, the purpose of the question may have been 
much deeper than its narrow wording, but regardless of such original purpose if that was 
the case, the Court‟s position was not to extend its answer to whether or not international 
law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to break away from Serbia 
and truly become independent. Expressed differently, with a permissible extent of fun 
and with all due respect to the ICJ and to the parties in conflict, Kosovo has the absolute 
right of trumpeting its independence every other day, however without necessarily 
becoming so qualified in reality. Now back to serious talking, the ICJ‟s opinion is 
consistent with the fundamental principle whereby an entity declaring itself independent 
                                                 
124
 See the ICJ‟s summary of its July 22nd 2010 ICJ Advisory Opinion about the question, available on the 
following website : http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/1601.pdf . Here are some excerpts: 
• On page 5 of the summary: 
“The Court observes that the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly formulated. The 
question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court‟s opinion on whether or not the declaration of 
independence is in accordance of international law. It notes that the question does not ask about the 
legal consequences of such declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has 
achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by 
those States which have recognized it as an independent State. The Court accordingly has no reason 
to reformulate the scope of the question.” 
• On page 6 of the summary: 
“... the task which the Court is called upon to perform is to determine whether or not the declaration of 
independence was adopted in violation of international law. The Court observes that it is not required 
by the question it has been asked to take a position on whether international law conferred a positive 
entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence or, a fortiori, on whether 
international law generally confers an entitlement on entities situated within a State unilaterally to 
break away from it. Indeed, it is entirely possible for a particular act – such as a unilateral 
declaration of independence – not to be in violation of international law without necessarily 
constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it. The Court notes that it has been «asked for an 
opinion on the first point, not the second».” 
• And on page 15 of the Summary: 
“THE COURT, 
... ... 
Is of the opinion that the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not 
violate international law.” 
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does not ipso facto qualify for statehood unless it becomes “a person of international law 
[possessing] the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.”125 
This latter condition amounts obviously to the recognition of Kosovo, by an appropriate 
majority of States (including all of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council), as 
an independent State. Indeed, experts have finely decoded the Court ruling as meaning 
legally that Kosovo‟s legitimacy is conferred by the recognition of States rather than by 
the Court itself.
126
 Here seems indeed to be located the real challenge for Kosovo and it is 
an issue by itself; it thus needs to be discussed separately because of the stake involved 
thereupon and the resulting scope of analysis. We will revert to this issue in concluding 
the present work.  
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 Bilefsky, D. (2010, July 22). World Court rules Kosovo declaration was legal. The New York Times: 
“James Ker-Lindsay, a Balkan expert at the London School of Economics, said the court had trod 
carefully in weighing the right of a people to self-determination over the right of a sovereign state to 
territorial integrity [two basic principles of the UN Charter to which we will revert later in this thesis], and 
had decided to sidestep the issue altogether. 
«It has essentially said that Kosovo’s legitimacy will be conferred by the countries that recognize it 
rather than by the court,» he said. 
... ... 
 ... legal experts stressed that the court’s studious avoidance of ruling on the legal status of Kosovo as a 
state had been calculated  to avoid encouraging nationalist movements and left the issue of a territory’s 
independence at the discretion of the countries that chose to recognize it.” 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Present International Context 
 Other matters cross-functioning with Kosovo’s issue 
 
4.1 Obama’s philosophy: Russo-US cooperation, conciliation v/s coerciveness 
President Obama‟s philosophy has alleviated the momentum of coerciveness in foreign 
policy that prevailed under President Bush. Obama‟s diplomacy is markedly more 
conciliatory toward Russia. Journalists like Judy Dempsey of the International Herald 
Tribune go as far as saying that “... President Barack Obama making improved relations 
with Russia [is] one of his foreign policy priorities ...”. 127  There are indeed facts 
comforting such assertion; under the Obama Administration for example, as early as in 
September 2009, just before the opening of the UNGA session, the United States 
announced that it was abandoning its antimissile shield project in Poland and in the 
Czech Republic, which aimed – it was said – to protect Europe from Iranian missile 
attacks, and which was not seen as such by Moscow, but rather as a threat to itself. 
Unless Russians are ultimately compelled to cooperate with Americans on common 
security concerns in Europe as envisaged during the November 19-20, 2010 NATO 
summit in Lisbon, the materialization of this measure may be interpreted as a US ballast 
dumping and a relative gain for Russia in the Balkans since it hasn‟t yet given up 
anything in exchange with regard to Kosovo; such interpretation tend to be comforted by 
a statement from President Obama himself during the said summit.
128
 Moscow‟s gain is 
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 Reuters. (2010, November 20). Obama, Medvedev urged Senate to ratify START. The New York Times: 
“Obama has warned that failure to ratify the treaty [START] would damage improving ties with Russia, 
which has helped impose tougher sanctions on Iran and allowed equipment destined for NATO forces in 
Afghanistan through its territory.” 
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indeed partial because, as we will discuss it later, it nevertheless finally backed up on its 
position regarding Iran‟s sanctions and it did not exclude cooperating with Washington 
on European security at the November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon.
129
 This being said, 
journalists and reporters like Laure Mandeville of the French daily Le Figaro and 
François Beurdeley of L‟Hebdo Magazine, a Lebanese weekly of French expression, 
early anticipated thereby an evident US concession made to Russia in the hope to win its 
support against the nuclear policy of Iran.
 130
 Likewise, commenting on President 
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• Beurdeley, F. (2009, September 25). Obama abandonne le projet de bouclier antimissile [Obama 
abandons the antimissile project]. L‟Hebdo Magazine, p. 35 : 
“… Si la menace iranienne a été relativisée par l‟Administration Obama, il n‟en demeure pas 
moins que les Etats-Unis continuent à voir une menace importante dans le projet de nucléaire 
iranien… 
… 
L’abandon du projet de bouclier antimissile en Europe est perçu comme une concession faite à 
la Russie, irritée par l‟éventuelle présence de missiles américains non loin de sa zone 
d‟influence… 
… 
Ce geste d’Obama envers la Russie a été récupéré par les Occidentaux, et l’Otan demande, 
désormais, à Moscou «d’exercer une pression politique et diplomatique maximale sur l’Iran, 
afin qu’il renonce à ses ambitions nucléaires»”. 
Translation : 
“… If the Iranian threat has been reconsidered in its context by the Obama Administration, 
nevertheless the United States still see in the Iranian nuclear project an important threat… 
… 
The abandonment of the antimissile shield project in Europe is perceived as a concession made 
to Russia, upset by the possible presence of American missiles not far from its zone of influence… 
… 
This gesture of Obama toward Russia has been retrieved by the Westerners, and the NATO 
requests, from now on, Moscow «to exert a maximal political and diplomatic pressure on Iran, 
to make it renounce to its nuclear ambitions»”. 
 
• Mandeville, L. (2009, September 24). Obama veut tester Medvedev sur le nucléaire iranien 
[Obama wants to test Medvedev on the Iranian nuclear subject]. Le Figaro: 
“Et l‟abandon par Washington du déploiement d‟un bouclier antimissile en Europe de l‟Est, 
annoncé une semaine avant l‟Assemblée générale de l‟ONU, contribuera-t-il à convaincre les 
Russes de se rallier à l‟idée d‟éventuelles sanctions américano-européennes contre l‟Iran, ... ...” 
Translation : 
“And what about the abandonment by Washington of an antimissile shield in Eastern Europe, 
announced one week before the General Assembly of the UNO? Would that contribute to convince 
the Russians to to rally the idea of possible Americano-European sanctions against Iran? ... ...ˮ 
 
68 
Obama‟s effort to revive the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Moscow 
(abandoned by President Bush because of Russia‟s invasion of Georgia in August 2008), 
Peter Baker of the International Herald Tribune stated that “the bid to renew the pact is 
the latest effort in Mr. Obama‟s drive to repair relations with Russia and comes as he 
seeks Moscow‟s support for tough new sanctions against Iran”; Baker further highlighted 
important concerns on the subject.
131
 A third example is the effort of the US and NATO 
to revive the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) from which Russia 
withdrew in December 2007.
132
 A fourth example is the April 2010 new START Treaty 
signed in Prague by Russians and Americans.
133
 Extrapolating our analysis enables us 
however to suppose that as long as Russia will not have obtained the maximum possible 
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132
 Ibid, pp.1&3: 
 
• On page 3: 
“The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe set limits on each side‟s deployment of weaponry 
between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, verifiable by mutual inspections. It was 
negotiated at Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and was considered one of the 
cornerstones of European security after the Cold War.” 
 
• On page 1: 
“Since 2007, the Russian government has provided no information to any of the other signatory 
states about its troop movements or reductions of conventional weapons. Nor has it accepted or 
participated in any inspections, which is one of the key verification features of the treaty, signed in 
1990 by the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries.” 
 
• On page 1 again: 
“But Mr. Rasmussen [Anders Fogh Rasmussen is NATO‟s secretary general], a former Danish 
prime minister, said he had no illusions about the difficulties in reviving the Treaty on 
Conventional Forces in Europe, or C.F.E., from which Russia with drew in December 2007”. 
 
• On page 1 again: 
“Nikolay Korchunov, Russia‟s deputy ambassador to NATO, said Thursday that Russia was 
«interested in reinvigorating » the treaty. He added, however, that « it should be part of a bigger 
package that would include missile defense as well as nuclear disarmament ».” 
 
133
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of its current expectations in the Caucasus it will most probably reject Kosovo‟s 
independence, irrespective of how many types of ballast were dumped by the US to win 
Russia‟s support for sanctioning Iran. And even though, Russia‟s revival of influence 
over the Caucasus would be a necessary condition but not a sufficient one due to its ties 
with Serbia.
134
 Despite its finally “purchasing” from the West the idea of sanctioning Iran, 
Russia made so far points in the Caucasus since Obama‟s current gestures of good will in 
its direction came on top of the fact that the West wasn‟t able to prevent its August 2008 
intervention in Georgia and its partial recuperation of influence in some of the old Soviet 
satellites as we will see a little further ahead, notwithstanding the recent withdrawal of 
the Russian army from the Georgian town of Perevia.
135
 As a result, with a necessary 
extent of qualification, one may assume that Russia still has a definite leverage in the arm 
wrestle over Kosovo and some comfortable leverage in the Caucasus. The prudence in 
making such statement is indeed necessary because not much later than September 2009, 
press correspondents like Karla Karkafi Ziadé of L‟Hebdo Magazine, Donaig Le Du and 
Altin Lazaj of Radio France Internationale reported that the US had in reality swapped its 
long range missile project in Poland and the Czech Republic with a project for shorter 
range weapons in Romania and Bulgaria.
136
 And it was later confirmed as it appeared 
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70 
indeed that the US substituted the original missile shield project with batteries of Patriot 
missiles, which are said to be of reduced range; the first battery arrived on Sunday the 
23
rd
 of May 2010 at the Polish town of Morag at only 60 kilometers from Russia‟s 
strategic Kaliningrad enclave on the Baltic Sea.
137
 Now scholars like Isabelle Facon, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
• Karkafi Ziadé, K. (2010, January 1). Le visage de la semaine – Vladimir Poutine – Le Premier 
ministre russe [The face of the week – Vladimir Putin – the Russian Prime Minister]. L‟Hebdo 
Magazine, p.3: 
“Les Etats-Unis avaient troqué les missiles de longue portée contre des armes de courte et 
moyenne portée, un système que le diplomate russe [Vladimir Poutine] revendique le droit de 
connaître tous les détails.ˮ 
Translation 
“The United States had swapped the long range missiles with short and medium range 
weaponry, a system of which the Russian diplomat requests the right to know all the details.ˮ 
• Lazaj, A. (2010, April 8). START II, un nouveau départ pour le désarmement nucléaire [START 
II, a new start up for nuclear disarmament]. Radio France Internationale: 
“L‟administration Obama a présenté un nouveau projet, après une réévaluation de la menace 
balistique iranienne. A la différence du plan de l‟administration précédente de George W. Bush, il 
est destiné à contrer des missiles non plus de longue, mais de courte et moyenne portées. Mais 
Moscou affirme avoir encore des questions sérieuses sur la nouvelle version”. 
Translation : 
“After reevaluating the Iranian ballistic threat, the Obama Administration presented a new project. 
Contrary to the precedent Administration‟s plan of George W. Bush, it no longer aims at 
countering long range missiles, but medium and short range missiles. Nevertheless, Moscow 
asserts having still serious questions on the new version.” 
• Le Du, D. (2010, April 8). Obama et Medvedev ont signé à Prague le nouveau traité START 
[Obama and Medvedev have signed in Prague the new START Treaty]. Radio France 
Internationale: 
“Les négociations ont pourtant été longues et difficiles, essentiellement parce que les Russes 
bloquaient sur le projet de bouclier de défense prôné par les Américains en Europe de l‟Est. Alors, 
en septembre, Barack Obama a renoncé au projet de son prédécesseur George Bush, qui voulait 
en installer en Pologne et en République tchèque, ce que les Russes dénonçaient, pour se 
tourner plutôt vers la Roumanie et la Bulgarie, en expliquant que ces missiles-là seront tournés 
essentiellement contre la menace iranienne.” 
Translation : 
“Negotiations had however been long and difficult, essentially because the Russians were blocking 
on the defense shield project advocated by the Americans in Eastern Europe. Therefore, in 
September, Barack Obama gave up the project of his predecessor George Bush, who wanted to 
install shields in Poland and in the Czech Republic – a project denounced by the Russians – 
opting instead for Romania and Bulgaria, and explaining that those missiles will essentially be 
oriented against the Iranian threat.” 
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• Fourt, O. (2010, May 26). Des missiles Patriot américains en Pologne [American made Patriot 
missiles in Poland]. Radio France Internationale: 
“Ce mercredi 26 mai, Polonais et Américains ont dévoilé la première batterie de missiles sol-air 
américains Patriot stationnés en Pologne, près de l‟enclave russe de Kaliningrad. Ce déploiement 
fait suite à la décision du président américain Barack Obama qui, en 2009, renonçait au lourd 
programme anti-missile que voulait mettre en place son prédécesseur George Bush”. 
Translation : 
71 
specialist of security policies at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, foresaw a 
consistent tempered reaction from Moscow due to the improved Russo-US relations and 
the Obama Administration‟s change in foreign Policy, including the signature of the new 
START Treaty in Prague early April 2010 and – importantly for our analysis – the 
reduction of the US focus on Russia‟s nostalgic places like Ukraine and Georgia.138 It 
should however be nuanced that, in order to enter into force, the START Treaty has to be 
ratified by the US Senate and the Russian «Duma»; in the Senate the needed majority is 
over 2/3
rd
 of the votes (at least 67 out of 100); and according to Altin Lazaj of Radio 
                                                                                                                                                 
“This Wednesday 26 May, Poles and Americans have uncovered the first battery of ground-air 
American made Patriot missiles stationed in Poland, near the enclave of Kaliningrad. This 
deployment follows the decision of American President Barack Obama who, in 2009, renounced to 
the heavy anti-missile program that his predecessor, George Bush, wanted to implement”. 
• Nouioua, V. & AFP. (2010, May 28). Nucléaire: Washington déploie ses missiles en Pologne 
[Nuclear issue: Washington deploys its missiles in Poland]. EditoWeb Magazine: 
“... sur la base militaire de Morag, à seulement 60 kilomètres de la frontière avec la région de 
Kaliningrad ... . La première batterie de missiles américains de défense anti-aérienne Patriot ainsi 
que quelques 150 soldats américains sont arrivés dimanche à Morag, dans le nord-est de la 
Pologne. ...” 
Translation : 
“... on the military base of Morag, at only 60 kilometers from the frontier with the region of 
Kaliningrad ... . The first battery of American anti-aerial defense missiles Patriot with some 150 
American soldiers arrived on Sunday at Morag, in the North-East of Poland ...” 
 
138
 Fourt, O. (2010, May 26). Radio France Internationale. Op-cit: 
“... ... les Russes s‟étaient vivement opposés à l‟installation du bouclier anti-missile en Pologne, un 
dispositif qu‟ils considéraient comme directement dirigé contre eux. Mais avec les Patriot en Pologne, rien 
de comparable : « les Russes ne disent pas grand chose !», car pour Isabelle Facon, spécialiste des 
politiques de sécurité à la Fondation pour la recherche Stratégique (FRS) à Paris, « le climat a changé, 
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Translation : 
“ ... ... the Russians had strongly opposed the installation of the anti-missile shield in Poland, an apparatus 
that they considered as being directly oriented against them. But with the Patriot in Poland, there is 
nothing to be compared: «the Russians don‟t say much!», because for Isabelle Facon, a specialist of 
security policies at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FSR) in Paris, «the climate has changed, 
relations between Moscow and Washington have warmed up with the arms limitation agreement, the 
Start Treaty signed in Prague early April 2010. The United States are a lot less concentrated over the 
issues of Ukraine and Georgia than they were these last years; as a consequence, Moscow is right to take 
easier this decision to deploy American made batteries of missiles anti-missiles in Poland».” 
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France Internationale, such ratification was already not guaranteed with the Senate‟s 57 
voters siding with Obama before the November 2
nd
, 2010 midterm elections.
139
 Therefore, 
there were concerns that the ratification of the Treaty be even harder under the prevailing 
composition of the Senate.
140
 Indeed, the November 2010 midterm elections for the 112
th
 
Congress have yielded a Senate with 51 seats to the Democrats plus 2 independents who 
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th
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... ... 
There remains however the ratification stage. ... ... It is expected to be hard at Senate, where the pact 
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Translation : 
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• The Associated Press. (2010, November 7). Analysis: Election Campaign Ignored Foreign Policy. 
The New York Times: 
“The Republican gains in Tuesday‟s midterm elections say a lot about how the American public 
wants the government to rule here at home, but very little about what it should do abroad. 
... ... 
There was little discussion during the campaign of a landmark arms control deal with Russia, 
which the Senate must ratify to take effect. ... ... 
... ... 
The Senate is considering a treaty with Russia to reduce stockpiles of U.S. and Russian long-
range nuclear weapons, ... ... 
The treaty still needs to be ratified by the Senate, where Republicans have balked at supporting 
it. Now with the Democrat’s Senate majority eroded, the treaty’s fate is in question. But it never 
became a major issue in the campaign.” 
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would normally vote with the Democrats (i.e. a total of only 53 already granted for the 
Obama Administration) against 47 to the Republicans, and a House of Representatives 
composed of 193 seats to the Democrats against 242 to the Republicans; whereas the 
111
th
 composition of Congress was as follows : 57 Democrats plus 2 independents (thus 
59 which were already granted for the Obama Administration) against 41 Republicans in 
the Senate; and 256 Democrats against 178 Republicans (and 1 vacancy) in the House of 
Representatives.
141
 There was therefore a sharp swing to the detriment of the current U.S. 
Administration, increasing thus anterior apprehensions to fail gathering the minimum of 
67 favorable votes in the Senate needed for the ratification of the START Treaty.
142
 And 
as reported by Reuters after the November 19-20, 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, both 
Presidents Obama and Medvedev urged the Senate to ratify the amended version of the 
START treaty, as if they seemed to apprehend a stalling of the ratification by the 
Senate.
143
 Finally however, the START Treaty was ratified by the US Senate on the 21
st
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«symmetrical» way to the United States. 
74 
of December 2010 and it is now expected to be ratified by the Russian «Duma», which is 
a positive development in terms of East/West cooperation on security following the 
November 2010 NATO Summit attended by President Medvedev as a guest.
144
 
Notwithstanding the progress on the START Treaty, with regard to the missile shield in 
Europe, the paradox is that, if Iran was the United States‟ major concern, the Patriot 
missiles being of shorter range as protection device against an Iranian missile attack may 
not serve efficiently the declared purpose as such and, conversely, they are more than 
enough to reach closer territories like Russia‟s minuscule Kaliningrad next door.145 This 
                                                                                                                                                 
... ... 
Obama has warned that failure to ratify the treaty would damage improving ties with Russia, which has 
helped impose tougher sanctions on Iran and allowed equipment destined for NATO forces in Afghanistan 
through its territory. 
... ... 
The treaty must be approved by the U.S. Senate and the Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, 
before it goes into force. Medvedev has urged the Duma not to ratify it until Senate approval is certain.” 
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Translation : 
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deduction is asserted by Poland‟s perception of Russia as a menace and by the conclusion 
of Olivier Fourt (Radio France Internationale) that the Patriots may be seen as a 
«consolation prize» for the Poles to compensate them for the US abandonment of the 
heavier missile shield.
146
 Therefore, as soon as the intention of abandoning such original 
project was made public by the Obama Administration, Putin had left the question on the 
agenda as he claimed the right for Russia to know all the details of such reduced 
system.
147
 And consistently with this position, Russia does not spare occasions to show 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Joseph Henrotin, researcher at the Center of Analysis and Prevention of International Risks (Capri) 
recalls  as a matter of facts « that the installation of batteries of Patriot missiles in Poland was provided 
for in the frame of compensations consented to Warsaw which had accepted to host the anti-missile shield», 
but he underlines that those missiles «would not at all be able to intercept a missile coming from Iran and 
heading toward Europe», ... ... 
The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad is very close, and every time the Russians disagree with a NATO 
decision, they threaten to install ground-ground Iskander missiles, just a few tens of kilometers far from the 
Polish border”. 
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 Ibid: 
“Les missiles Patriot qui sont stationnés aujourd‟hui en Pologne, peuvent donc apparaître comme un « lot 
de consolation », mais c‟est aussi le signe que Washington tient ses promesses et ne laisse pas tomber la 
Pologne, l‟un de ses alliés de l‟Alliance atlantique. ... ... Car en Pologne, la Russie est toujours « perçue » 
comme une menace.” 
Translation: 
“The Patriot missiles which are stationed today in Poland could have the look of « a consolation prize », 
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of the Atlantic Alliance. ... ... Because in Poland, Russia is always « perceived » as a menace.” 
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 Karkafi Ziadé, K. (2010, January 1). L‟Hebdo Magazine. Op-cit., p.3: 
“Pourquoi lui? 
Parce qu‟il veut contrer la suprématie américaine à travers des armes offensives. Vladimir Poutine a 
annoncé que la Russie devrait développer des armements « offensifs », afin de garantir une parité 
stratégique avec les Etats-Unis, sans pour autant préciser de quel type d‟armes il est 
question……….L’homme fort de la Russie remet alors la question du système antimissile américain sur 
le tapis, alors que Barack Obama avait annoncé, en septembre, qu’il renonçait au bouclier en Europe de 
l’Est, élaboré par George Bush et considéré par Moscou comme une menace pour sa sécurité. Les Etats-
Unis avaient troqué les missiles de longue portée contre des armes de courte et moyenne portée, un 
système que le diplomate russe revendique le droit de connaître tous les détails.ˮ 
Translation 
“Why him ? 
Because he wants to counter the American supremacy with offensive weaponry. Vladimir Putin has 
announced that Russia should develop «offensive» weapons in order to guarantee a strategic equality 
with the United States, however  without specifying what type of arms he was referring to………The strong 
man of Russia is reopening therefore the subject of the American antimissile system, although Barack 
Obama had announced, in September, that he renounced to the shield in Eastern Europe, elaborated by 
George Bush and considered by Moscow as a threat for its security. The United States had swapped the 
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its muscles.
148
 Nevertheless, the American decision of abandoning the original missile 
project was itself welcomed by the Kremlin and President Medvedev even suggested 
cooperating with the West on security.
149
 But as pertinently pointed out by the 
correspondent of l‟Hebdo Magazine in Moscow, Nathalie Ouvaroff, while it is true that 
Medvedev has opened the door for cooperation with the West on worldwide security 
matters, when it comes however to Russia‟s own and specific security concerns his 
foreign policy follows faithfully that of his predecessor, notwithstanding signs of rivalry 
with this latter on the presidential elections of 2012.
150
 As a matter of fact Medvedev‟s 
                                                                                                                                                 
long range missiles with short and medium range weaponry, a system of which the Russian diplomat 
requests the right to know all the details. ˮ 
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 Fourt, O. (2010, May 26). Radio France Internationale. Op-cit: 
“Mais la Russie ne perds jamais une occasion d‟exposer sa puissance. Lors du grand défilé de la victoire 
le 9 mai 2010 à Moscou, on a vu passer ... ... des missiles sol-sol Iskander et des anti-missiles S400, 
considérés comme plus évolués que les Patriots.” 
Translation : 
“But Russia never loses any occasion to expose its power. At the great victory parade in Moscow, on the 9th 
of May 2010, we have seen passing ... ... ground-ground missiles Iskander and S400 anti-missiles, which 
are considered as more advanced than the Patriots.” 
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 Dempsey, J. (2010, April 30). International Herald Tribune. Op-cit, p. 3: 
“When Mr. Obama decided last year to drop plans to deploy parts of the shield system in Poland and the 
Czech Republic, the Kremlin scaled down its oratory on the matter. And to the surprise of NATO diplomats, 
Mr. Medvedev even suggested last week that Russia might be able to cooperate with the United Stated and 
NATO on security.” 
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 Ouvaroff,  N. (2010, August 6). Présidentielle 2012, Medvedev contre Poutine? [Presidential elections 
of 2012, Medvedev against Putin?]. L‟Hebdo Magazine, pp.48-49: 
“Dès son arrivée à la tête de l‟Etat en 2008, Dmitri Medvedev ... ... tente timidement de se démarquer de 
son mentor tout en affichant pour la galerie une parfaite complicité avec ce dernier. ... ... 
En politique étrangère, il suit  fidèlement la politique ultra-sécuritaire mise en place par Poutine. C’est 
lui qui décide l’envoi des troupes russes en Abkhazie et en Ossétie du Sud et la reconnaissance des deux 
Républiques séparatistes. ... ... 
... ... 
... la nouvelle diplomatie s‟est déjà concrétisée: signature des nouveaux accords Start en mars et reprise du 
partenariat stratégique avec les Etats-Unis, concrétisée en juillet par une visite d‟Etat, particulièrement 
réussie, et par le traitement en douceur de l‟affaire des espions ; vote des sanctions contre l‟Iran et 
annulation d‟un gros contrat de vente d‟armes à la République islamique ; enfin, refus d‟intervenir en 
Kirghizie malgré la demande expresse de la présidente Kirghize. 
Reste à savoir si ces changements laissent entrevoir un affrontement fratricide entre les deux têtes de 
l’exécutif. Les politologues sont divisés sur ce sujet. Evgueni Mitchenko, chercheur indépendant, 
souligne que ... ... « Medvedev s’agite et pendant ce temps Poutine entretien sa forme pour assumer de 
nouveaux les plus hautes charges .» 
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recent acceptance to attend the November 19-20, 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon goes 
along the same line with his prior statements about cooperation; but he was indeed 
prudent enough not to contradict Putin‟s stance as he posed the condition to check the 
veracity of Washington‟s policy change on the missile project in Europe before any 
related Russian engagement is made.
151
 In other words, in the East/West political and 
security bargain, the trade encompasses Iran and perhaps some places in Europe, to the 
exception of remote Russian territories like Kaliningrad, in addition to the Caucasus and 
Kosovo which are still “non negotiable” for Russia; bearing in mind that: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nicolas Petrov, expert au centre Carnegie, ... ... pense que Medvedev ne présente pas une sérieuse 
menace pour Poutine. ... ...  
Alexei Moukhine, un autre chercheur indépendant, ... ... pense que Poutine ne veut plus de la présidence 
mais tient par contre à garder coûte que coûte son poste de Premier ministre.” 
Translation : 
“As soon as he became head of the State in 2008, Dmitri Medvedev ... ... timidly to distinguish himself 
from his mentor while flaunting to the gallery a perfect complicity with this latter. ... ... 
In foreign policy, he faithfully follows the ultra-security concerned policy implemented by Putin. He was 
the one who decided to send Russian troops in Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, and to recognize the two 
separatist Republics. ... ... 
... ... 
... the new diplomacy has already materialized: signature of the new Start agreements in March and 
resumption of the strategic partnership with the United States, concretized in July by a State visit, 
particularly successful, and by the easy handling the spies affair; voting sanctions against Iran and 
cancellation of an important contract for the sale of weapons to the Islamic Republic; and, lastly, refusal to 
intervene in Kirghizstan in spite of the express request of the Kirgiz President.   
But it is still unclear whether or not those changes permit to foresee a fratricidal confrontation between 
the two heads of the executive power. Political scientists are divided over that subject. Evgueni 
Mitchenko, an independent researcher, underlines that ... ... «Medvedev is in a state of unrest and 
meanwhile Putin keeps himself fit to take again the highest responsibilities.» 
Nicolas Petrov, expert at the Carnegie Center, ... ... thinks that Medvedev does not represent a serious 
menace for Putin. ... ... 
Alexei Moukhine, another independent researcher, ... ... thinks that Putin does no longer want the 
presidency but is eager to keep at any price his position of Prime Minister.” 
 
151
 Benhold, K. (2010, October 19). The New York Times. Op-cit: 
“«I will go to the Russia-NATO summit,» Mr. Medvedev said at a news conference, formally accepting an 
invitation to the Nov. 19-20 meeting that was extended to Russia weeks ago. «This will further the search 
for necessary compromises and the development of dialogue between the Russian Federation and the North 
Atlantic Alliance as a whole.» 
... ... 
«We are now evaluating the idea of this proposal, but I think that NATO itself needs to understand in what 
form it sees Russia joining this system, what it will bring, in what manner an agreement can be reached, 
and how to proceed further,» he said. «Only based on the evaluation of this proposal can we give an 
answer on how wee will proceed with regard to the idea of European missile defense.»” 
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(i) The Caucasus is in the direct vicinity of Russia and, as such, is geographically 
vital for it in comparison with Kosovo. 
(ii) The U.S. stuck to its position over the Balkans. 
(iii) The U.S. conversely has moderated its policy over the Caucasus in spite of 
having roughly kept the same rhetoric on the subject. It would be relevant to 
point out here that, notwithstanding the tempering of its policy in the region, 
the U.S. needs certain Caucasian and Central Asian republics for its military 
as logistic bases and as transit passageways to Afghanistan.
152
 President 
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 References: 
• Héry, J-J. (2010, July 5). Washington rassure ses alliés européens [Washington reassures its 
European allies]. Radio France Internationale: 
“Si la critique américaine de l‟influence russe dans la région s‟est faite plus feutrée en Ukraine, 
ce n‟est pas seulement parce que l‟élection du pro-russe Ianoukovitch a changé la donne en 
ramenant le pays dans le giron russe. C‟est également en raison des intérêts stratégiques et 
économiques à ne pas se couper de l‟Ukraine. Washington s‟est d‟ailleurs dit prêt à investir dans 
le secteur énergétique et gazier ukrainien. 
En Azerbaïdjan, c‟est un autre facteur qui a poussé Hilary Clinton à réaffirmer l‟ambition 
américaine d‟être «un partenaire, un soutien, un défenseur». Les Etats-Unis utilisent la petite 
république du Caucase comme une base logistique où transitent tout le matériel et les véhicules 
militaires américains en partance pour l’Afghanistan. Alors même que 30 000 hommes doivent 
partir renforcer les troupes de la coalition, pas question pour les Américains de prendre le 
risque de détériorer davantage des relations déjà tendues avec le régime du président Ilham 
Aliev. C‟est l‟appui de Washington au rapprochement entre la Turquie et l‟Arménie qui a fâché 
Bakou. L‟Azerbaïdjan n‟a pas apprécié de voir les Etats-Unis privilégier ses voisins arméniens, 
des voisins avec qui ils sont en conflit territorial depuis la fin des années 1980 et la sécession de 
la région frontalière du Nagorny-Karabach. Le pouvoir azéri a même menacé de «revoir» ses 
liens avec Washington.” 
Translation : 
“If America‟s critique of Russia‟s influence in the region became felted with regard to Ukraine, 
this is not only because of the election of the pro-Russian Yanukovitch has changed the deal by 
bringing back the country in Russia‟s fold. It is also because of strategic and economic interests 
not to break with Ukraine. As a matter of fact, Washington has said it was ready to invest in the 
energy and gas field. 
In Azerbaijan it is another factor which pushed Hilary Clinton to reaffirm America‟s ambition to 
be «a partner, a support, a protector». The United States uses the small Caucasian republic as a 
logistic base where all the American military equipment and vehicles transit on their way to 
Afghanistan. While 30 000 men are on the point to go there to reinforce the troops of the 
coalition, it is out of question for the Americans to take the risk of deteriorating even more the 
relations with the regime of President Ilham Aliev, which are already tense. It is Washington‟s 
support to the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia which upset Baku. Azerbaijan did not 
appreciate seeing the United States privileging its Armenian neighbors, with whom they are in 
territorial conflict since the end of the 1980s and the secession of the Nagorno-Karabakh border 
region. The Azeri administration has even threatened it would  «reconsider» its relations with 
Washington.” 
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Obama himself admitted during the November 2010 Lisbon summit that 
NATO equipment transits to Afghanistan even through the Russian 
territory.
153
 And an agreement was signed during the summit to expand 
NATO‟s passageways through Russia toward Afghanistan.154 
From this perspective, and given consideration to the prevailing conditions and to 
economic and even strategic interests, we may cautiously suggest that – far from having 
obtained any Western concession on Kosovo in counterpart – Russia cooperated with the 
West over the Iranian nuclear issue inasmuch as it felt a direct threat on itself, or to the 
extent it has been subject to an unsustainable Western pressure. And the West has been 
heralding the November 2010 summit as a chance for closer ties with Russia, warning 
otherwise about the reverse of the medal if such opportunity was missed; indeed, at a 
meeting with Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy on Tuesday October 19, 2010, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel made a statement resembling a reminder for some anterior 
triggering of alarm bells which apparently did not fall on Russian deaf ears as they had 
                                                                                                                                                 
• Benhold, K. (2010, October 19). The New York Times. Op-cit: 
“Russia, ..., [had] accused NATO of encircling its borders by dangling potential membership 
before countries like Ukraine and Georgia. ... ... 
... ... 
Thomas Gomart, Russia expert at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris, said 
interests were converging on several fronts. «There is a lot of convergence on major security 
issues like Iran and Afghanistan,» he said. «The fact that NATO membership for countries like 
Ukraine has been put on the backburner also helps to ease tension.»” 
 
153
 Reuters. (2010, November 20). Obama, Medvedev urged Senate to ratify START. The New York Times. 
Op-cit.: 
“Obama has warned that failure to ratify the treaty [START] would damage improving ties with Russia, 
which has helped impose tougher sanctions on Iran and allowed equipment destined for NATO forces in 
Afghanistan through its territory.” 
 
154
 The Associated Press. (2010, November 20). NATO invites Russia to join Europe missile shield. The 
New York Times: 
“NATO and Moscow signed an agreement to expand the alliance‟s supply routes to Afghanistan through 
Russia and were expected to set up a new training program in Russia for counter-narcotics agents from 
Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries; and agree on a program to provide training to Afghan 
helicopter crews.” 
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incited Russia to envisage cooperation with the West on security issues.
155
 We will thus 
try later in this chapter to highlight the stakes relevant to this part of the game; but before 
we do, let us point out that the November 10-20, 2010 Summit in Lisbon has yielded a 
promising climate with positive statements from every side, nevertheless with a degree of 
Russian prudence.
156
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 Benhold, K. (2010, October 19). The New York Times. Op-cit: 
“On Tuesday Mr. Medvedev told Mr. Sarkozy and Mrs. Merkel that he needed more information but also 
indicated that his country was potentially open to the idea of cooperation. 
... ... 
The new strategic concept, which the 28 NATO members plan to unveil at their November summit meeting, 
is part of that rethinking, analysts say, and it could provide an opportunity for closer ties with Moscow. 
«We are all in the same boat when it comes to the real threats of the 21
st
 century,» Mrs. Merkel said, 
while Mr. Sarkozy called Russia «a friend, a friendly country».” 
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 References: 
• Reuters. (2010, November 20). NATO, Russia to cooperate on missile defence. The New York 
Times: 
“NATO and Russia agreed on Saturday to cooperate on missile defence and other security issues, 
and hailed a new start in relations strained since Russia‟s military intervention in Georgia in 
2008. 
... ... 
Medvedev said a period of strained relations had been overcome and added : «We have large-
scale plans, we will be working in all areas, including European missile defence». 
... ... 
They [NATO and Russia] also agreed to conduct a joint study on how Russian could join a new 
system designed to protect Europe and North America from long-range missiles fired from the 
Middle East. 
... ... 
In the past Russian officials have expressed reservations about the plan, fearing it could negate 
the strategic value of Russia‟s own ballistic missiles. 
It was also reluctant to join a program that had defined Iran as a potential missile threat, as had 
NATO member Turkey. NATO sources said alliance leaders had agreed to drop Iran‟s name from 
the summit statement to secure Turkey‟s support. 
Despite the warm words, the challenge will now be to see how NATO and Russia can build on 
Saturday’s talks and turn the success into fruitful cooperation in practice. 
... ... 
General Nikolai Makarov, chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, said there were good reasons 
to link the Russian and NATO missile defence systems. «Now there is the technical side – how to 
join the two systems. It will all depend on the configurations,» he told reporters.” 
 
• The Associated Press. (2010, November 20). NATO invites Russia to join Europe missile shield. 
The New York Times. Op-cit: 
“Russia was receptive but stopped short of accepting a historic NATO invitation Saturday to join a 
missile shield protecting Europe against Iranian attack. 
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev agreed to involve technicians in development plans, but did 
not make a commitment if it becomes operational and warned that Russia might decide against 
joining the U.S.-led effort if it doesn’t feel it is being treated equally as a partner. 
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Also in this chapter, we will focus on matters of concern for the parties other than the 
Caucasus and Iran, like the oil markets and routes, which may impact the outcome over 
Kosovo as well.   
                                                                                                                                                 
«Our participation has to be a full-fledged exchange of information, or we won’t take part at 
all,» he told reporters after the announcement by NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen.” 
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4.2 Russia’s old sphere of influence: Central Europe and the Baltic States, the 
Caucasus, Central Asia. 
 
A strict observation of the facts shows that, (i) by the 18
th
 of February 2008, as the parties‟ 
negotiations never made any success, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence with 
the approval of most Western nations, and (ii) today no final status has yet been agreed 
upon by the international community as a whole, in spite of the ICJ‟s opinion that the 
declaration of independence did not violate international law. Indeed, as we saw in the 
introduction of the present work, there were 69 States having recognized Kosovo‟s 
independence when the ICJ rendered its opinion on the 22
nd
 of July 2010. But 
subsequently, by the 25
th
 of October 2010 (thus, 3 months later), it happened that only 
two more States recognized Kosovo‟s independence, increasing thereby the number of 
recognitions to 71, which is not a significant change.
157
 In reality, as pointed out much 
earlier by Isabelle Lasserre of Le Figaro, the Kosovar issue should not be regarded as an 
isolated step by itself but as part of an East/West arm-wrestle over the post Soviet sphere 
of influence.
158
 Indeed, after having lost number of former clients, in particular those of 
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 AFP. (2010, October 25). Kiribati reconnaît le Kosovo indépendant [Kiribati recognize the independent 
Kosovo]. Le Figaro: 
“La République de Kiribati a reconnu le Kosovo indépendant, portant le nombre de pays à l‟avoir fait à 
soixante et onze, ... ...” 
Translation : 
“The Republic of Kiribati has recognized the independent Kosovo, increasing thereby the number of 
countries having done so to seventy one, ... ...” 
 
158
 Lasserre, I. (2007, November 29). Le Kosovo vers la sécession après l‟échec des négociations [Kosovo 
toward secession after the failure of the negotiations]. Le Figaro: 
“L’indépendance de la province serbe est au centre d’un bras de fer international entre les États-Unis, 
la Russie et l’Union Européenne. ... 
... ... États-Unis, Russie et Union européenne règlent leurs différends au Kosovo, objets de marchandages 
internationaux qui dépassent, et de loin, les problématiques balkaniques.ˮ 
Translation : 
“The independence of the Serbian province is at the center of an international arm-wrestle between the 
United States, Russia and the European Union. ...  
... ... the United States, Russia and the European Union settle their dispute in Kosovo, object of 
international bargains, which go far beyond the Balkans issues.ˮ  
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Central Europe and the Baltic States which were hastily “rescued” by the European 
Union shortly after their relief from the Soviet grip as we saw earlier in our discussion of 
Euro-Balkans issues, Russia was planning upstream for an energetic come back on the 
international chessboard as a pole trying to recover whatever possible from its past glory 
and its share of worldwide influence. And this was precisely the content of the message 
conveyed by the then president, Vladimir Putin, on the 10
th
 of February 2007 (about a 
year earlier than the unilateral declaration of independence, therefore) when he explicitly 
announced, drumming and trumpeting, that Russia was coming back on the front of the 
scene; and it was thus not an undeclared objective.
159
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 Abi-Ramia, J. (2008, August 29). L‟Hebdo Magazine. Op-cit, pp.38-45. 
 
On page 40: 
“C’est le 10 février 2007, devant une quarantaine de ministres de la Défense et des Affaires étrangères 
participant à la 43
ème
 conférence de Munich sur la sécurité, que l’ancien président et désormais Premier 
ministre russe, Vladimir Poutine a proclamé le retour de la Russie sur le devant de la scène 
internationale... ... ˮ 
Translation : 
“It was on the 10th of February 2007, at the 43rd Conference of Munich on Security, which was attended 
by about forty ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, that former president and now Prime minister 
Vladimir Putin announced the return of Russia on the front of the international scene... .ˮ 
 
Also on pages 40 and 41: 
“Dans le contexte diplomatique actuel, la Russie poursuit deux objectifs différents. Les anciennes 
républiques de la défunte URSS, surtout celles membres de la CEI (Communauté des Etats 
indépendants), occupant une place centrale dans la reconstruction de la politique internationale russe. Le 
but primordial de la nouvelle doctrine géostratégique russe relève d’une tentative de reconquête de 
l’influence prédominante dans cet espace géopolitique, depuis toujours considéré comme une zone 
d’«intérêt vital». 
L‟autre objectif vise à limiter l’influence de l’OTAN... ... ˮ 
Translation : 
“In the present diplomatic context, Russia follows two different objectives. The old republics of the late 
USSR, particularly those that are members of the CIS (Community of Independent States), and which 
occupy a central place in the reconstruction of Russia‟s international politics. The primordial aim of the 
new Russian geo-strategic doctrine stems from a temptation to re-conquer the influence predominant in 
this geopolitical space, ever considered as a zone of «vital interest». 
The other objective is to limit the influence of NATO ... ...ˮ 
 
Also on pages 41 and 42: 
“La Russie a d’ores et déjà étendu sa mainmise sur l’Asie centrale, grâce notamment aux accords 
énergétiques ..., militaires et politiques dans le cadre de la CEE (Communauté économique eurasienne) 
qui la lient avec les pays de la région ; ce qui constitue une épine dans le pieds des Américains. Ceux-ci 
sont très dépendants de leurs ressources énergétiques car cette zone est l‟une des plus pétrolifères du 
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This Russian warning signal was coupled with a counterattack denouncing unilateral 
Western decisions. On this occasion, President Putin criticized the Western dynamics 
towards the expansion of democracy (most probably insinuating Kosovo among others, 
of course), in what he rather saw a Western conduct as a unique pole over the world 
affairs and thus, in Julien Abi Ramia‟s own words, he broke the prevailing order of 
international relations in just a few seconds.
160
 The dynamics for such new international 
balance kept moving forward with intermittent messages like that other one of President 
Putin in April 2008 (fourteen months later) denouncing NATO‟s expansion as a threat to 
Russia; it came right about to assert previous statements, positions, measures and 
negotiations.
161
 Such prior statements, positions, measures and negotiations had already 
                                                                                                                                                 
monde. En soutenant les régimes de la région en échange de l’installation de bases militaires, la Russie 
assure une couverture sécuritaire de ses frontières du sud. Mais les Etats-Unis restent présents.ˮ 
Translation : 
“Russia has already extended its grasp over Central Asia through, in particular, energy ..., military and 
political agreements in the frame of the EEC (Eurasian Economic Community) which link it with the 
countries of the region; this puts the Americans into a spot. These latter are very dependent on their 
energy resources because this zone is one of the most oil rich in the world. By trading its support to the 
regimes of the region in exchange of the installation of military bases, Russia insures its southern 
borders with a security cover. But the United States are still present.ˮ 
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 Ibid, p.40: 
“«Le monde unipolaire n’a rien à voir avec la démocratie, qui veut que la majorité prenne aussi en 
compte l‟opinion de la minorité. Il y a des gens qui n‟arrêtent pas de nous donner des leçons de démocratie 
qu‟ils ne suivent pas eux-mêmes. Plus personne ne se sent en sécurité car plus personne ne peut se 
prévaloir des règles du droit international. Les Etats-Unis sortent de leurs frontières nationales dans 
tous les domaines et cela est très dangereux». En quelques secondes, Poutine a rompu l‟ordre des 
relations internationales qui prévalait depuis la chute de l‟Union Soviétique, en 1991, et plus 
particulièrement depuis le 11 septembre 2001 ... ... dans le pays où le rideau de fer est tombé, la 
superpuissance russe nargue et avertit l‟hyper puissance américaine.ˮ 
Translation : 
“«The unipolar world has nothing to do with democracy, which advocates that the majority takes into 
consideration the opinion of the minority. There are people who do not stop giving us lessons of democracy 
by which they do not abide themselves. Nobody feels any longer in security because nobody can boast any 
longer about the rules of international laws. The United States move out of their national borders in all 
fields, and this is very dangerous». In a few seconds, Putin broke the order of the international relations 
which was prevailing since the fall of the Soviet Union, in 1991, and more particularly since the 11
th
 of 
September 2001 ... ... in the country where the iron curtain has fallen, the Russian superpower scorns and 
warns the American hyper-power.ˮ 
 
161
 Annex 6 to this thesis briefly summarizes the failure of the negotiations over Kosovo‟s status at the end 
of the process. 
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demonstrated that Russia‟s stand over Kosovo‟s independence was just one part of a 
much larger framework for a new Russian worldwide policy long time engineered by 
President Putin and thereafter implemented by the Putin/Medvedev tandem.
162
 Indeed, 
President Medvedev‟s declaration, on Monday the 25th of August 2008, that his country 
was ready to break its relations with NATO reasserted the then toughness of Russia‟s 
position and the continuity of Putin‟s policy.163 
Ground developments in the region were consistent with Moscow‟s messages and thus 
confirmed its determination as the Western influence was threatening to get closer and 
closer to its vital space. It merits here to open a parenthesis highlighting the fact that all 
these regions of the Caucasus are considered by Russia as its « near abroad » in 
opposition to other places like Kosovo located in its « remote abroad »; and, in a 
September 2008 article, Germany‟s former Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, expressed 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
162
 Abi-Ramia, J. (2008, August 29). L‟Hebdo Magazine. Op-ci, p. 44: 
“Lors de la réunion de l’Otan d’avril 2008 à Bucarest, en Roumanie, alors qu‟invité pour discuter de 
l‟autorisation du transport logistique de matériel non militaire sur le sol russe, Vladimir Poutine a déclaré 
que l’élargissement de l’Otan vers les ex-Républiques de l’URSS constituait une menace pour la Russie.” 
Translation : 
“During the NATO meeting of April 2008 in Bucharest, in Romania, while invited to discuss the 
authorization of the logistic transport of non-military equipment on the Russian soil, Vladimir Putin 
declared that the extension of NATO to the ex-Republics of USSR constitutes a threat for Russia.ˮ 
 
163
 Ibid, p.44: 
“Les Européens, avec le président de l‟Union en exercice, Nicolas Sarkozy, très présent sur le dossier 
géorgien, pensaient mettre les Russes sous pression, en décidant ce lundi [soit, le 25 août 2008] de 
convoquer, pour le 1
er
 septembre, un sommet exceptionnel sur la situation en Géorgie. Une réunion qui 
sera consacrée « notamment à l‟avenir des relations de l‟Union européenne avec la Russie », selon le 
communiqué de la présidence française des Vingt-Sept. Moscou n‟a, semble-t-il, pas l‟intention de se 
laisser intimider. Le président russe, Dmitri Medvedev, est même allé jusqu’à déclarer, lundi, que son 
pays était prêt à « une rupture des relations » avec l’OTAN.ˮ 
Translation : 
“The Europeans, with the current president of the Union, Nicolas Sarkozy, closely following the Georgian 
issue, thought they would put the Russians under pressure in deciding this Monday [i.e., the 25
th
 of August 
2008] to call for an exceptional summit on the situation in Georgia, to be held on the 1
st
 of September. A 
meeting with an agenda particularly devoted «to the future of the relations of the European Union with 
Russia », according to a statement of the French presidency of the Twenty-Seven. Apparently Moscow has 
no intention to be intimidated. The Russian president, Dmitri Medvedev, went as far as declaring, on 
Monday, that his country was ready to «cut its relations » with NATO.ˮ 
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the opinion that Russia was then ready to use force to protect its patronage over its near 
abroad.
164
 This luxury, Russia could no longer afford it in dealing with its remote abroad 
after having lost its might in the early 1990s.
165
 But one has to admit that it moved in its 
near abroad shortly after the spark went off in its remote abroad. Accordingly, Russia 
made advantage of its inability to block Kosovo‟s unilateral declaration of independence 
to accelerate the process of reasserting itself next door to its borders. 
Examples of such developments are the following: 
i. The Georgian crisis in August 2008, 
ii. The April 2010 agreement (with a great deal of crashing and banging) on 
extending the lease by Ukraine to Russia for its Black Sea fleet of the Crimean 
harbor of Sevastopol for another quarter of century, thus until 2042, 
iii. The revolution in Kyrgyzstan which started in April 2010. 
With regard to the Georgian crisis, Scholars and journalists like Pavel Felgengauer, 
David Ignatius, Joseph S. Nye, Arielle Thedrel, Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, Isabelle Lasserre 
and Hélène Carrère d‟Encausse have all stressed on the long time premeditation for such 
Russian catching up. 
Pavel Felgengauer, a Muscovite analyst of defense issues, states that one of the main 
Russian objectives was to prevent such old satellite from integrating NATO; and the 
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 Fischer, J. (2008, September 6). Cold realism is needed to face Russian revivalism. The Daily Star, p.9. 
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 For example, as we saw earlier in discussing Euro-Balkans issues, Serbia and Kosovo are totally 
encircled by a majority of members of the European Union and a balance of prospective members; in fact 
Serbia and Kosovo are themselves prospective members. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, for the 
Russian army to move there as it did in Georgia in August 2008; all the more that the totality of the terrain 
of the former Yugoslavia has been under Western management since the fall of the Soviet Union. A 
Russian military action would therefore just be equivalent to challenging the West. 
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preparation of the military operation in Georgia was already under way in July 2008.
166
 
But David Ignatius goes way back and makes reference to the fact that there were more 
and more Russian signals on the forthcoming invasion of Georgia because of American 
attempts to bring its new ally into NATO, and the West wasn‟t sufficiently alert to stave 
off the flood through a diplomatic containment policy, although there was only one step 
to hint that Moscow was going to initiate a move after having used South Ossetia as a 
bait for Georgia. Ignatius says that Georgia‟s president, Mikhail Saakashvili, got lured 
into a trap set by the “Russian bear”. 167  The trap hypothesis is confirmed by other 
scholars like Joseph S. Nye who, importantly for our analysis, added that the issue over 
Kosovo‟s independence was not totally unrelated to such Russian plan in its direct 
neighborhood.
168
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 Mandeville, L. (2008, August 18). Cette opération a été planifiée de longue date [This operation was 
planned long time ago]. Le Figaro.  
 
167
 Ignatius, D. (2008, September 4). The US presidential candidates blow hot and cool on Georgia, p.9: 
“The Georgia crisis, in truth, shouldn’t have surprised anyone. It has been coming at us in slow motion 
for several years. The Russians, far from hiding their intention, have warned repeatedly that American 
attempts to bring Georgia into NATO were unacceptable to the Kremlin and would have consequences; 
the Bush administration didn’t respond to Russia’s statement of its interests in a way that might have 
deterred Moscow. It didn‟t make clear in advance the consequences Russia would pay if it attacked. 
Instead, the US tried to play both sides of the street – encouraging Georgia‟s NATO hopes, but not just yet. 
Georgia’s president, Mikhail Saakashvili, kept poking the Russian bear – and finally launched the attack 
on South Ossetia that gave Russia a pretext for its devastating response. The administration knew 
Saakashvili was walking into a trap, officials even told him so privately – but not with a decisive, high-
level intervention that might have checked the disaster.” 
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 Nye, J.S. (2008, September 5). Contrasts the guns and golds of August. The Daily Star, p.9: 
“ ... Russia is now going through a period of nationalistic reaction to what it regards as the humiliation it 
suffered after the Soviet empire collapsed. With the rise in energy prices boosting its economy, Russia has 
seen an opportunity to reassert its power over its neighbors. In addition, it felt aggrieved by plans for 
further expansion of NATO, a proposed ballistic missile defense system in Eastern Europe, and Western 
recognition of Kosovo’s secession from Russia’s ally, Serbia. 
Russia has sought to weaken Georgia’s government for some time. In early August, Russia set a trap in 
South Ossetia, and Georgia foolishly walked into it. ...” 
Note: 
In this article, Joseph S. Nye was in reality criticizing Russia for its use of what he calls “hard power” 
where, he feels, it could have obtained a better result with the use of “soft power” (non-military measures, 
persuasion, diplomacy, etc...). Our purpose here is not to compare hard power v/s soft power; but the above 
citations are important for our present analysis. 
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The above analyses were based on the rather near past; but some other analysts have 
focused on recent and ancient history to establish the traditional characteristic of Russia‟s 
position vis-à-vis its close satellites. For example, Arielle Thedrel and Fabrice Nodé-
Langlois pertinently point out that Southern Ossetia‟s and Abkhazia‟s claims for 
independence were issued in 1992, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union.
169
 Moreover, 
both Thedrel and Nodé-Langlois relevantly remark that Ossetians and Abkhazians are 
Russian nationals since 2002. As a result, Russia‟s potential control of those regions was 
more a reality than a threat.
170
 For her part, Hélène Carrère d‟Encausse, the prominent 
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 References :  
 
• Nodé-Langlois, F. (2007, October 15). L‟Ossétie du Sud s‟éloigne encore de la Géorgie [Southern 
Ossetia moves farther away from Georgia]. Le Figaro: 
“ ... La République autoproclamée d‟Ossétie du Sud. Ce territoire de 3 900 km2a fait sécession 
avec la Géorgie à l’issue du conflit sanglant de 1992.ˮ 
Translation : 
“ ... the auto-proclaimed republic of Southern Ossetia. This 3 900 km2 territory has seceded from 
Georgia at the outcome of the bloody conflict of 1992.ˮ 
 
• Nodé-Langlois, F. (2008, January 4). L‟Abkhazie, principal enjeu du scrutin Géorgien [Abkhazia, 
principal stake of the Georgian poll]. Le Figaro: 
“La Géorgie, république soviétique du versant sud du Caucase devenue indépendante en 1991, a 
été vite amputée de 2 provinces prorusses, la minuscule Ossétie du Sud et l’Abkhazie ... 
 ... La guerre de 1992-1993 aurait fait 13 000 morts. Les Abkhazes ont repoussé les Géorgiens. 
Et la république indépendante ... ... s‟est vidée de la moitié des ses 530 000 habitants.ˮ 
Translation : 
“Georgia, a Soviet Republic of the southern slope of the Caucasus, which became independent in 
1991, has been rapidly amputated of two pro-Russian provinces, the tiny Southern Ossetia and 
Abkhazia ... 
... The 1992-1993 war would have made 13000 dead. The Abkhazians have pushed back the 
Georgians. And the independent republic ... ... was emptied by half of its 530 000 inhabitants.ˮ 
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  References : 
 
• Nodé-Langlois, F. (2008, January 4). Le Figaro. Ibid: 
“L‟Abkhazie ressemble déjà à un protectorat russe. ...  jeunes et vieux parlent le russe. La devise 
est le rouble. Moscou a distribué en masse des passeports. Selon Sergueï Bagapch, le nouveau 
président abkhaze, 85% de la population qu‟il administre en détiendrait. Ainsi, la plupart des 
Abkhazes ont voté aux législatives russes du 2 décembre pour élire des députés à la Douma de 
Moscou.” 
Translation : 
“Abkhazia looks already like a Russian protectorate. ... young and elderly speak Russian. The 
currency is the rouble. Moscow has massively distributed passports. According to Sergueï 
Bagapch, the new Abkhazian president, 85% of the population he administers would hold Russian 
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perpetual secretary to the prestigious French Academy (l‟Académie française), goes even 
farther backward in history to highlight the fact that those minorities were consented by 
Lenin and Stalin a status of autonomy since 1922.
171
 And this latent issue had always 
been a handy tool ready for use by Russia if needed. As a matter of fact, a lot of analysts 
like Lasserre and Nodé-Langlois reported about the threat of swapping Kosovo‟s 
unilaterally declared independence with South Ossetia and Abkhazia‟s recognition by 
Russia.
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 And the August 2008 vote of the Russian « Duma » in favor of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
passports. Thus, most Abkhazians have voted at the legislative elections of the 2
nd
 of December 
to elect deputies at Moscow’s Duma.ˮ 
 
• Thedrel, A. (2008, August 14).  L‟accord Géorgie-Russie ne règle pas tous les contentieux [The 
Russo-Georgian agreement does not settle all disputes. Le Figaro: 
“La Russie fait valoir que l’Abkhazie (12% du territoire géorgien) a proclamé son indépendance 
en août 1992 et que la même année, l’Ossétie du Sud (5% du territoire géorgien) s’est prononcée 
par référendum pour son rattachement à l’Ossétie du Nord (qui fait partie de la Fédération de 
Russie). Ossètes et Abkhazes possèdent des passeports russes depuis 2002.” 
Translation : 
“Russia emphasizes that Abkhazia (12% of the Georgian territory) proclaimed independence in 
August 1992 and that the same year, Southern Ossetia (5% of the Georgian territory) has opted 
by referendum for its jurisdictional linkage to Northern Ossetia (which is part of the Russian 
Federation). Ossetians and Abkhazians have Russian passports since 2002.ˮ 
 
171
 Carrère d‟Encausse, H. (2008, August 13). Le président géorgien a rendu, malgré lui, un grand service à 
la Russie [The Georgian President has made a larger favor to Russia, against his will]. Le Figaro: 
“Les peuples minoritaires – ossètes, abkhazes, adjars, etc. – avaient reçu en 1922 de Lénine et Staline, 
soucieux de briser le sentiment national géorgien, un statut d‟autonomie culturel et administratif au sein de 
la République.” 
Translation : 
“Minority peoples – Ossetians, Abkhazians, Adjars, etc. – had been granted in 1922 a status of cultural 
and administrative autonomy within the Georgian Republic by Lenin and Stalin, who were eager to break 
the Georgian national feeling.ˮ 
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• Lasserre, I. (2007, November 16). Belgrade ne jure plus que par le grand frère russe [Belgrade 
does no longer swear by anyone else but the Russian big brother]. Le Figaro: 
“ ... la Russie de Poutine a des cartes puissantes, qui servent ses intérêts. ... l’effet domino que 
pourrait avoir, pour le meilleur ou pour le pire, l’indépendance du Kosovo sur les nombreux 
conflits gelés de l’ancien espace soviétique.” 
Translation : 
“ ... Putin‟s Russia has powerful cards which serve its interest. ... the domino effect that could 
have, for the best or for the worst, the independence of Kosovo on the numerous frozen conflicts 
of the old Soviet Space.ˮ 
 
Also quoting a European observer: 
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independence of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia gives such analysis substantial 
credence.
173
 Indeed, one may ask otherwise why the Russians waited so long to recognize 
those peoples‟ independence. 
As for Ukraine, if any element transpires from the Russo-Ukrainian April 2010 landmark 
agreement (as qualified by Nicolai N. Petro) signed in Kharkov in a cloak-and-dagger 
operation (in the words of Friedbert Pflüger) for extending Russia‟s lease from Ukraine 
of the Crimean harbor of Sevastopol for its Black Sea Fleet in exchange of a 30% 
discount on the price of Russian gas coupled with a commitment for 10 years of 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Les Russes ont remarquablement joué. Si le Kosovo est indépendant, ils utiliseront le précédent 
pour certaines républiques sécessionnistes de l’ancien espace soviétique, comme l’Abkhazie. Et 
s‟il y a un compromis, ils diront qu‟ils avaient eu raison de s‟opposer à l‟indépendance et qu‟un 
accord était possible. Ils sont gagnants dans tous les cas.” 
Translation : 
“The Russians have remarkably played. If Kosovo is independent, they will use the precedent for 
certain secessionist republics of the old Soviet Space, like Abkhazia. And if there is a 
compromise, they will say that they were right to oppose independence and that an agreement was 
possible. They are winners in any case.ˮ 
 
• Lasserre, I. (2007, November 29). Le Figaro. Op-cit:  
“La Russie a en effet affirmé qu’elle considérait l’indépendance du Kosovo comme un 
précédent qu’elle pourrait reproduire dans sa sphère d’influence, notamment en Abkhazie et en 
Transnistrie, deux républiques indépendantistes très proches de Moscou.” 
Translation : 
“Russia has indeed asserted that it considers the independence of Kosovo like a precedent that it 
could reproduce in its sphere of influence, particularly in Abkhazia and in Transnistria, two 
separatist republics very close to Moscow.ˮ 
 
• Nodé-Langlois, F. (2008, January 4). Le Figaro. Op-cit:  
“Moscou a averti qu’en cas d’indépendance du Kosovo, les territoires séparatistes de Géorgie 
(l’Abkhazie, Ossétie du Sud), de Moldavie (Transnistrie) et d’Azerbaïdjan (Haut-Karabakh) 
pourraient suivre le même chemin.” 
Translation : 
“Moscow has warned that in case of independence of Kosovo, the separatist territories of 
Georgia (Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia), of Moldavia (Transnistria) and Azerbaijan (Upper-
Karabakh) could follow the same path.ˮ 
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• The Associated Press. (2008, August 26). Russia recognizes breakaway Georgian regions. The 
New York Times. 
 
• Medvedev‟s statement on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (2008, August 27). The New York Times.  
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uninterrupted supply, such element is but a modification of the balance in favor of 
Russia‟s resurgence as a regional patron and its determination to freeze any European or 
North Atlantic aspiration for Ukraine in the foreseeable future, as pertinently explained 
by Friedbert Pflüger.
174
 Indeed, a Reuters‟ news item in the New York Time has 
consistently reported on the 27
th
 of May 2010 that Ukraine formally ended its pursuit of 
NATO membership.
175
 In passing, it may be worth mentioning that, the Russians 
consolidated the deal by offering the Ukrainians a carrot in waiving a $2 billion fine 
owed to Russia by Ukraine for having purchased less gas than provided for in a January 
2010 contract.
176
 And from the way the factual situation is developing, those protests 
during the stormy parliamentary voting session of the 27
th
 of April 2010 – expressed by 
an exchange of punches and the throwing of smoke bombs and eggs, from which the 
speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament had to be protected by umbrellas – and the 
subsequent street demonstrations reflect nothing else than the powerlessness of the 
Ukrainians in resisting Russia‟s reinvigorating hegemony and its fait accompli.177 With 
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 Pflüger, F. (2010, April 30). Fighting over Moscow‟s embrace. International Herald Tribune, p. 6: 
“The Ukrainian-Russian agreement suggests a de facto end to any prospects of NATO membership for 
Ukraine in the foreseeable future. While NATO and the European Union have hesitated about making any 
concrete moves toward Ukrainian accession, the Kremlin has known exactly what it wants. 
... ... 
But it is the Kremlin, at least for now, that decides whether and to what extent Ukraine will be allowed to 
integrate into the European structures.” 
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 Reuters. (2010, May 27). Ukraine: NATO application suspended. The New York Times. 
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 Barry, E. (2010, May 3). Putin surprises Ukraine with energy-merger plan. International Herald Tribune, 
p.4: 
“Russia, in return, agreed to cut the price of its natural gas by 30 percent – at a cost to Russia of at least 
$30 billion, Mr. Weafer said [Chris Weafer : chief strategist at UralSib Capital, an investment bank] – and 
went on to waive a $2billion fine it could have levied on Ukraine for purchasing less gas than was included 
in a contract signed in January.” 
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all due respect to Petro‟s logic and a reasonable extent of realism, such circumstances, 
together with the Putin/Medvedev geopolitical nostalgia, leave so far little room for 
suggesting a Russian willingness to share anything with the European Union or with any 
other power over places like Ukraine; for Russia, the negotiation should encompass other 
terrains, if not exclusively be over such other terrains.
178 
And this perception tends to 
make sense if we consider Putin‟s concurrent proposal to merge Russia‟s giant Gazprom 
(the largest gas provider of the world of which Europe is heavily tributary) with the ailing 
Ukrainian Naftogaz, along with a series of other projects (including the merging of 
Russian nuclear assets with those of Ukraine, it should importantly be emphasized) 
whose resultant would inevitably be to increase Ukraine‟s economic (and political as a 
consequence) dependency on Russia; we will elaborate more thoroughly on this subject 
in discussing the oil issue next section.
179
 It does not mean that the Ukrainians are not 
                                                                                                                                                 
• Williams, S. & AFP. (2010, April 29). La Russie fait feu de tout bois pour rétablir son influence 
en Ukraine [Russia is using all available means to reestablish its influence over Ukraine]. L‟Orient 
– Le Jour, p.10. 
 
• AFP. (2010, May 11). Moscou-Kiev: protestations en Ukraine [Moscow-Kiev : [street] protests in 
Ukraine] . Le Figaro. 
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 Petro, N.N. (2010, May 5). Ukraine can have them and us. International herald Tribune, p. 8: 
“Few, however, seem to see that there is a third option – embrace Ukraine and turn it to the West‟s 
advantage. Replace the misguided « divide and conquer » strategy that the West has been pursuing in the 
region with a new one that aims at the simultaneous integration of the Slavic cultural component of Europe 
into pan-European institutions. Make Ukraine Europe‟s indispensable partner for bringing Russia into the 
European Union. Rather than placing the two countries on different tracks, reward them both for moving 
along the same path.” 
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• Pflüger, F. (2010, April, 30). International Herald Tribune. Op-cit, p. 6: 
“Now there are signs that the visit to Brussels was just cosmetic, and that Mr. Yanukovitch‟s  real 
focus has been development of relations with Moscow [Viktor Yanukovitch is the newly elected 
pro-Russian Ukrainian president and he made a state visit to the EU in Brussels on the 5
th
 of 
March 2010]. Since March 5, there have been at least seven Russia-Ukraine meetings on the level 
of president or prime minister – in effect, one a week. Four more meetings are scheduled before 
May 17. 
On the night before the memorable Parliament session, the Russian prime minister, Vladimir 
Putin, made an unscheduled visit to Kiev, bringing a long list of proposed joint projects. 
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trying to resist Russia‟s attempts to resume control over their destiny. Indeed, even the 
new president himself Viktor Yanukovich, a veteran apparatchik of the Soviet Era, is 
keeping on the agenda Ukraine‟s EU integration as a long-term goal and had objected 
that he would have to consult with the EU before deciding on the merging of Gazprom 
and Naftogaz, but the fate of such condition is still unclear at this stage.
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 It is unclear 
                                                                                                                                                 
They include cooperation on new nuclear reactors (on the 24
th
 anniversary of Chernobyl!), a 
bridge between Russia and the Crimea, cooperation of the aircraft industries and Russian 
access to gas transportation and storage systems in Ukraine.”  
 
• Poutine propose de marier Gazprom à l‟ukrainien Naftogaz [Putin proposes to marry Gazprom to 
the Ukrainian Naftogaz]. (2010, May 1). L‟orient – Le Jour, p.9: 
“La demande de mariage gazier suit ainsi de peu une autre idée lancée il y a quelques jours par 
M. Poutine : en déplacement à Kiev, il avait suggéré de créer une holding rassemblant les actifs 
nucléaires des deux pays, ... ...” 
Translation : 
“The gas marriage proposal follows thus by a short period of time another idea tried a few days 
ago by Mr. Putin : while travelling in Kiev, he had suggested to create a holding company that 
would assemble and carry the nuclear assets of both countries, ... ...” 
 
• Reuters. (2010, May 12). Energie : pas d‟accords Ukraine/Russie [Energy: no agreement 
Ukraine/Russia]. Le Figaro: 
“La Russie a également proposé une plus forte coopération avec l‟Ukraine en matière d‟énergie 
nucléaire”. 
Translation : 
“Russia has also proposed a larger cooperation with Ukraine on the matter of nuclear energy.” 
 
• AFP. (2010, May 17). Accords signés entre Moscou et Kiev [Agreements signed between 
Moscow and Kiev). Le Figaro: 
“Cinq accords de coopération ont été signés, dont le plus important concerne la délimitation de la 
frontière russo-ukrainienne. Les autres portent sur l‟utilisation conjointe du système russe de 
navigation par satellite Glonass, et la collaboration dans les secteurs bancaire, culturel et 
éducatif.” 
Translation : 
“Five cooperation agreements have been signed, whose most important is on the delimitation of 
the Russo-Ukrainian border. The others are on the joint usage of the Russian navigation system by 
satellite Glonass, and the collaboration in the fields of banking, culture and education. ” 
 
• Kiev se rapproche de Moscou, mais pas trop! [Kiev is getting closer to Moscow, but not too 
much!]. (2010, May 19). Le Figaro: 
“Par ailleurs, toute une série d‟accords parallèles a été signée. Il s‟agit notamment de l‟ouverture 
du marché russe à l‟exportation des tuyaux ukrainiens, et l‟ouverture du marché ukrainien aux 
produits chimiques russes.” 
Translation : 
“In addition, a whole series of accords has been signed. They involve particularly opening the 
Russian market for the export of Ukrainian pipes, and opening the Ukrainian market for Russian 
chemical products.” 
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precisely because of the concerns of the European Union (EU), according to some reports, 
to be short of gas as a result of Russo-Ukrainian disagreements over energy; and hence 
the EU may paradoxically not support Ukraine in its attempts to throw off Russia‟s 
domination in connection with gas if the supply is rather uninterrupted under Russia‟s 
patronage.
181
 As a matter of fact a similar seism which had triggered European alarm 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
• Kiev se rapproche de Moscou, mais pas trop! [Kiev is getting closer to Moscow, but not too much]. 
Ibid: 
“Le président ukrainien a presque immédiatement douché l‟enthousiasme du Premier ministre 
russe Vladimir Poutine, qui voulait aller plus loin avec la proposition de fusion du monopoliste 
russe Gazprom et de la plus grande compagnie gazière ukrainienne, Naftogaz. Le nouvel élu a 
tenu à renforcer sa position pro-européenne en politique étrangère en affirmant que toute fusion 
se fera uniquement après des discussions concertées avec l‟Union européenne. 
... . Or c’est exactement ce que veut éviter Moscow, qui tient à tout prix à écarter Bruxelles des 
infrastructures gazières ukrainiennes. 
... Yanoukovich est encore en rodage pour trouver un nouvel équilibre entre Moscou et Bruxelles.” 
Translation : 
“The Ukrainian President has almost immediately let down the enthusiasm of the Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin, who wanted to go further ahead with the merging proposition between 
the Russian monopolist Gazprom and the largest gas Ukrainian gas company, Naftogaz. The 
newly elected [president] was keen on strengthening his pro-European position in foreign 
policy in asserting that any merging will only be done after thorough discussions with the 
European Union. 
... . Yet, this is exactly what Moscow wants to avoid, as it is eager to keep Brussels away from 
Ukrainian gas infrastructures. 
Yanukovich is still running in to find a new equilibrium between Moscow and Brussels.” 
 
• Reuters. (2010, June 1). Ukraine Ditches NATO goal. The New York Times:  
“Ukraine‟s new president , ... ... , outlined a foreign policy bill on Tuesday that ditches his 
predecessor„s aim to join NATO but keeps EU-membership as a long-term goal. 
President Viktor Yanukovich‟s draft foreign policy law would commit Ukraine to «a non-bloc 
policy which means not participating in military-political alliances,» a clear effort to show he is 
trying to steer between East and West.” 
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 Européens et Russes cherchent à relancer leur coopération économique et politique [Europeans and 
Russians are trying to resume their economic and political cooperation]. (2010, May 20). Le Figaro: 
“Le deuxième de ces trois dossiers concerne indirectement les intérêts de l‟Union européenne. Il s‟agit de 
la proposition de fusion entre les deux géants gaziers, russe et ukrainien, Gazprom et Naftogaz. 
Officiellement, l‟Union européenne considère que la question relève de la compétence des pays concernés. 
Mais elle va en étudier les conséquences possibles pour ses consommateurs. Car plusieurs coupures 
d’approvisionnement en gaz de ces dernières années, causées par des conflits entre la Russie et 
l’Ukraine, ont beaucoup agacé les Européens. L’amélioration des relations entre Ukraine et Russie 
consécutive à l’élection du président prorusse Viktor Yanoukovich, rassure déjà à Bruxelles.” 
Translation : 
“The second of those three matters involves indirectly the interests of the European Union. It is about the 
merging proposal between the two gas giants, Russian and Ukrainian, Gazprom and Naftogaz. Officially, 
the European Union considers the question as being of the competence of the concerned countries. But she 
will study the resulting possible consequences for her own consumers. Because several interruptions of 
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bells has recently been avoided next door, as Byelorussia was in conflict with Russia 
about financial dues for gas related matters.
182
 Consequently, what we can say now is that 
Russia is in fact making advantage of Ukraine‟s economic difficulties to offer it not more 
than lifebuoys that would afford back a Russian foothold in this old satellite which was 
on the verge of turning Westward and hence being lost for Russia; and Ukrainian pro-
Western leaders, like former Prime Minister Ms. Yulia Tymoshenko, are aware of such 
policy and had a hard time resisting it.
183
  
                                                                                                                                                 
gas supply these last years, caused by conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, have a lot irritated the 
Europeans. The improvement of relations between Ukraine and Russia consequently to the election of 
the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich, already reassures Brussels.” 
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• Gazprom réduit ses livraisons de gaz à Minsk, réunion de crise à Bruxelles [Gazprom reduces its 
gas deliveries to Minsk, crisis meeting in Brussels]. (2010, June 22). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p. 9. 
• Le Belarus suspend le transit du gaz vers l‟Europe, Moscou veut rassurer [The Belarus suspends 
gas transit toward Europe, Moscow wants to reassure]. (2010, June 23]. L‟Orient – le Jour, p.9. 
• La crise du gaz entre la Russie et le Belarus s‟envenime [The gas crisis between Russia and the 
Belarus is worsening]. (2010, June 24). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9. 
• Détente dans le conflit gazier entre la Russie et le Belarus [Detente in the gas conflict between 
Russia and the Belarus]. (2010, June 25). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9. 
• La Russie et le Belarus mettent fin à leur conflit gazier [Russia and the Belarus put an end to their 
gas conflict]. (2010, July 3). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9. 
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• Tessier-Stall, S. & Zarembo, K. (2010, May 21). Ukraine is not yet „lost‟ – Yanukovich has no 
choice but to deal with Moscow, but he is not Moscow‟s man. International Herald Tribune, p.6: 
“... it‟s a bad deal. In exchange for rebates on natural gas until 2019, President Yanukovich has 
allowed Moscow to station its Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol until 2042. In doing so, he 
has allowed Russia to maintain a foothold in a particularly unstable part of Ukraine – Crimea – 
and to continue to project its military power in the volatile Black Sea region – not a minor 
development, especially after Russia and neighbor Georgia came to blows in August 2008. 
... ... 
The agreement is less evidence of Mr. Yanukovich’s geopolitical inclinations than proof of his 
country’s weakness. Ukraine‟s economy shrank by one seventh in 2009, and with it the 
government‟s ability to pay its energy bills. 
Even Yulia Tymoshenko, a leader of the Orange Revolution who as recently as 2008 had called 
for Ukraine to join NATO, as prime minister found herself compelled in 2009 to make 
important concessions to Moscow – including a gas accord so one-sided [that] it had to be 
revised only a few months after its signing. 
... ... 
It is too early to say that President Yanukovich is intentionally helping Russia « steal » Ukraine 
from the West. He is more positively inclined toward Moscow than his predecessor, but the truth is 
that he has been pushed into a corner by a combination of geopolitical ineptness, special interests 
and pre-existing problems.” 
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The third example of ground developments which followed Russia‟s signals is the 
outburst of riots, beginning April 2010, in the small Republic of Kyrgyzstan. Nathalie 
Ouvaroff fairly covered the issue. She pointed out the fact that there are two bases in this 
country, one Russian base and one American base (established in Manas since 2001) 
which is said to be momentarily closed, but which the Russians would most logically 
want to see permanently closed.
184
 Ouvaroff further expands her analysis highlighting the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
• Wilson, A. (2010, May 21). Tilting toward Russia? Keeping close ties with the Kremlin may 
strengthen Yanukovich‟s hand, at home and abroad. International Herald Tribune, p.6: 
“Viktor Yanukovich replaced the Kremlin‟s bête noire, Viktor Yushchenko, as Ukrainian president 
in February. Since then, high-level meetings have taken place almost weekly, culminating in Mr. 
Medvedev‟s state visit to Kiev this week. ... ... 
Mr. Yanukovich has now signed a huge number of agreements with Russia, most notably the 
deal to swap an extra 25 years for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for a 30 percent 
reduction in the price of gas. Ukraine has also agreed to big deals on cooperation in the nuclear 
industry and in the aviation, a 10-year economic cooperation plan, and common positions on 
Transnistria and security in the Black Sea region that have disturbed neighbors like Moldova and 
Georgia. And Mr. Yanukovich has backed Mr. Medvedev‟s pet European Security Initiative and its 
goal to « eliminate the dangerous dividing lines that have appeared in the European region over 
the past decade ». 
A recently leaked strategy paper written by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, defines 
Russia’s overall aim as nothing less than « to actively draw Ukraine into an orbit of economic 
cooperation with Russia ».” 
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 Ouvaroff, N. (2010, June 18). Le retour de la Russie impériale [The return of the imperial Russia]. 
L‟Hebdo Magazine, p.45: 
“Début avril, à l‟autre bout de l‟espace postsoviétique, des «troubles spontanés», provoqués par la 
corruption et le népotisme du président, éclatent dans la petite République Kirghize, seul pays du monde à 
abriter une base russe et une base américaine. Le président Kourmanbek Bakiev, considéré comme 
favorable à l‟Occident, est chassé et remplacé par un gouvernement de salut public dirigé par Rosa 
Otoumbaeva, dont la première initiative est d‟envoyer une délégation à Moscou. Quant à la base 
américaine de Manas, elle est momentanément fermée. Les Russes démentent toute implication dans les 
événements, les experts sont sceptiques. Certains voient également la main de l‟Iran. Peu de temps avant 
«la révolution», Bakiev avait accepté la création d‟un centre antiterroriste à côté de la base [américaine], 
et le président Iranien, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, avait accusé la Kirghizie de fermer les yeux sur la 
formation par les experts américains de «terroristes» payés pour déstabiliser le régime iranien. 
... ... 
La révolution Kirghize n‟a été qu‟un coup d‟Etat fomenté par les barons de la drogue qui sont en train de 
transformer le pays en un second Afghanistan, avec en prime des risques de sécession entre le Nord et le 
Sud.” 
Translation : 
“Beginning of April, at the other end of the post-Soviet space, «spontaneous troubles», caused by the 
corruption and the nepotism of the president, outburst in the small Kirghiz Republic, the only country of the 
world which hosts a Russian base and an American base. President Kourmanbek Bakiev, considered as 
favoring the West, is expelled and replaced by a government of public salvation led by Rosa Otoumbaeva, 
whose first initiative is to send a delegation to Moscow. As to the American base of Manas, it is 
97 
rivalries on the control of the post-Soviet space : the United States‟ and China‟s rivalry 
over Central Asia on one hand, and Iran‟s and Turkey‟s rivalry over the Caucasus on the 
other hand. There are Russian advances on the ground like the reconstituted hard node of 
Russia-Ukraine-Byelorussia-Kazakhstan; but the competition is far from being over as, 
for example, it is still open (i) in Byelorussia where the talks over customs unification did 
not yield any result for the time being, and (ii) in Kazakhstan which offered to host a new 
US military base in exchange for the one lost in Manas, Kyrgyzstan.
185
 The Russians 
                                                                                                                                                 
momentarily closed. The Russians deny any implication in the events, but experts are skeptical. Some of 
them see even the hand of Iran. A little before «the revolution», Bakiev had accepted the creation of an 
antiterrorist center close to the base, and the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had accused 
Kirghizia of closing its eyes on the training, by American experts, of «terrorists» paid to destabilize the 
Iranian Regime. 
... ... 
The revolution in Kirghizia has just been a Coup d‟état, fomented by drug tycoons who are transforming 
the country in a second Afghanistan with, on top of it, risks of secessions between North and South”. 
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 Ibid, p.45: 
“ ... ... la politique russe dans le CEI [Communauté des Etats Indépendants], devenue un nouveau terrain 
de guerre froide, se heurte à d‟autres intérêts et ambitions, ceux des Etats-Unis et la Chine en Asie centrale, 
ceux de l‟Iran et surtout de la Turquie dans le Caucase. Cette rivalité des trois grandes puissances et des 
puissances émergeantes pour le contrôle de l‟espace postsoviétique augmente les risques de déstabilisation 
dans les régions volatiles et hautement stratégiques. 
Certes, le noyau dur Russie-Ukraine-Biélorussie-Kazakhstan est reconstitué. Cependant, de nombreux 
problèmes demeurent. Les pourparlers avec le Belarus pour l‟union douanière ont été laborieux et n‟ont 
pas pour le moment apporté de résultat. Quant au Kazakhstan, s‟il a signé le traité instituant un espace 
économique unique entre les deux pays, il a dans le même temps offert à la Maison-Blanche une base 
militaire pour remplacer celle de Manas. 
... ... 
Le conflit gelé du Haut-Karabagh risque de se réchauffer avec la montée en puissance de la Turquie, 
décidée de s‟inviter dans le processus de Minsk pour être en mesure de soutenir plus efficacement 
l‟Azerbaïdjan”. 
Translation : 
“ ... ... The policy of Russia in the CIS [Community of Independent States], which became a new terrain for 
a Cold War, faces other interests and ambitions, those of the United States and China in Central Asia, 
those of Iran and particularly Turkey in the Caucasus. This rivalry of the three great powers and of the 
emerging powers for the control of the post-Soviet space increases the destabilization risks in highly 
strategic and volatile regions. 
It is true that the hard node Russia-Ukraine-Byelorussia-Kazakhstan has been reconstituted. A lot of 
problems however persist. Talks with the Belarus for customs unification have been laborious without 
yielding any result for the moment. As to Kazakhstan, it has indeed signed the Treaty implementing a 
unique economic space between the two counties, but it has concurrently offered The White House a 
military base to replace that of Manas. 
... ... 
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denied of course any implication, but the circumstantial outcome does not seem to be 
detrimental for them; as a matter of fact (i) Moscow recognized the temporary 
government led by Mrs. Rosa Outounbaïeva, and (ii) this latter revealed in a press 
conference that she wrote to President Dmitri Medvedev asking for assistance in 
reinstating order in the country, notwithstanding his abstention to comply with the 
request, not only because, unlike Georgia, Kyrgyzstan has no common borders with 
today‟s Russia (Kazakhstan is in between) but also for apprehending the challenge of 
having to resolve unwanted ethnic problems as unsuccessfully experienced by the 
Russians in Afghanistan.
186
 Ouvaroff further states that the Kremlin has played with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
The frozen conflict in the Upper Karabakh runs the risk of being revived with the rise of Turkey‟s power, 
given consideration to its determination to invite itself to in the process of Minsk in order to be able to 
support more efficiently Azerbaijan”. 
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 References: 
• Collins, J.F. & Rojansky, M. (2010, June 15). Kyrgyzstan: a test for mutual security. The New 
York Times: 
“Although the Kyrgyz provisional government has called for Russian troops to help maintain 
order, Moscow referred the problem to the C.S.T.O. [Collective Security Treaty Organization, an 
alliance of seven former Soviet states], which resolved on Monday to provide «comprehensive 
assistance».” 
• Ouvaroff, N. (2010, June 25). Le Kremlin joue avec le feu [The Kremlin plays with the fire]. 
L‟Hebdo Magazine, pp.44-45: 
“Rosa Outoumbaïeva a annoncé au cours d‟une conférence de presse qu‟elle avait écrit au 
président Dmitri Medvedev pour lui demander son assistance afin de ramener l‟ordre dans le pays. 
« La situation à Och est hors de contrôle. Tous nos efforts pour rétablir un dialogue entre les 
communautés ont échoué, nous avons demandé à la Russie son aide et nous espérons que des 
mesures seront prises dans les plus brefs délais », ... ... . La décision de la présidente 
intérimaire, ... ... , ne fait pas l‟unanimité. Certains observateurs remarquent que la présence de 
forces étrangères, loin de ramener le calme, ne fera qu‟envenimer la situation et de rappeler «le 
bourbier afghan» dont les Russes ont eu tant de mal à sortir et que les Américains ne parviennent 
toujours pas à pacifier. 
... ... 
Moscou reconnaît immédiatement le nouveau régime. Dans ce contexte, il n‟est pas étonnant que 
de nombreux experts aient vu la main de la Russie dans événements de Bichkek”. 
Translation : 
“Rosa Outoumbaïeva has announced during a press conference that she wrote to President Dmitri 
Medvedev requesting his assistance in order to reinstate order in the country. « The situation in 
Och is out of control. All our efforts to reestablish a dialogue between the communities have failed, 
we have asked Russia to help us and we hope that measures will be taken within the shortest 
deadlines », .... ... .The decision of the interim President has not obtained a unanimous support. 
Recalling the «Afghan quagmire» of which the Russians had a hard time getting out and that the 
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fire in this episode of its competition with the United States over the post-Soviet space, 
because it underestimated ethno-religious related factors.
187
 The credibility of Ouvaroff‟s 
analysis cannot be categorically ruled out if a recent statement of President Medvedev is 
profoundly meditated on. Indeed, he wasn‟t satisfied with the voting of the new 
constitution which aimed at reducing the prerogatives of the Kyrgyz President to the 
benefit of a democratic (multiethnic) Parliament, favoring instead that a « strong 
administration » be vested with power.
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 Summing up therefore, Ouvaroff‟s analysis 
enables us to cautiously suggest in the bottom line that, regardless of whether or not 
                                                                                                                                                 
Americans are still unable to pacify, some observers note that the presence of foreign forces, far 
from calming down the situation back again, will only worsen it. 
... ... 
Moscow immediately recognized the new regime. In this context, it is not surprising that a lot of 
experts saw Russia‟s hands in the events of Bichkek ”. 
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 Ouvaroff, N. (2010, June 25). L‟Hebdo Magazine. Ibid, p.45: 
“... le Kremlin, centré exclusivement sur son bras de fer avec les Etats-Unis pour la réappropriation de 
l‟espace postsoviétique, a joué avec le feu en sous-estimant un certain nombre de facteurs à l‟œuvre dans 
la République : les frustrations de la minorité ouzbek, la perte de popularité du gouvernement provisoire 
qui accumules les erreurs et, enfin, la montée de l‟islam radical”. 
Translation : 
“... focusing on its arm-wrestle with the United States for the recuperation of the post-Soviet space, the 
Kremlin has played with the fire in underestimating a certain number of active factors in the Republic : the 
frustrations of the Uzbek minority, the drop of popularity of the temporary government which accumulates 
errors, and finally the rise of radical Islam”. 
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 La nouvelle Constitution approuvée au Kirghizistan [Approval of the new Constitution in Kyrgyzstan]. 
(2010, June 29). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.10: 
“La nouvelle Constitution devrait affaiblir considérablement le président au bénéfice du Parlement afin 
d‟éviter la concentration du pouvoir dans les mains d‟une seule personne. ... ... 
... ... 
La Russie a exprimé des inquiétudes, le président Dmitri Medvedev estimant que la Constitution risquait 
d‟attiser l‟extrémisme. «Une république parlementaire au Kirghizistan pourrait encourager l‟arrivée au 
pouvoir de forces extrémistes», a-t-il déclaré à l‟issue du sommet du G20 au Canada, estimant nécessaire 
«un pouvoir fort» pour éviter l‟«éclatement» de cette ex-république soviétique”. 
Translation : 
“The new Constitution should considerably weaken the president to the advantage of Parliament in order 
to avoid power concentration in the hands of one person. ... ... 
 ... ... 
Russia has expressed concerns, as President Dmitri Medvedev estimated that the Constitution would risk 
awakening extremism. At the end of the G20 summit in Canada, he said that «a parliamentary republic in 
Kyrgyzstan may encourage the taking over by extremist forces» estimating that «a strong regime» was 
necessary to avoid the «breakup» of the ex-Soviet Republic”. 
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Moscow would have played a role in orchestrating the events to oust the United States, 
the outcome of such events did not seem to negatively affect Russia which, moreover, 
stays very prudent about opening up a Pandora box of irreconcilable belligerents called « 
parliamentary democracy »; this would explain Moscow‟s prompt recognition of the new 
government and, conversely, its restraint about walking into the trap of a risky 
intervention in an ethnically mined terrain, even upon President Outounbaïeva‟s official 
“invitation”. The West is therefore very welcome to go far away if that was the will of 
“providential” circumstances, but in accordance with Russian standards there should be 
one Kyrgyz interlocutor to deal with ... if not to squarely receive instructions from 
Moscow. 
The return on Russia‟s “investment” in the Caucasus and in Central Asia has to date been 
relatively efficient insofar as (i) Western expansion has slowed down there, and (ii) the 
“subcontracting” of Kosovo‟s issue to the “fertile imagination” of the ICJ (with all due 
respect) has yielded nothing more than a hopeful prelude to a workable settlement, in the 
absence of any forceful condition. 
Regarded as such, it becomes clearly evident that the independence of Kosovo is neither 
an isolated issue which emerged by itself in a vacuum nor a fundamental cause for 
Russia‟s policy in the Caucasus. Our analysis enables us instead to suggest that Kosovo‟s 
independence has been a catalytic event of sufficient magnitude to give Russia‟s latent 
momentum a substantial impulse after years of incubation; such building up of energy 
had to do with Russia‟s long term goals and its release was only a matter of timing; the 
“Go Ahead” was of course Kosovo. Such interplay between immediate objectives and 
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long term goals was finely decoded by Hélène Carrère d‟Encausse.189 In other words, 
there seems to be a kind of inverse relationship between Russia‟s immediate objectives 
and long term goals on one side, and its geographical priorities on the other side; in that 
the reassertion of its imperial power (particularly in its direct vicinity) was in reality its 
long term goal; and Russia‟s apparent strategy was to make use of the serving of its 
immediate objectives in remote areas where it had an influence (Serbia/Kosovo) to help 
ultimately achieving the said long term goal. 
Thus, may we deduce from the above overview and analysis, after years of weakness 
because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, instead of conceding any negotiation 
on Kosovo, Russia ignored the calls of the West and rather triggered the maneuver for its 
long time planned reentry of the international chessboard – of which, it would later 
appear that Kosovo was only one pawn out of many others, the most critical of them for 
Russia being concentrated in the Caucasus and in Central Asia – with substantially more 
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 Carrère d‟Encausse, H. (2008, August 13). Le Figaro. Op-cit: 
“Le sort des Ossètes et des Abkhazes importe peu, en définitive, à la Russie, même si elle y a attisé le feu 
du séparatisme pour affaiblir Saakashvili et son zèle atlantiste. Mais il s’agit ici des leviers de l’action 
russe et non de la logique de son action. Ce qui est au cœur du conflit pour Moscou, c’est la puissance 
perdue il y a près de 20 ans, l‟humiliation d‟un pays privé d‟Empire et qui a essayé vainement de 
construire avec ses anciennes possessions une communauté d‟un type nouveau, tandis que ses partenaires 
potentiels se dressaient contre lui et se tournaient vers l‟Occident, les Etats-Unis, avant tout. ...  
... 
... et la reconnaissance par les Etats-Unis et quelques pays européens de l’indépendance du Kosovo, au 
mépris des protestations russes, ce que la Russie n’avait pas manqué d’invoquer comme précédent 
possible à une future reconnaissance de l’Ossétie et de l’Abkhazie.ˮ 
Translation : 
“The fate of Ossetians and Abkhazians, finally, does not import Russia much, even if she has poked there 
the flames of separatism to weaken Saakachvili and his Atlantic zeal. But these are only the levers of 
Russia’s action and not its logic. The issue being at the heart of the conflict for Moscow is the lost power 
some 20 years ago, the humiliation of a country deprived of Empire and which has vainly tried to construct 
with its old possessions a new type community, whereas its potential partners were all standing against it 
and turning towards the West, beginning with the United States. ... 
... 
... and the recognition by the United States and some European countries of the independence of Kosovo, 
with no regard for Russian protests, a fact that Russia did not fail to invoke as a possible precedent to a 
future recognition of Ossetia and Abkhazia.ˮ 
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leverage than what was left for it just when its empire collapsed in the early 1990s. Hence, 
from a Russian perspective, the Serbian nationalism and affectivity in connection with 
the history of Kosovo should obviously be regarded here as an appropriate ingredient 
nourishing Russia‟s hearty appetite to recover – at least partially – the prior losses it 
incurred to the detriment of its status as Superpower.
190
 And it would thus be difficult to 
convince oneself that this ultimate goal has nothing to do with Russia‟s handling of the 
ICJ‟s award; but let us leave this point for a later part of our discussion and let us 
concentrate for the moment on other relevant issues of the whole balance, like oil routes 
and the Iranian nuclear issue. 
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 Lasserre, I. (2007, November 16). Le Figaro. Op-cit: 
“... la Russie de Poutine a ... . Une volonté affirmée de faire renaître la puissance russe. ... ˮ 
Quoting the Serbian economist Misa Brkic :“Pour prouver qu’ils sont à nouveau une puissance 
économique et politique, les Russes nous utilisent comme une base pour avancer leurs pions en Europe 
et sur la scène internationale.ˮ 
Translation : 
“ ... Putin‟s Russia has ... an asserted will to let the Russian power be reborn again.  ... ˮ 
Quoting the Serbian economist Misa Brkic “In order to prove that they are again an economic and 
political power, the Russians are using us like a basis to push forward their pawns in Europe and on the 
international scene.” 
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4.3 – The oil issue in Europe : sources, needs and routes  
In order to figure out the weight of oil in the present moving balance, of which Kosovo is 
a part with another weight, one has to observe the East/West European interdependency 
over the energy issue. First, Western Europe is dependent on Russia for about 40 to 45 
percent of its gas and a third of its oil. The Russians for their part obviously do not ignore 
this fact and it happened that they showed readiness to make use of it against the West if 
ever they are compelled to by extreme situations, even reluctantly one has to admit.
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Second, the energy issue is like a double edged sword, for Russia needs Europe not only 
as a market but conversely as a route to export elsewhere its energy products and 
derivatives.
192
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 Muller, M-A. (2008, September 5). Pas de mesures punitives contre la Russie [No punitive measures 
against Russia]. L‟Hebdo Magazine: 
“Le sommet Européen est un avertissement pour Moscou à respecter ses engagements en Géorgie. La 
déclaration finale souligne que l‟UE «restera vigilante » et mettra sous surveillance ses relations avec la 
Russie avant leur prochain sommet conjoint. Pas de sanctions pour autant. L’Europe risquerait trop gros, 
car la Russie a clairement fait savoir qu’en cas de mesures punitives, elle pourrait bien revoir sa 
politique d’exportation de l’énergie vers l’Europe. Or, elle fournit à l’Europe de l’Ouest 40% de son gaz 
et un tiers de son pétrole.” 
Translation : 
“The European summit is a warning to Moscow to bring it to fulfill its engagements in Georgia. The final 
declaration underlines that the European Union «will remain vigilant» and monitor its relations with 
Russia before their next common summit. No sanctions for the time being. Europe would risk too much, 
because Russia has made clear that in case of punitive measures, it could very well revise its policy of 
exportation of energy toward Europe. And it should be noted that Russia provides Western Europe with 
40% of its gas and a third of its oilˮ. 
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  Abi Ramia, J. (2008, August 29). L‟Hebdo Magazine. Op-cit: 
“Le pétrole et le gaz, enjeux de tous les cauchemars européens, illustrent l’interdépendance. Certes, 
L‟Europe dépend du gaz russe à hauteur de 45% de ses approvisionnements, et du pétrole pour 30%. Mais 
en retour, 90% des exportations russes de gaz prennent le chemin de l’Europe. Gazprom, l’inquiétant 
géant de l’énergie, tire 65% de ses revenus du marché européen. « Les Russes tiennent autant à leur 
recettes d’exportation que les Européens à la régularité de leurs livraisons », dit Arianna Checchi, du 
Center for European Studies (Bruxelles). « L‟Europe dispose d‟un solide levier, le tableau n‟est pas si 
sombre.» Au sommet européen, le plus difficile sera peut-être de calmer l‟ardeur vindicative de l‟Europe 
orientale et des pays baltes. Sortis du joug soviétique, ils ont vu avec horreur le Kremlin lancer ses chars à 
l‟assaut du voisin. Ils craignent d‟être les prochaines victimes d‟une nouvelle politique russe d‟intimidation. 
A leurs yeux, « la Géorgie ne serait que le premier domino », comme le souligne Tomas Valasek du Center 
for European reform (Londres)”. 
Translation : 
“Oil and gas, the stakes of all European nightmares, illustrate the interdependence. Of course, Europe 
depends on Russia for 45% of its gas supplies and for 30% of its oil supplies. But, conversely, 90% of 
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Given the facts above, it becomes clearly understandable for the parties – which are in 
competition over positions in the forthcoming stabilization of power balance – to try, 
each on its side, either to reverse the dependency ratio in its favor or else to maintain and 
even improve its current advantage. Accordingly, the correlation with other centers of 
interest for the parties prevails inasmuch as the winner of this part of the game would 
either be more comfortable in putting forward its position over such other centers of 
interest, like Kosovo, or conversely, would become more inclined to negotiate if it 
considers that it has at least secured the essential part of what it was heading for; the loser 
for its part would either try to stiffen its position in those other centers of interest to 
compensate for its loss or, conversely, would resort to negotiation in case of persistent 
weakness. 
Russia‟s reaction to Georgia‟s move in August 2008 has concretized and increased an old 
European growing concern about Europe‟s energy supply routes because Georgia is a 
junction point between Europe and Turkey as consumers on one side, and Central Asia as 
provider on the other side.
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 Ukraine and Byelorussia are other connection points 
between Europe and Russia, with different extents of importance however, and are thus 
                                                                                                                                                 
Russian gas exports are routed through Europe. Gazprom, the worrying energy giant, extracts 65% of its 
revenues from the European market. «Russians care for their export revenues as much as Europeans do 
for the steadiness of their supplies », says Arianna Checchi, of the center for European Studies (Brussels). 
«Europe has got a strong lever, the board is not so much dark.» At the European summit, the most difficult 
will perhaps be to calm down the vindictive ardor of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. Having exited 
from the Soviet yoke, they saw with horror the Kremlin sending its tanks to the assault of a neighbor. They 
fear to be the next victim of a new Russian policy of intimidation. In their view, «Georgia would only be the 
first of the domino», as underlined by Tomas Valasek of the Center for European Reform (London)ˮ. 
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 Tbilissi rompt ses relations avec Moscou [Tbilissi interrupts its relations with Moscow]. (2008, August 
30). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.10: 
“Les pays occidentaux accusent Moscou d‟avoir fait un «usage excessif de la force » et de chercher à 
établir une présence permanente en Géorgie, un pays stratégique pour l’approvisionnement de l’Europe 
en pétrole et en gaz”. 
Translation : 
“Western countries accuse Moscow of having made « an excessive use of force » and to try to establish a 
permanent presence in Georgia, a strategic country for Europe’s supply of oil and gasˮ.  
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definitely part of the game as we will see a little further in this same section.
194
 Hence, 
the Europeans‟ plans to diversify their sources of supply by opening up more channels of 
supply from Central Asia, however without closing the door on Russia as we will see. In 
turn, this latter being well aware of the Europeans‟ apprehensions, and eager not to push 
them to totally resort to substitute ways of supply, has issued reassuring statements when 
it moved in Georgia in August 2008; the Russian army thus consistently cared for sparing 
the Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and gas pipelines which go all the way from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey through Georgia, and in which Russia has no interest.
195
 Russia‟s 
                                                 
194 Signature d‟un accord turco-européen sur le gazoduc Nabucco [Signature of a Turkish-European 
agreement on the gas pipeline Nabucco. (2009, July 14). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9: 
“Un quart du gaz naturel utilisé en Europe provient actuellement de Russie. Un différend entre la Russie 
et l’Ukraine, point de transit essentiel, a déjà gravement porté atteinte aux approvisionnements vers 
l’Europe.” 
Translation : 
“A quarter of the natural gas used in Europe is presently provided by Russia. A conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine, an essential transit point, has already severely prejudiced the supplies toward Europe.ˮ 
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 Entre la Russie et l‟UE, des liens énergétiques incontournables [Between Russia and the EU, energy 
links that cannot be bypassed]. (2008, August 30). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.10: 
“Dmitri Peskov, porte-parole du Premier ministre russe Vladimir Poutine, a d‟ailleurs assuré hier que «la 
Russie a été, est et sera à l‟avenir le fournisseur sûr et fiable des ressources énergétiques » des 
Occidentaux. 
... ... 
De son côté, le nº 2 de l‟Agence internationale de l‟Energie (AIE), William Ramsey, a estimé hier que la 
Russie n‟a pas l‟intention de perturber l‟approvisionnement en énergie vers l‟Europe à des fins politiques. 
«Pendant toute la période d’hostilités » militaires entre la Russie et la Géorgie début août, «les Russes 
ont fait très attention à ne rien endommager » sur le passage de l’oléoduc et du gazoduc Bakou-Tbilissi-
Ceyhan, «je pense que c’est un message à l’attention des Azéris et des Turcs indiquant qu’ils ne veulent 
pas s’en prendre à ces infrastructures »... ...”. 
Translation : 
“As a matter of fact, Dmitri Peskov, spokesman for the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, has assured 
yesterday that «Russia has been, is and will be in the future the trustworthy and reliable provider of energy 
resources» for the Westerners. 
... ... 
From his side, the Nr. 2 of the International Energy Agency (IEA), William Ramsey, has considered 
yesterday that Russia has no intention to disrupt Europe‟s energy supply for political motives. «All the way 
through the period of » military «hostilities » between Russia and Georgia at the beginning of August, 
«the Russians were very careful not to damage anything » on the passageway of the oil and gas pipeline 
Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan, «I believe it is a message addressed to the attention of the Azeris and Turks 
indicating that they don’t want to attack those infrastructures » ... ...ˮ. 
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caution here clearly stems from its concerns about losing leverage as the West is trying to 
accelerate its plans for securing alternative sources and routes of supply.
 196
 
The most important of such plans is the Nabucco project, which dates back to 2002 and 
which aims at linking Central Asia to the European Union through Turkey and South-
East Europe – thus avoiding Russia – for supplying Europe with up to 31 billion m3 of 
Central Asian gas per year.
197
 The projected gas pipeline will be routed through Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria.
198
 Also in this project Georgia, Syria and Iraq 
may be possible transit points on the way to Europe, while Azerbaijan would be the 
supplier of an important quantity of the Central Asian gas so channeled.
199
 Its budget is 
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 Energie : Berlusconi reçoit Poutine [Energy, Berlusconi receives Putin]. (2010, April 26). Le Figaro: 
“Largement dépendante du gaz russe, l‟Europe tente de diversifier ses sources d‟approvisionnement en 
soutenant notamment le projet de gazoduc alternatif «Nabucco».” 
Translation : 
“Being largely dependent on Russian gas, Europe tries to diversify its sources of supply, in particular by 
supporting the alternative gas pipeline «Nabucco».” 
 
197
 Nabucco : un accord sera signé lundi, mais des questions restent en suspens [Nabucco : an agreement 
will be signed on Monday, but there are pending questions]. (2009, July 11). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.8: 
“Le projet Nabucco prévoit la construction d‟un gazoduc pour transporter graduellement jusqu‟à 31 
milliards de m
3
 de gaz par an en provenance d‟Asie centrale notamment vers l‟Union européenne, en 
passant par la Turquie et le Sud-est de l‟Europe.” 
Translation : 
“The Nabucco project provides for the construction of a gas pipeline to transport gradually up to 31 billion 
m
3 
of gas per year from Central Asia particularly toward the European Union, going through Turkey and 
South-East Europe.” 
 
198
 Information retrieved on the 30
th
 of December 2010, from http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com.   
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 Signature d‟un accord turco-européen sur le gazoduc Nabucco [Signature of a Turkish-European 
agreement on the gas pipeline Nabucco]. (2009, July 14). L‟Orient – Le Jour. Op-cit: 
“Le Premier ministre irakien Nouri al-Maliki, le président géorgien Mikheïl Saakaschvili, un représentant 
de l‟Azerbaïdjan et l‟émissaire spécial américain pour l‟énergie en Eurasie, Richard Morningstar, avaient 
fait le déplacement [pour assister à la cérémonie de signature]. 
La Géorgie est un des points de connexion possibles du gazoduc, avec l’Irak et la Syrie. L’Azerbaïdjan 
doit fournir une part importante du gaz.” 
Translation : 
“The Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, a representative 
of Azerbaijan and the American special envoy for energy in Eurasia, Richard Morningstar, had made the 
trip [to attend the signature ceremony]. 
Georgia is one of the possible connection points of the gas pipeline, with Iraq and Syria. Azerbaijan is 
supposed to supply an important part of the gas.” 
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around 8 billion Euros and its expected completion date is by 2014.
200
 The related 
agreement was signed on the 13
th
 of July 2009 by Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania, with the support of the European Union and – importantly for our analysis 
– of the United States. 201  Also, an agreement was signed on Monday the 06th of 
September 2010 whereby a syndicate of major banks would lend 4 billion Euros for the 
project.
202
 It should as well be pertinently noted for our analysis that about 2/3
rd
 of the 
                                                 
200
 Ibid: 
“Nabucco, lancé en 2002, devrait démarrer en 2014. Son coût est estimé à 7,9 milliards d‟euros.” 
Translation : 
“Launched in 2002, Nabucco should start up in 2014. Its cost is estimated at 7.9 billion Euros.” 
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 Ibid: 
“Le Premier ministre turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan a signé l‟accord, ainsi que les Premiers ministres 
d‟Autriche, Bulgarie, Hongrie et Roumanie. Le président de la Commission européenne, José Manuel 
Barroso, était présent, pour signifier l’importance de ce projet. 
Nabucco, qui est soutenu par les Etats-Unis, prévoit la construction d‟un gazoduc pour transporter 
jusqu‟à 31 milliards de m3 de gaz par an en provenance d‟Asie centrale vers l‟UE, en passant par la 
Turquie et le Sud-Est de l‟Europe. 
Le Premier ministre irakien Nouri al-Maliki, le président géorgien Mikheïl Saakaschvili, un représentant 
de l‟Azerbaïdjan et l’émissaire spécial américain pour l’énergie en Eurasie, Richard Morningstar, 
avaient fait le déplacement [pour assister à la cérémonie de signature]. 
... ... 
Les compagnies actionnaires du projet sont OMV (Autriche), Botas (Turquie), Bulgargaz (Bulgarie), MOL 
(Hongrie), Transgaz (Roumanie) et RWE (Allemagne).” 
Translation : 
“The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has signed the agreement, together with the Prime 
Ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The President of the European Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, was present in order to emphasize the importance of the project. 
Nabucco, which is backed by the United States, provides for the construction of a gas pipeline to transport 
up to 31 billion m
3 
of gas per year from Central Asia toward the EU, going through Turkey and South-East 
Europe. 
The Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, a representative of 
Azerbaijan and the American special envoy for energy in Eurasia, Richard Morningstar, had made the 
trip [to attend the signature ceremony] 
... ... 
The shareholders companies of the project are OMV (Austria), Botas (Turkey), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), MOL 
(Hungary), Transgaz (Romania) and RWE (Germany).” 
 
202
 Nodé-Langlois, F. (2010, September 6). Quatre milliards d‟euros de prêts pour le gazoduc Nabucco 
[Four billion Euros in loans for the gas pipeline Nabucco]. Le Figaro: 
“Le consortium européen Nabucco bénéficiera de près de 4 milliards d‟euros de crédits de la part de la 
Berd (Banque européenne de reconstruction et de développement), de la BEI (Banque européenne 
d‟investissement) et de la Banque mondiale (via sa filiale IFC) selon un accord signé lundi.” 
Translation : 
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length of the pipeline (2,000 km out of 3,300) lies down in Turkey; this latter is thus 
advantaged by having a primordial and lucrative role in the project.
203
 There are also 
other projects, however of lesser magnitude, like the ITGI gas pipeline (Azerbaidjan-
Turkey-Greece-Italy) which is partially completed, as well as White Stream (Georgia-EU) 
and the Trans-Adriatic gas pipeline between Greece and Italy.
204
 The materialization of 
                                                                                                                                                 
“The European consortium Nabucco will be granted about 4 billion Euros of credits from EBRD (the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), from EIB (the European Investment Bank) and from 
the World Bank (via its affiliate IFC), in accordance with an agreement signed on Monday.” 
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 Nabucco : un accord sera signé lundi, mais des questions restent en suspens [Nabucco : an agreement 
will be signed on Monday, but there are pending questions]. (2009, July 11). L‟Orient – Le Jour. Op-cit: 
“ « L‟accord prévoit le principe que les taxes seront redistribuées en fonction de la longueur de gazoduc 
traversant chaque pays », a indiqué un diplomate turc parlant sous le couvert de l‟anonymat. 
« Comme la Turquie va avoir près de 2000 des 3300 km du gazoduc sur son territoire, elle va recevoir 60% 
des revenus des taxes, soit environ 400 des 450 millions d‟euros par an » (558 à 628 millions de dollars), a 
ajouté cette source .” 
Translation : 
“A Turkish diplomat has anonymously stated that « the agreement provides for the principle that taxes will 
be redistributed in function of the length of the gas pipeline crossing each country ». 
The same source has added that « as Turkey will have in its territory about 2000 of the 3300 km of the gas 
pipeline, it will receive 60% of the tax revenues, i.e. about 400 to 450 million Euros per year » (558 to 628 
million dollars).” 
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 AFP. (2010, October 22). Turquie: le gazoduc ITGI prêt en 2015 [Turkey: the gas pipeline ITGI ready 
in 2015]. Le Figaro: 
“Le Premier ministre turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan a fixé à 2015 l‟achèvement du gazoduc ITGI devant 
acheminer du gaz azéri jusqu‟en Italie via la Turquie et la Grèce, ... ... 
Le tronçon reliant la Turquie à la Grèce, d‟une capacité maximale de 11,5 milliards de mètres cubes par 
an, avait lui été achevé en 2007. L‟interconnexion avec l‟Italie prévoit une capacité de 10 milliards de 
mètres cubes.... ... 
Les ministres de l‟Energie des deux pays [Turquie et Grèce] avaient signé en mai à Athènes, ... ..., un 
mémorandum pour l’avancement de ce projet «ayant comme objectif stratégique le transfert de gaz du 
Moyen-Orient et de la mer Caspienne vers l’Europe». Codirigé par le groupe italien Edison et les sociétés 
publiques gazières grecque, Depa et turque, Botas, ce projet vise à «garantir la sécurité de 
l’approvisionnement énergétique de l’Europe en diversifiant les sources du gaz et son acheminement», 
selon ce mémorandum. 
La Commission européenne a affirmé inclure l’ITGI parmi les projets des gazoducs que l’UE était prête 
à soutenir. Les deux autres sont le White Stream devant relier la Géorgie à l’UE et le gazoduc 
Transadriatique entre la Grèce et l’Italie.” 
Translation : 
“The Turquish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has scheduled 2015 for the completion of the gas 
pipeline ITGI which should convey Azeri gas to Italy via Turkey and Greece, ... ... 
The segment linking Turkey to Greece, of a maximal capacity of 11.5 billion cubic meters per year, was 
completed in 2007. The interconnection with Italy is planned to have a capacity of 10 billion cubic 
meters. ... ...  
The Energy Ministers of the two countries [Turkey and Greece] had signed in May in Athens, ... ..., a 
memorandum to move forward this project «which strategically aims at transferring gas from the Middle 
East and from the Caspian Sea to Europe». Co-managed by the Italian group Edison and the public gas 
109 
all those plans will evidently reduce both Central and Western Europe‟s dependency on 
Russian gas and, by implication, will reduce Russia‟s leverage in this respect. But this 
latter has other designs in counterpart. 
Firstly, as reported by L‟Orient – Le Jour of the 11th of July 2009, Baku and Moscow had 
signed an agreement for the purchase of Azeri gas starting 2010. This measure was not 
expected by Ankara to affect the Nabucco project whereby Azerbaijan would be an 
important gas provider and in which Turkey has an important stake, as we saw above.
205
 
But even though, and regardless of the limited capacity of Azerbaijan, it is likely to drag 
out of Europe‟s way part of the availability of Asian energy supplied through Nabucco.206 
And whether or not the Turkish assumption is correct, this Russo-Azeri agreement does 
certainly not suffice for an integral torpedoing of the Nabucco project but it does 
                                                                                                                                                 
companies Depa (Greek) and Botas (Turkish), this project – according to the memorandum – aims at 
«guaranteeing the security of energy supply to Europe by the diversification of the sources of gas and its 
routing». 
The European Commission has asserted that it includes the ITGI among the gas pipeline projects that 
the EU was ready to support. The two others are White Stream, which should link Georgia to the EU, 
and the Trans-Adriatic gas pipeline between Greece and Italy.” 
 
205
 Nabucco : un accord sera signé lundi, mais des questions restent en suspens [Nabucco : an agreement 
will be signed on Monday, but there are pending questions]. (2009, July 11). L‟Orient – Le Jour. Op-cit: 
“Bakou et Moscou viennent de signer récemment un accord pour l‟achat de gaz azéri à partir de 2010 
mais, affirme Ankara, celui-ci ne devrait pas affecter le projet Nabucco.” 
Translation : 
“Baku and Moscow have just signed recently an agreement for the purchase of Azeri gas starting 2010, but 
Ankara asserts that this latter agreement should not affect the Nabucco project.” 
 
206
 Signature d‟un accord turco-européen sur le gazoduc Nabucco [Signature of a Turkish-European 
agreement on the gas pipeline Nabucco]. (2009, July 14). L‟Orient – Le Jour. Op-cit: 
“Le Turkménistan, qui dispose d‟importants gisements, a apporté un précieux soutien à Nabucco vendredi 
en annonçant être prêt à s‟y associer. 
Les Européens attentent encore l‟accord de pays-clés comme le Kazakhstan ou l‟Ouzbékistan. 
L’Azerbaïdjan sera un des principaux fournisseurs, mais n’a pas assez de gaz pour remplir le tube. Et 
Bakou et Moscou viennent de signer un accord pour l’achat de gaz azerbaïdjanais.” 
Translation : 
“Turkmenistan, which has got important gas fields, brought a precious support to Nabucco on Friday as it 
announced it was ready to take a share in it. 
The Europeans are still waiting for the approval of key-countries like Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. 
Azerbaijan will be one of the main providers, but it does not have enough gas to fill in the tube. And 
Baku and Moscow have just signed an agreement for the purchase of Azeri gas.” 
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represents at least a Russian spot in its way. In fact, not much back in history, there were 
signs for this Azeri inclination to deal with the Russians as, during the August 2008 
Russo-Georgian crisis, the Azeri public petroleum company Socar had stated that it was 
abandoning a project to convey up to 400,000 tons of raw starting 2009 through the BTC 
oil pipeline which crosses Georgia because of the instability there, and that it would 
rather choose a Russian oil pipeline. In other words, the Russians move in Georgia was 
paying in that they took over Georgian business by attracting Azeri interest without even 
the need to shell the BTC pipeline (which they spared as we saw earlier), and they 
consequently reduced the competitiveness of Georgia as a Euro-Asian crossing point.
207
 
Secondly, Russia has other plans designed to satisfy European groups separately and to 
isolate Central Europe in the hope of maintaining this latter‟s economic and political 
dependency and to avoid being itself endemically tributary of passageways like Ukraine 
and the Belarus. In fact Russia‟s strategy is to make advantage of Western Europeans‟ 
concerns about their supply and their resulting rush for securing their needs by offering 
them not only alternative projects to Nabucco but also some participation in such 
alternative projects. A successful outcome for Russia here would undoubtedly facilitate 
its task while adding up to the complexity of the situation for Ukraine and Byelorussia as 
transit channels, and for Central Asia as provider, in addition to keeping Europe (as 
                                                 
207
 Tbilissi rompt ses relations avec Moscou [Tbilissi interrupts its relations with Moscow]. (2008, August 
30). L‟Orient – Le Jour, Op-cit: 
“La companie publique pétrolière d‟Azerbaïdjan, Socar, a de son côté annoncé qu‟elle renonçait à son 
projet de transporter jusqu‟à 400 000 tonnes de brut à compter de l‟an prochain par l‟oléoduc BTC 
(Bakou-Tbilissi-Ceyhan) qui traverse la Géorgie, en raison de l‟instabilité dans le pays, et choisirait à la 
place un oléoduc russe.” 
Translation : 
“The Azeri petroleum public company, Socar, has on its side announced that it was renouncing to its 
project for transporting up to 400,000 tons of raw starting next year through the oil pipeline BTC (Baku-
Tbilissi-Ceyhan) which crosses Georgia, due to the instability in the country, and that it would choose 
instead a Russian oil pipeline.” 
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consumer) supplied through two delivery routes, a Northern route and a Southern route; 
the division resulting from the distance separating those two routes (plus the 
participations offered by Moscow) would obviously help avoiding the building up of a 
European trust against Russia. 
Two projects are thus envisaged in this regard: 
The first project is known as the « South Stream » project, whereby the giant Russian 
company Gazprom and the Italian ENI have signed on the 23
rd
 of June 2007 a 
memorandum of understanding for the construction of a gas pipeline under the Black Sea, 
linking Russia to Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia), with 
Italy, Greece and Austria as outlets and avoiding Ukraine; its budget estimate is 15.5 
billion Euros, as at the 30
th
 of November 2010.
208
 It is supposed to provide Europe with 
63 billion m
3 
of gas per year through a pipeline of 3,600 km of length and it was first 
expected to be completed by 2015.
209
 But subsequent projections postponed to 2018 the 
date when the gas pipeline would be fully operational.
210
 The second project is known as 
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 Information retrieved on the 30
th
 of December 2010 from http://south-stream.info/index.php?id=2&L=1. 
By clicking on “Gas Pipeline Route” the map shows that the projected gas pipeline goes from Dzhubga in 
Russia under the Black Sea to Varna, and from there to Pleven, in Bulgaria. From Pleven there are 2 
branches: 
• One branch goes North through Serbia, crossing the cities of Zajecar, Beograd and Subotica. From 
Subotica, one sub-branch crosses Hungary to end up directly in Baumgarten Austria, and another sub-
branch crosses Hungary first then Slovenia next (Lubljana) to end up in Arnoldstein in Austria again.  
• The other branch departing from Pleven goes South and crosses Petrich (Bulgaria), then Greece 
(Thessaloniki, Larissa and Igoumenitsa). It goes then under the Ionian Sea to reach Otranto then 
Brindisi in Italy.  
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 References: 
• Energie : Berlusconi reçoit Poutine [Energy, Berlusconi receives Putin). (2010, April 26). Le 
Figaro. Op-cit: 
• AFP. (2010, July 12). South Stream : Gazprom veut rallier RWE [South Stream : Gazprom wants 
to win over RWE]. Le Figaro. 
 
210
 Moscou à marche forcée dans son projet de gazoduc South Stream [Moscow‟s fast and lengthy walk in 
its gas pipeline project South stream]. (2010, November 16). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9: 
“South Stream  ... ... devrait livrer ses premières quantités dès décembre 2015, via le tronçon bulgare. Le 
gazoduc devrait être entièrement opérationnel en 2018.” 
112 
the Russo-German gas pipeline « Nord Stream » project and is designed to link Russia to 
Germany under the Baltic Sea, thus turning around Ukraine as well as the Baltic states 
and Poland; its budgeted cost is 7.4 billion Euros and it is supposed to transport yearly 55 
billion m
3 
of gas to Europe through a pipeline of 1,220 km of length underneath the Baltic 
Sea, linking the Russian city of Vyborg (close to the border with Finland) with 
Greifswald in Germany.
211
 Nord Stream is expected to be operational by the end of 
2011.
212
 
In comparison, South Stream is in direct competition with Nabucco as it is routed through 
the Southern part of Europe.
213
 It needs however Turkey‟s approval for crossing its 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the Balck Sea; bearing in mind, as we saw above, 
Turkey‟s important stake in the competitor project, Nabucco, of which it had signed the 
related agreement in July 2009. But according to Mr. Igor Setchine, Russia‟s Vice Prime 
                                                                                                                                                 
Translation : 
“South Stream  ... ... should make its first deliveries starting in December 2015, via the Bulgarian segment. 
The gas pipeline should be entirely operational by 2018.”  
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 References: 
• AFP. (2010, February 12). Nord Stream : accord de la Finlande [Nord Stream : Finland‟s 
agreement]. Le Figaro. 
• AFP. (2010, June 19). Russie : GDF Suez rejoint Nord Stream [Russia : GDF Suez joins Nord 
Stream]. Le Figaro.  
 
212
 Nodé-Langlois, F. (2010, June 14). La crise du gaz entre Minsk et Moscou irrite Bruxelles [The gas 
crisis between Minsk and Moscow irritates Brussels]. Le Figaro: 
“Les routes d‟exportations du gaz russe vont se diversifier dès la fin 2011 avec l‟entrée en service du 
gazoduc Nord Stream qui reliera directement la Russie à l‟Allemagne, sans pays de transit.” 
Translation : 
“Export routes of Russian gas will diversify as early as the end of 2011 with the entrance into service of the 
gas pipeline Nord Stream which will link directly Russia to Germany, without transit country.” 
 
213
 AFP. (2010, May 6). Medvedev en Turquie les 11 et 12 mai [Medvedev in Turkey on May 11 and 12]. 
Le Figaro: 
“Le projet South Stream est en concurrence directe avec le projet de gazoduc Nabucco, qui doit relier les 
champs gaziers d‟Asie centrale à l‟Europe, via la Turquie et le sud-est de l‟Europe, en évitant la Russie.” 
Translation : 
“The South Stream project is in direct competition with the Nabucco project, which is intended to link the 
gas fields of Central Asia to Europe, through Turkey and South-East Europe, avoiding Ukraine.” 
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Minister, Turkey is going to authorize the construction of the South Stream pipeline in its 
EEZ under the Black Sea.
214
 As a matter of fact, Russia offered Turkey incentives for 
securing this latter‟s green light to proceed with the execution of South Stream, knowing 
that Turkey is dependent on Russia for about 60% of it gas.
215
 Aside from the fact that 
South Stream is in direct competition with Nabucco, it should pertinently be observed 
that neither one of those two Russian-driven projects (Nord Stream and South Stream) 
goes across the old “Soviet” channels of supply for Russian energy located in Ukraine 
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 La Turquie va donner son feu vert à South Stream, selon Moscou [According to Moscow, Turkey is 
going to give South Stream its green light]. (2010, May 15). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9: 
“La Turquie va autoriser la construction du gazoduc russo-italien South Stream dans sa zone économique, 
sous la mer Noire, en novembre, a indiqué hier le vice-premier ministre russe Igor Setchine. «Le Premier 
ministre (turc Recep Tayyip) Erdogan a dit soutenir le projet, déclarant qu‟en novembre les documents 
nécessaires autorisant le début de la construction dans la zone économique turque seront donnés», a 
déclaré M. Setchine cité par les agences russes.” 
Translation: 
“Russia‟s Vice Prime Minister, Igor Setchine, has stated that Turkey will authorize the construction of the 
Russo-Italian gas pipeline South Stream in its economic zone, under the Black Sea, in November. Cited by 
Russian agencies, Mr. Setchine has declared that « Prime Minister Erdogan (Turkey‟s Prime Minister, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan) has said he supported the project, declaring that in November, the documents 
necessary authorizing the start up of the construction in the Turkish economic zone will be given».” 
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 References: 
• AFP. (2010, May 6). Medvedev en Turquie les 11 et 12 mai [Medvedev in Turkey on May 11 and 
12]. Le Figaro. Op-cit : 
“La Russie figure parmi les principaux partenaires commerciaux de la Turquie et est son 
principal fournisseur de gaz. Environ 60% du gaz turc est importé de Russie. La Turquie avait 
autorisé l‟été dernier la Russie à entreprendre des travaux d‟exploration pour réaliser le gazoduc 
South Stream, qui doit relier la Russie à l‟Europe par les eaux territoriales turques de la mer 
Noire, en évitant l‟Ukraine qui s‟est durement affrontée à Moscou sur la question des prix.” 
Translation : 
“Russia is among the main commercial partners of Turkey and is its main gas supplier. About 60% 
of Turkey‟s gas is imported from Russia. Turkey had authorized Russia last summer to execute 
exploration works in view of the realization of the gas pipeline South Stream, which should link 
Russia to Europe through the Turkish territorial waters of the Black Sea, avoiding Ukraine which 
had hard confrontations with Moscow over the question of prices.” 
 
• La Turquie va donner son feu vert à South Stream, selon Moscou [According to Moscow, Turkey 
is going to give South Stream its green light]. (2010, May 15). Op-cit. L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9: 
“La semaine dernière, le quotidien Kommersant a rapporté que le géant russe Gazprom avait 
accepté d‟assouplir nettement les clauses du contrat de livraisons de gaz à la Turquie pour 
obtenir en échange un feu vert à la construction du Gazoduc.” 
Translation : 
“The daily Kommersant has reported last week that the Russian Giant Gazprom had agreed to 
soften markedly the clauses of the contract for gas deliveries to Turkey, in order to obtain in 
exchange a green light for the construction of the gas pipeline.” 
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and Byelorussia; and since neither does sustain or even establish a common interest 
between the Northern part of Europe and its Southern part, as a result of the successful 
implementation of those two projects, the Europeans will be supplied with energy 
products in different ways, of which most will however originate from Russia. Even old 
“comrades” to Ukraine and Byelorussia that are now west sided and are already involved 
in Nabucco, like Romania and Bulgaria, show interest for the competitor project South 
Stream in order to secure a safe supply of energy.
216
 And in some instances Russia 
managed to put them into competition over the routing of South Stream, ameliorating 
thereby its own position.
217
 Moreover, there are reports about Russia‟s trying hard to 
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 AFP. (2010, October 13). Gazoduc: accord Gazprom/Roumanie [Gas pipeline : Agreement 
Gazprom/Romania]. Le Figaro: 
“Le géant gazier russe Gazprom a signé mercredi à Bucarest un mémorandum d‟intention sur la 
participation de la Roumanie au projet de gazoduc russo-italien South Stream, a annoncé son président 
Alexeï Miller. ... ... «En cas de décision favorable, un accord sera signé entre les gouvernements russe et 
roumain», a-t-il précisé. 
... ... 
Bucarest avait déjà exprimé son intérêt pour participer à ce projet, bien qu‟il ait signé en juillet l‟accord 
de participation au projet concurrent de gazoduc Nabucco, qui vise à réduire la dépendance européenne 
au gaz russe.” 
Translation : 
“The Russian gas giant Gazprom has signed on Wednesday in Bucharest a memorandum of intent on 
Romania‟s participation to the Russo-Italian gas pipeline project South Stream, has announced its 
President Alexeï Miller. ... ... He pointed out that «in case of favorable decision, an agreement will be 
signed between the Russian and the Romanian governments». 
... ... 
Bucharest had already expressed its interest in participating to this project, in spite of the fact that he had 
signed in July the participation agreement to the gas pipeline competitor project Nabucco, which aims at 
reducing the European dependency on Russian gas.” 
 
217
 Moscou à marche forcée dans son projet de gazoduc South Stream [Moscow‟s fast and lengthy walk in 
its gas pipeline project South stream]. (2010, November 16). Op-cit. L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9: 
“La Bulgarie et la Russie ont signé samedi un accord pour la création d‟une société mixte, détenue par le 
géant russe Gazprom (50%) et le groupe public Bulgarian Energy Holding (50%), pour la construction et 
l‟exploitation du tronçon bulgare du gazoduc South Stream qui doit acheminer le gaz russe vers l‟Europe 
occidentale sur 3600 km. ... ... 
Rallier Sofia, déjà engagé sur Nabucco, n’a pas été chose facile. 
En 2008, les deux pays avaient déjà signé un accord sur South Stream, mais des différends étaient 
apparus, notamment sur la propriété du tronçon bulgare et en raison de la volonté de la Bulgarie 
d’obtenir des réductions sur le prix du gaz russe. 
... ... 
Les différends avec Sofia ont en partie été à l’origine de l’apparition dans le projet de la Roumanie, 
également engagée sur Nabucco. En octobre, la Russie et la Roumanie ont signé un mémorandum 
115 
undermine Nabucco at costly adventures.
218
 Consequently, the Europeans will still be 
dependent on Russia for their oil and gas. Furthermore, the networks supplying them will 
not necessarily induce their unification in a trust facing Russia‟s powerful position in 
being the largest reservoir of energy products. A flagrant example is that of Italy which 
has interest neither in Nabucco (the Western driven project) nor in Nord Stream (the 
                                                                                                                                                 
d’intention pour étudier son éventuelle participation, qui ouvrirait une autre voie de passage que la 
Bulgarie pour le gazoduc.” 
Translation : 
“Bulgaria and Russia have signed on Saturday an agreement for the creation of a mixed company, held by 
the Russian giant Gazprom (50%) and the public group Bulgarian Energy Holding (50%), for the 
construction and the exploitation of the Bulgarian segment of the gas pipeline South Stream which should 
convey the Russian gas to Western Europe over a length of 3600 km. ... ... 
The winning over of Sofia, already engaged in Nabucco, has not been an easy task. 
In 2008, the two countries had already signed an accord on South Stream, but disagreements have 
appeared, particularly on the ownership of the Bulgarian segment and because of the intention of 
Bulgaria to obtain reductions over the price of Russian gas. 
... ... 
The disagreements with Sofia has been in part at the origin of the apparition of Romania in the project, 
this latter being also engaged in Nabucco. In October, Russia and Romania have signed a memorandum 
of intent to study the latter’s possible participation, which would open up another passageway than 
Bulgaria for the gas pipeline.” 
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 AFP. (2010, October 23). Gazprom: un gazoduc en zone taliban [Gazprom: a gas pipeline in Taliban 
zone]. Le Figaro: 
“Le géant russe Gazprom est prêt à s‟associer à un projet de gazoduc passant par des zones sous contrôle 
taliban pour desservir le Pakistan et l‟Inde, a rapporté samedi le quotidien économique russe Kommersant, 
citant un haut fonctionnaire russe du secteur de l‟énergie, Igor Sechin. 
... ...«Aucun investisseur n‟avait fait preuve d‟une telle ambition», ajoute l‟article, qualifiant de «plutôt 
risqué» ce projet Turkménistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Inde 
... ... Les observateurs estiment que Gazprom est un outil politique et que l‟unique objet de ses accords 
internationaux est de saper le projet européen rival Nabucco contournant la Russie, au détriment de toute 
logique économique. 
... ... Les Européens cherchent à alimenter leur futur gazoduc Nabucco avec du gaz d‟Asie centrale afin de 
réduire leur dépendance vis-à-vis de Moscou, dont le projet concurrent, South Stream, est pour l‟heure 
plus avancé.” 
Translation : 
“Citing a high ranking official of the energy sector, Igor Sechin, the economic Russian daily Kommersant 
has reported on Saturday that the Russian giant Gazprom is ready for share taking in a gas pipeline 
project going through Taliban controlled zones for supplying Pakistan and India. 
... ... The article added that «no investor had yet showed such an ambition» and it qualified this 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India project of «rather risky». 
... ... Observers estimate that Gazprom is a political tool and that the unique objective for its international 
agreements is to undermine the rival European project Nabucco which turns around Russia, to the 
detriment of any economical logic. 
... ... Europeans are trying to fill in their future gas pipeline Nabucco with Central Asian gas in order to 
reduce their dependency vis-à-vis Moscow, whose competitor project, South Stream, is so far more 
advanced.” 
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other Eastern driven project), and which hence does not seem to care much for 
implicating itself in the efforts to reduce Europe‟s dependence on Russian oil and gas. 219 
Now the success perspectives are perhaps difficult to closely estimate at this stage. But 
the general Euro-Turkish cooperation does not permit to foresee any insurmountable 
obstacle. Besides, the stake of South Stream alone (63 billion m
3
 per year) is already 
higher than that of its main rival Nabucco (31 billion m
3 
per year) in addition to other 
smaller infrastructures; and the global stake of both Nord Stream and South Stream 
(55+63 = 138 billion m
3 
per year) is even much higher; while Nord Stream for its part – 
with Finland‟s recent authorization for passing the pipes in its EEZ in the Baltic Sea – has 
already got all the legal approvals needed from the countries involved to proceed with the 
work.
220
  
The above having been exposed, it should be stressed that, until now, the huge majority 
of Russian gas supply to Europe goes through Ukraine (80%) and a small minority 
through Byelorussia (20%).
221
 And neither are the Ukrainians blind, nor are the Russians 
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 Donadio, R. & Bohlen, C. (2010, December 2). Caustic U.S. views of Berlusconi churn Italy‟s politics. 
The New York Times:  
“It was noted that Mr.Berlusconi had criticized the American missile defense project, eastward expansion 
of NATO and support for Kosovo‟s independence as «provocations of Russia.» Virtually alone among 
European leaders, he defended Russia‟s military push into Georgia during the August 2008 war and has 
backed joint energy projects between Gazprom in Russia and the Italian energy company ENI, at a time 
when the European Union is pushing for less dependence on Russian gas.” 
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 AFP. (2010, February 12). Gazoduc: Accord de la Finlande [Gas pipeline : Finland‟s approval]. Le 
Figaro.  
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 Nodé-Langlois, F. (2010, June 24). La crise du gaz entre Minsk et Moscou irrite Bruxelles [The gas 
crisis between Minsk and Moscow irritates Brussels]. Le Figaro:  
“ ... ... 20% des exportations gazières russes à destination de l‟UE transitent par la petite Biélorussie, le 
solde de 80% passant par les gazoducs ukrainiens.” 
Translation : 
“ ... ... 20% of Russian gas exports to the EU transit through the small Byelorussia, and the balance of 80% 
goes through the Ukrainian gas pipelines.” 
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concealing their long term goals.
222
 But in fact Russia has two valid reasons for such 
planning. The first reason is mainly economical in that, by putting offside Ukraine and 
The Belarus, Russia is endeavoring to cease to be tributary of those latter for securing a 
steady flow of revenues from an uninterrupted supply of gas to its European clients; 
indeed, Ukraine has been to date strategic for furnishing Europe with Russian gas 
whereas there have been lately several Russo-Ukrainian and Russo-Byelorussian 
contentions about gas prices and transit fees.
223
 Russia‟s plan is anterior to the February 
2010 election of the new Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich whose close ties with 
Moscow – as an old apparatchik figure – date back to the Soviet era. The modern 
nomenclature‟s (Medvedev/Putin) support to Yanukovich comes on top of its designs 
already under way and would paradoxically comfort – rather than induce a change in – 
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 AFP. (2010, February 12). Gazoduc: Accord de la Finlande [Gas pipeline : Finland‟s approval]. Le 
Figaro. Op-cit: 
“La construction de Nord Stream devrait lever les incertitudes liées au passage actuel de 80% de ce gaz 
par l‟Ukraine, selon Moscou.” 
Translation : 
“According to Moscow, the construction of Nord Stream should lift the uncertainties in connection with the 
present transit of 80% of this gas through Ukraine.” 
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 References: 
 
• AFP. (2010, February 9). Gazoducs: consortium avec Gazprom? [Gas pipelines: consortium with 
Gazprom?]. Le Figaro: 
“Le réseau de gazoducs traversant l‟Ukraine est stratégique pour l‟approvisionnement de 
l‟Europe en gaz russe. Après une série de crises gazières russo-ukrainiennes, Moscou a décidé de 
construire deux gazoducs (Nord Stream et South Stream) contournant l‟Ukraine pour desservir 
l‟UE.” 
Translation : 
“The gas pipelines network crossing Ukraine is strategic for the supply of Europe in Russian gas. 
After a series of Russo-Ukrainian gas crises, Moscow has decided to construct two gas pipelines 
(Nord Stream and South Stream) to serve the EU by turning around Ukraine.” 
 
• AFP. (2010, July 12). South Stream : Gazprom veut rallier RWE [South Stream : Gazprom wants 
to win over RWE]. Le Figaro. Op-cit:  
“Gazprom cherche ainsi à contourner l‟Ukraine et la Biélorussie. Des contentieux sur le prix du 
gaz russe avec ces deux pays avaient conduit à des ruptures d‟approvisionnement en Europe ces 
dernières années.” 
Translation : 
“Gazprom wants this way to turn around Ukraine and Byelorussia. Contentions over Russian gas 
prices with these two countries had led to interruptions of supply to Europe these last years.” 
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Russia‟s current global strategy, in spite of the Ukrainians‟ endeavor to dissuade their 
reborn “patron” to proceed with the South Stream and Nord Stream projects and their 
attempt to create a Russo-Ukrainian-European consortium that would keep Ukraine 
within the buckle.
 224
 We will highlight such Russian strategy a little later in this section. 
The second reason is still related to economy but it has in addition a geostrategic 
dimension. As we saw earlier indeed, Russia‟s strategy is to work by all means on 
recouping its hegemony over the old Soviet republics and to use such fact for the forceful 
establishment of economical partnerships that would drag out those places from the reach 
of Western covetousness, and would thus increase Russia‟s leverage. Such means consist 
of a variety of processes, among others, (i) invading Georgia and supporting the 
independencies of its breakaway regions (ii) in addition to supporting the access to power 
of former apparatchiks of the old Soviets satellites like just recently in Ukraine, in 
addition to (iii) supporting (even passively) the change of regime in Kyrgyzstan. By so 
doing, Russia increases the chances to safeguard its status as main supplier of energy 
products to the European continent in competition with Central Asia, regardless of the 
lower capacities of this latter as we saw earlier. A flagrant evidence of this aspect of 
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 AFP. (2010, February 9). Gazoducs: consortium avec Gazprom? [Gas pipelines: consortium with 
Gazprom?]. Le Figaro. Op-cit: 
 “Le futur président ukrainien Viktor Ianoukovitch envisage de créer un consortium associant le russe 
Gazprom, l‟ukrainien Naftogaz et des compagnies européennes pour gérer le réseau de gazoducs du pays, 
écrit mardi le quotidien russe Kommersant. 
... ... 
... M. Ianoukovitch espère obtenir de meilleurs prix pour l‟achat de gaz russe et dissuader le Kremlin de 
construire des routes alternatives, relève Kommersant.” 
Translation : 
“The Russian daily Kommersant has reported on Tueseday that the forthcoming Ukrainian President 
Viktor Yanukovich is considering the creation of a consortium grouping the Russian Gazprom, the 
Ukrainian Naftogaz and European companies to manage the gas pipelines network of the country. 
... ... 
... Kommersant has pointed out that Mr. Yanukovich hopes to obtain better prices for the purchase of 
Russian gas and dissuade the Kremlin from constructing alternative supply routes.” 
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Russia‟s strategy is Putin‟s recent proposal (which even surprised his Ukrainian 
counterpart) to merge the Russian gas giant Gazprom with the Ukrainian ailing Naftogaz 
which, in the words of Chris Weafer (chief strategist at UralSib Capital, an investment 
bank), would result in Gazprom effectively swallowing Naftogaz.
225
 In May 2010, 
Russia‟s Gazprom boss, Alexeï Miller, has expressed his confidence that the 
Gazprom/Naftogaz merging project does not prejudice the South Stream project but 
would, on the contrary, contribute to diversify the itineraries of supply.
226
 As much as 
this fact may be true, it is also an understandably un-avowed reality that the praised 
diversification will afford Moscow the control of most delivery terminals around Western 
Europe. And any arguing about the flagrant aspect of such maneuver would simply be an 
insult to European understanding.
 227
 Hence, in view of the projected Russian network of 
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 Barry, E. (2010, May 3). Putin surprises Ukraine with energy-merger plan. International Herald Tribune, 
p.4. Op-cit: 
“ ... ... The Ukrainian prime minister, Mykola Azarov, said through a spokesman that the idea of a merger 
had not come up in their meetings, and that Mr. Putin had «expressed it in an impromptu way. » 
... ... Ukraine elected a new president, Viktor F. Yanukovich, who vowed to increase cooperation with 
Russia. ... ... 
Russia is heavily dependent on Ukrainian pipelines, which carry about 80% of its natural gas exports to 
Europe, and it has long coveted a greater degree of control over them. If the deal were to go through, 
Gazprom would effectively swallow the Ukrainain company Naftogaz, said Chris Weafer, ... ... 
... ... 
Yulia V. Tymoshenko, who lost to Mr. Yanukovich in a bitterly fought presidential race, said the merger 
proposal «could be seen as a joke » but warned of «a large-scale plan to liquidate independent Ukraine». 
... ... 
Mr. Yanukovich, a former Communist apparatchik who ran on a platform of closer ties with Moscow, has 
closed a series of agreements with the Kremlin since taking office, ... ...” 
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 La fusion Gazprom-Naftogaz ne menace pas le projet de gazoduc South Stream [The Gazprom-Naftogaz 
merging does not threaten the gas pipeline project South Stream].  (2010, May 14). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.9: 
“«Je suis persuadé que la fusion des deux groupes sera un facteur important pour accroître la sécurité 
énergétique de l‟Europe, de même que la diversification des itinéraires de livraison du gaz russe en 
Europe», a déclaré Alexeï Miller [le patron de Gazprom] à l‟issue d‟une rencontre avec le ministre 
ukrainien de l‟Energie, Iouri Boïko.” 
Translation : 
“After having met with the Ukrainian Minister of Energy, Iouri Boïko, Alexeï Miller [Gazprom‟s boss] 
declared : «I am convinced that the merging of the two groups will be an important factor to increase the 
energy security of Europe, and to diversify the itineraries of supply of Russian gas to Europe».” 
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 Dempsey, J. (2009, March 18). Two natural gas deals tie Hungary closer to Russia. The New York Times: 
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routes for the supply of energy products, instead of initiating any adverse reaction whose 
success is far from being guaranteed, the Europeans have opted for a policy of 
collaboration with the Russians by acquiring interests in both projects Nord Stream and 
South Stream; a tactic which would spare them the risk of enduring shortages to the 
detriment of transit states like Ukraine and the Belarus – and perhaps even Georgia which 
conveys Central Asian gas to Europe and Turkey – without however (nobody knows) 
boycotting the US backed Nabucco project.
228
 In fact Russia welcomes such European 
participation to secure a successful implementation of both projects and, as a 
consequence, safeguard its geo-economic interest in the energy sector; and West 
European companies are invited even if they have a stake in the competitor project, 
Nabucco.
229
 Consequently, there are at least either French or German or Bulgarian or 
                                                                                                                                                 
“For Russia, South Stream would reduce dependence on Ukraine, with which Moscow has continuing 
political conflicts. It would also lock countries in Central and Southern Europe into long-term Russian 
energy contracts that would prevent them from diversifying their sources.” 
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 Sarkozy scelle le rapprochement avec Moscou dans la pierre [Sarkozy seals the rapprochement with 
Moscow in real estate].  (2010, June 22). Le Figaro: 
“Les accords les plus massifs concernent, pour ne pas changer, le secteur de l‟énergie. Comme prévu, 
GDF-Suez a finalisé sa prise de participation dans le gazoduc Nord Stream, aux côtés du géant russe 
Gazprom, des entreprises allemandes EON et BASF et du Néerlandais Gasunie. En mars, le groupe 
français avait déjà signé un protocole pour l‟achat de parts aux partenaires allemands de Gazprom (4,5% 
à E.ON et 4,5%  à Wintershall) afin de devenir actionnaire à 9%. EDF a confirmé sa prise de participation 
à 10%, aux côtés de l‟italien ENI et de Gazprom, dans la Société South Stream AG pour participer au 
projet de construction de l‟autre gazoduc destiné à approvisionner l‟Europe, via la mer Noire. Les deux 
gouvernements ont en outre signé une déclaration politique sur la création d‟un « centre franco-russe pour 
l‟efficacité énergétique », dont Paris attend d‟importantes retombées à l‟avenir.” 
Translation : 
“The most massive agreements involve, as usual, the energy sector. As planned, GDF-Suez has finalized its 
share acquisition in the gas pipeline Nord Stream, partnering with the Russian giant Gazprom, with the 
German enterprises EON and BASF and the Dutch Gasunie. In March, the French group had already 
signed a protocol for the purchase of parts from the German partners of Gazprom (4.5% from E.ON and 
4.5% from Wintershall) in order to become a 9% shareholder. EDF has confirmed its 10% share 
acquisition in the company South Stream AG, partnering with the Italian ENI and Gazprom, to participate 
in the construction project of the other gas pipeline which aims at supplying Europe, via the Black Sea. The 
two governments have also signed a political declaration on the creation of a « Franco-Russian Center for 
Energetic Efficiency », of which Paris expects important repercussions in the future.” 
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 AFP. (2010, July 12). South Stream : Gazprom veut rallier RWE [South Stream : Gazprom wants to win 
over RWE]. Le Figaro. Op-cit:  
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Romanian or Hungarian or Austrian interests in Nabucco on one side and in either Nord 
Stream or South Stream on the other side. Moreover, as we saw above, non-partner 
countries that have however rights stemming from the Law of the Sea – like Turkey and 
Finland – are so far cooperating. And to fasten the whole structure, Russia even offers 
Western companies participations in the exploitation of its own energy field; and the 
Europeans understandably prefer to play that particular card of the game, and even offer 
the Russians reciprocate participations in European exploited fields, for the safety of their 
supply.
230
 This merging of interests in the energy sector between Russia and Europe is of 
course detrimental to Ukraine and to the Belarus since – in a not too distant future – they 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Le groupe russe d‟énergie Gazprom a fait une offre à l‟allemand RWE pour que celui-ci prenne une 
participation dans le projet de gazoduc paneuropéen South Stream, concurrent direct du projet Nabucco, 
selon le Handelsblatt paru lundi. 
... ... 
RWE est déjà impliqué dans le projet concurrent Nabucco, ... ... 
Mais une participation dans deux projets rivaux n‟est pas impossible: c‟est le cas du groupe autrichien 
OMV, impliqué aussi bien dans Nabucco que dans South Stream. 
Outre OMV, Gazprom a réuni l‟italien ENI et le français EDF pour construire ce gazoduc long de 3.600 
km, qui doit alimenter l‟Europe occidentale en gaz russe via la Mer Noire et les Balkans à partir de 2015” 
Translation : 
“According to the Monday issue of Handelsblatt, the Russian group Gazprom involved in energy products 
has offered the German RWE to participate in the pan-European gas pipeline project South Stream, which 
is in direct competition with the Nabucco project. 
... ... 
RWE is already involved in the competitor project Nabucco, ... ... 
But a participation in two rival projects is not impossible: this is the case of the Austrian group OMV, 
which is involved in Nabucco as well as in South Stream. 
Aside from OMV, Gazprom has grouped together the Italian ENI and the French EDF to construct this gas 
pipeline, which should supply Western Europe with Russian gas via the Black Sea and the Balkans starting 
in 2015.” 
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 Nodé-Langlois F. (2009, November 27). Les groupes français misent sur le gaz russe [French groups bet 
on Russian gas]. Le Figaro: 
“Total a récemment signé un accord avec le gazier Novatek pour l‟exploitation d‟un champ dans le Grand 
Nord russe, qui pourrait produire pour « des dizaines d‟années ». Et ce vendredi, la compagnie française a 
cédé une participation de 10% à une société russe publique, Zaroubejneft, dans le champ de Khariaga, 
« un rééquilibrage » que réclamait la Russie de longue date.” 
Translation : 
“Total has recently signed an agreement with the gas company Novatek for the exploitation of a field in the 
Russian Grand North, which could produce for « several decades ». And this Friday, the French company 
has sold to a Russian public company, Zaroubejneft, a 10% share in the field of Khariaga, « a rebalance » 
that Russia had been requesting for long time.” 
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will lose their quasi-monopolistic position as central nodes between Russia and Europe 
for oil and gas transportation. 
Now, can anyone imagine what would the balance look like as far as oil and geopolitical 
issues are concerned, if both South Stream and Nord Stream projects are successfully 
implemented, on top of (i) a fragmented and paralyzed Georgia, and (ii) an impoverished 
Ukraine deprived of its status as privileged junction point for energy products and 
becoming a “prodigal daughter” to Russia, and (iii) an impoverished Byelorussia 
suffering also from the loss of its geographical interest for the transit of oil and gas, and 
(iv) a Kyrgyzstan turning Eastward for a badly needed help to solve its ethnic problems? 
In strategic terms this is comparable to hitting two targets with one single shot, in that it 
would just amount to both a neutralization and an encirclement of the former Soviet 
republics of Central Europe, catching them in a pincer movement and thus, by 
implication, affording Russia the recovery of a substantial part of its former worldwide 
power, due to its control of energy sources and routes around Europe and due to its 
blocking the way for NATO to access those remains of the former Soviet Empire, 
symbols of the Kremlin‟s glory and might during the Cold War era. Furthermore, in 
partnering on its energy projects with West European companies and in merging 
Gazprom with East European counterparts, Russia undoubtedly hampers the EU‟s 
momentum in winning over the remaining Central European former Soviet republics that 
were until recently “still free to join” like Ukraine and Byelorussia.  
But the immediate question is then: how does this Russian dynamics in encircling its 
close neighborhood affect the fate of remote areas of its former “hunting ground” like 
Kosovo? The answer is straightforward. Firstly, in January 2008 (so, just before Kosovo 
123 
declares itself independent), the Russian giant Gazprom bought a majority stake in 
Serbia‟s oil monopoly, comforting thus its abovementioned encirclement of Europe; a 
deal which was described by analysts as a blow to Nabucco.
231
 Secondly, such control of 
oil infrastructure in Europe, including the routing of South Stream through Serbia as 
gateway for the delivery of Russian gas to Western Europe, has afforded Russia the 
power to keep Belgrade in its sphere of influence.
232
 Thirdly, the resultant of the above 
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 Dempsey, J. (2008, January 23). Russia‟s Gazprom takes control of Serbian oil monopoly.  The New 
York Times:  
“Serbia announced Tuesday that Russia has bought Serbia‟s oil monopoly, the latest in Russia‟s recent 
string of energy acquisitions. The deal will also allow Moscow to send more natural gas to Europe 
through its South Stream pipeline. 
Four days after signing a major pipeline deal with Bulgaria, the Russian state-owned energy giant 
Gazprom agreed to buy a 51% stake in NIS, the Serbian state-owned oil company. The deal was yet 
another blow to the European Union’s ambitions to build its own 2,000-mile pipeline to bring gas to 
Europe from Iran and Azerbaijan via Turkey, analysts said. 
... ... 
«As regards the deal between Russia and Serbia, we can blame the E.U. for some of this,» said Borut Grgic, 
an energy expert and director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Ljubljana, Slovenia. «In all its 
negotiations with Serbia when dealing with the future status of Kosovo, the E.U. never brought up with 
Serbia the issue of energy security and how Serbia could play an important role for Europe», he added.”  
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 References: 
• Dempsey, J. (2008, January 23). Ibid:  
“Gazprom will also invest about $725 million toward modernizing Serbia‟s energy infrastructure. 
In addition, a spur from the South Stream pipeline under the Black Sea will be directed into 
Serbia, enhancing its role as a transit point for Russian gas. 
The Russian deal coincides with a fiercely contested presidential election that has focused on 
plans by the United States and the European Union to recognize the independence of the 
province of Kosovo despite opposition from most Serbian political parties and Russia, Serbia’s 
closest ally on the issue. 
... ... 
Given the political context, analysts said, there was a link between the energy deal and the 
presidential elections.” 
• Bilefsky, D. (2008, November 1). Despite crisis, wealthy Russians are buying up coastal 
Montenegro. The New York Times:  
“In ... Serbia, Gazprom, the Russian state energy monopoly, recently bought a majority stake in 
the national energy company, Petroleum Industry of Serbia, for $520 million and agreed to invest 
another $650 million in 2012. The deal will give Gazprom a dominant position in Serbia’s 
energy market while transforming Serbia into a gateway for the transportation of Russian gas 
into Western Europe. 
... ... 
... in ... Serbia, where the pro-Western government of President Boris Tadic has been pressing for 
European Union membership, some critics argue that Russia is using pipeline politics to keep 
Belgrade in Russia’s sphere of influence. 
In a recently announced energy deal, Gazprom agreed to make Serbia a transit country for its 
south stream pipeline, a $14 billion project that will stretch 560 miles undersea from Russia to 
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two conditions having to do with Kosovo is just that Russia would by no means find an 
interest in betraying its “adoptive daughter”, Serbia; and would thus obviously reject 
Kosovo‟s independence as long as such independence would be rejected by Serbia itself, 
or perhaps even longer if power balance is to be considered. This was pertinently 
demonstrated by Danica Popovic, chief economist at the Center for Liberal-Democratic 
Studies in Belgrade, a Serbian economic research institute, as she “argued that economic 
relations shifted fundamentally in Russia’s favor after Moscow repeatedly invoked its 
veto in the United Nations Security Council to prevent it from recognizing Kosovo, 
which declared independence from Serbia last February.”233 Expressed differently, an 
increase of Russia‟s leverage over its former remote areas of influence helps it locking up 
again its old European backyard, located just next door. 
The next logical question is: does the July 2010 opinion of the ICJ have any relation with 
the above described situation? And here again the answer is very simple; in that its 
wording may look flowery enough for the Kosovars‟ “local consumption” in order to 
calm down and take it easy while, at the same time, such formulation scrupulously 
avoided any excessive rhetoric on the substance of the issue that the Serbs did not want to 
hear at any price; but, most importantly, it conceals in reality an un-avowed Court‟s 
record of Russia‟s reshaping mesh in Europe. We will revert to this aspect of the subject 
in concluding our present work; but let us see just next whether or not the Iranian nuclear 
issue could have had a direct or an indirect impact on the great powers‟ policies in the 
Balkans, or vice versa.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Europe. The project – which Gazprom insists will forge ahead despite the global financial crisis – 
is a direct challenge to Nabucco, a pipeline championed by the United States and the European 
union to bring natural gas to Europe via Central Asia, offsetting energy dependence on Russia.” 
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 Bilefsky, D. (2008, November 1). Ibid. 
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4.4 – Iran 
It is common knowledge, with regard to Iran, that the West was the first international 
actor to apprehend Iran‟s becoming a nuclear power; but at the same time, all the parties 
were very well aware of the limited efficiency of a Western unilateral sanctioning of 
Iran.
234
 As pointed out in clear terms by U.S. Vice-President Joseph R. Biden Jr., the 
West saw a risk of transshipment of nuclear capacity from structures like the Iranian 
regime to terrorist and criminal networks of which no place in the world would be 
immune; thus including Russia and China.
235
 The matter subject to trade was hence to 
gain the support of reluctant member states of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) to vote for one more resolution sanctioning Iran.
 236
 This meant Russia and 
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Translation ; 
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 Biden, J.R. Jr. (2010, May 6). Advancing Europe‟s security. International Herald Tribune, p.6: 
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 Note : A series of measures were already taken against Iran by the UN Security Council in 2006, 2007 
and 2008. See resolutions (i) number 1696 adopted on the 31
st
 of July 2006 [S/RES/1696 (2006)], (ii) 
number 1737 adopted on the 23
rd
 of December 2006 [S/RES/1737 (2006)], (iii) number 1747 adopted on 
the 24
th
 of March 2007 [S/RES/1747 (2007)]. (iv) number 1803 adopted on the 3
rd
 of March 2008 
[S/RES/1803 (2008)], and (v) number 1835 adopted on the 27
th
 of September 2008 [S/RES/1835 (2008)]. 
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China‟s support imperatively on one hand and, on the other hand, the support of other 
member states of the UNSC to obtain a casting majority.
237
 In this respect, the US-
Chinese negotiation is indeed important and we cannot disregard it, all the more that 
China is a member of the group of Six.
 238
 But the Russo-US bargain is more interesting 
for us and more relevant with our work due to the Russo-Serbian ties, notwithstanding 
the fact that China was as much unfavorable to Kosovo‟s independence as Russia was, if 
not more than this latter.
239
 As a result of the lack of specificity of the Sino-Serbian 
relationship in comparison with the Russo-Serbian ethnic ties (racial and religious: they 
are both Slavs and Orthodox) and as long as the Chinese had no concerns about a direct 
Iranian threat, if a counterpart was ever requested by China for siding with the West to 
sanction Iran, such counterpart has probably not involved Kosovo but rather some other 
concessions than in the Balkans bearing more direct relevancy for China. But what about 
a Russo-Western deal involving Kosovo as a bargaining counter for Russia‟s alignment 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
237
 The permanent members of the Security Council are of course the United States, Russia, China, France 
and Great Britain and they have a veto right in the vote of resolutions. The number of revolving 
nonpermanent members is 10. The current nonpermanent members are the following: Lebanon (who 
assumed the presidency in May 2010), Brazil, Turkey, Japan, Bosnia, Gabon, Mexico, Austria, Nigeria and 
Uganda. Furthermore, a majority of 9 over 15 votes is needed to pass UNSC resolutions, provided there is 
not a single veto. 
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 The Six designates the concerned parties involved in the negotiations with Iran about its nuclear 
program; these are the following countries: The United States, Russia, China, France, Great Britain and 
Germany. 
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 Mandeville, L. (2009, September 28). Obama entame une incertaine marche face à l‟Iran [Obama starts 
an uncertain march in facing Iran]. Le Figaro. Op-cit:  
“Les Chinois semblent encore moins emballés [que les Russes] à l‟idée de «punir» l‟Iran. Le Financial 
Times a rapporté que les compagnies chinoises avaient commencé de fournir du carburant à l‟Iran, 
remplissant le vide laissé par BP qui a stoppé ses livraisons l‟an passé.” 
Translation : 
“The Chinese seem to be even less enthusiastic [than the Russians] about the idea of «punishing» Iran. The 
Financial Times has reported that the Chinese companies had started to supply Iran with fuel, offsetting 
thereby the vacuum left by BP which stopped its deliveries last year.” 
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with the West over sanctioning Iran? In our analysis of the concurrent factual situation 
here below, we will examine any foreseeable relevancy enabling us to postulate on such a 
hypothetical deal, or otherwise to refrain.  
In connection with the observations here above, it should pertinently be noted that the 
Iranians were very well aware of the East/West relational flaw on sanctioning them and 
they were tactically exploiting it, to gain time, through spectacular tricks and reversals 
that first confirmed early Western concerns about the paralysis due to the latent inability 
of the Six to convene on a common stance from the outset; and despite the Iranians‟ 
assurances that they were not working on the development of nuclear weaponry, there 
was a confusion at the international level.
240
 But it is evident that the Western anxiety 
about the Iranians‟ ultimate intentions was precocious as compared to that of the East. 
Indeed, it took Westerners five and a half months (January 2010 to mid-June 2010) to 
convince Easterners to accept the principle of a new set of sanctions; and the West was 
fast to unilaterally increase the dosage, as we will see a little later in this section. At any 
rate, the worldwide concerns were subsequently confirmed by declarations from both 
sides, West and East. On the 27
th
 of June 2010, thus less than three weeks after the last 
set of sanctions was voted (09
th
 of June), Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency has declared on ABC Television that Iran had already enough 
uranium to produce two bombs.
241
 This declaration was followed on the 12
th
 of July 2010 
                                                 
240 See the summary of the 2009 / 2010 negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme in Annex 7 to this 
thesis. 
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 CIA : L‟Iran a assez d‟uranium pour fabriquer deux bombes [CIA : Iran has enough uranium to fabricate 
two bombs]. (2010, June 28). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.11: 
“L‟Iran dispose de suffisamment d‟uranium faiblement enrichi «pour fabriquer deux armes» nucléaires, a 
déclaré hier le patron de la CIA Léon Panetta sur la chaîne ABC. «Cela leur prendrait sans doute un an 
(pour fabriquer la bombe) et ensuite une autre année pour développer un système opérationnel 
d‟utilisation de cette arme», a ajouté M. Panetta”. 
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by a statement from Russia‟s President, Dmitri Medvedev, saying that Iran was close to 
having the bomb.
242
 A couple of days later, Medvedev repeated the essence of his 
message, however with an extent of weighting in a visible attempt to salvage the business 
relationship.
243
 
Now therefore, going into the details of our study and analyzing the motives for the 
relevant actors‟ positions, we may say that Russia‟s implication in siding with the West 
would need to be qualified in terms of the extent to which Russia ultimately saw the 
growing nuclear capacity of Iran as dangerous for it as the West did for itself, and in 
terms of economic and strategic considerations. This approach stems from an overlook on 
Russia‟s rational priorities, its partnership with Iran on multiple issues, and its 
geopolitical particularities. Thus, may we cautiously assume that, as long as Russia did 
not feel threatened, or else, was not driven by diverse Western means of pressure or 
incentives, it logically acted in a way to safeguard the volume of the ongoing business it 
has with Iran; this amounted to a Russian preference for conciliatory diplomacy over 
                                                                                                                                                 
Translation : 
“Leon Panetta, CIA‟s boss, has declared yesterday on ABC Television chain that Iran has got enough low 
enriched uranium «to fabricate two arms» in terms of nuclear weaponry. He added that «it will probably 
take them a year (to produce the bomb) and thereafter another year to develop an operational system for 
the use of such arm»”. 
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 L‟Iran est proche d‟avoir le potentiel pour créer une arme atomique, assure Medvedev [Medvedev 
assures that Iran is on the verge of having the potential to create an atomic bomb]. (2010, July 13). L‟Orient 
– Le Jour, p.11: 
“«L‟Iran est proche d‟avoir le potentiel qui, en principe, peut être utilisé pour créer une arme nucléaire», 
a affirmé le président Russe, Dmitri Medvedev, ... ...” 
Translation : 
“ ... ... the Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, has asserted that «Iran is close to have the potential which, 
in principle, could be used to create a nuclear arm».” 
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 The Associated Press. (2010, July 23). Ahmadinejad says Russia part of anti-Iran campaign. The New 
York Times: 
“Medvedev said last week that although Iran is «an active and trusted trading partner ... this does not 
mean we don‟t care how it develops its nuclear program and what its military component look like. In this 
respect we expect explanation from Iran».” 
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coercive sanctions. Russia therefore tried to resist – as much as it could – the offering of 
such an important card to the West, fearing that the deal would prejudice its matters of 
international trade with Iran; a trade – it has to be emphasized – which is inclusive of 
weaponry.
244
 In this respect, it does merit to point out here that the Obama 
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pour quelque 700 millions d’euros. ... ... Moscou, qui livre du combustible à la centrale, a 
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complexes. Dans le domaine du gaz – ressource alternative à l‟atome –, les deux pays, qui 
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Translation : 
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in Iran are complex. Regarding the field of gas – an alternative resource to atom –, the two 
130 
Administration had to compensate Russia with a lot of concessions for offsetting its loss 
of benefits resulting from the interruption of its assistance to Iran in the development of 
this latter‟s nuclear program and the building up of its missile system. 245 To evaluate the 
importance of those concessions, one should only read the critiques of former officials of 
the Bush Administration, like John Bolton, who was US Ambassador to the United 
Nations and who made a statement in May 2010 wondering what other concession Russia 
would manage to drag out from a despaired Obama Administration.
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 In furtherance to 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries, which contain more than half of the worldwide reserves – are both allies – especially 
through the giant Gazprom – and competitors. 
 
• Baker, P. (2010, May 8). Obama seeking to revive nuclear deal with Moscow. International 
Herald Tribune, p.3, Op-cit: 
“Critics said Mr. Obama was too quick to give Russia something it wants without ... ... the 
cancellation of Russia’s still-unfulfilled deal to sell S-300 antiaircraft missiles to Iran.” 
Note: 
This was about the Obama proposed revival of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement 
scrapped by Bush in August 2008 during the Georgian crisis. 
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 Smith, A. (2010, May 24). Compromis russo-américains sur l‟Iran [Russo-American compromises over 
Iran]. Le Figaro: 
“Cette même Russie, dont plusieurs entreprises ont pourtant été accusées ces dernières années de soutenir 
le programme nucléaire et le système de missiles iraniens, peut se targuer d‟une autre victoire. Les Etats-
Unis ont annoncé vendredi [21 mai 2010] – trois jours seulement après le lancement officiel des 
consultations sur l‟Iran – la levée des sanctions américaines contre quatre de ces entreprises. En janvier 
déjà, deux autres avaient bénéficié de la même mesure. Il s‟agit du bras armé du Kremlin, 
Rosoboronexport, de deux instituts et d‟un bureau de design. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères russe, 
Sergueï Lavrov, avait mis cette exigence sur la table à la dernière minute, alors qu’il avait déjà donné 
son feu vert au texte proposé par les Américains”. 
Translation : 
“This same Russia, whose several enterprises have however been accused these last years of supporting 
the Iranian nuclear program and missile system, can be proud of another victory. The United States has 
announced Friday [21 May 2010] – just three days after the official launching of consultations on Iran – 
the lifting of American sanctions against four of these enterprises. In January, two others had already 
benefited of that same measure. These represent the Kremlin‟s armed body, Rosoboronexport, two 
institutes and a design office. The Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergeï Lavrov, has put that request 
on the table at the last minute, while he had already given his green light to the text proposed by the 
Americans.” 
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• Baker, P. & Sanger D.E. (2010, May 21). U.S. makes concessions to Russia for Iran Sanctions. 
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“John R. Bolton, who was acting ambassador to the United Nations under Mr. Bush, said Russia‟s 
foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, got the upper hand on the Obama team. «He sensed 
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Bolton‟s statement quoted above, one may relevantly suggest giving fair consideration to 
the fact that, not much later, on the 9
th
 of June 2010, the UNSC adopted resolution 1929 
by 12 favorable votes over 15, sanctioning once more Iran however with a lesser scope 
than targeted by the West.
 247
 Thus, now that the issue of sanctions has been “sold” to 
Russia, the next rational step in our analysis would be for us to assess the extent to which 
such critical card was exchanged with the U.S. and Europe  either against compensations 
offsetting the former‟s exposure to geopolitical and economical losses or against 
concessions on its other issues of concern in the Caucasus, in Central Europe and in 
Kosovo, or else for security considerations.
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 It should pertinently be observed in this 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the traffic would bear,» he said. «The only remaining question is what else he got that we 
don’t yet know about.»” 
 
• Smith, A. (2010, May 24). Ibid:  
“L‟ambassadeur à l‟ONU sous George Bush, John Bolton, se demande « quels autres compromis 
» la Russie a-t-elle réussi à imposer à une Administration Obama manifestement «désespérée».” 
Translation : 
“The Ambassador to the UNO under George Bush, John Bolton, wonders « what other 
compromise » Russia has managed to impose on an evidently « despaired » Obama 
Administration.” 
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 See United Nations Security Council Resolution number 1929 (2010), adopted on the 09
th
 of June 2010. 
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respect that, until now, the power balances over the Caucasus and Kosovo are not yet at 
rest as either one of the cores is still trying hard to gain (or safeguard) there the maximum 
influence for itself, in which case, there would be no direct relation between Kosovo and 
Iran. In fact, concurrent press reports (June 2010) about an embryo of Russo-US 
cooperation on security matters tend to give credit to the hypothesis that Russians and 
Chinese had indeed an extent of security concerns which made them decide to vote for 
the sanctions.
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 This adds up of course to the Russo-US cooperation on START; and the 
trend seems to be progressing positively with Medvedev‟s attendance of the November 
2010 NATO Summit. 
The above discussion is supported by the fact that, notwithstanding any forceful 
condition having compelled the Russians to accept the idea of sanctions itself, their 
interests are in reality so much imbricated with those of the Iranians that they endeavored 
– as it was clearly expected by Neil MacFarquhar of the International Herald Tribune – to 
dilute the effects of such sanctions while insisting on maintaining the process of 
negotiations.
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 And the imposition by the European Union and the United States 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Parallèlement à ces liens économiques inextricables, Téhéran joue depuis des décennies un rôle 
plutôt pacificateur dans les anciennes républiques soviétiques, que ce soit en Asie centrale, et 
notamment au Tadjikistan, en Arménie ou dans le Caucase du Nord. L‟Iran, en particulier, s‟est 
toujours gardé d‟attiser la rébellion islamique tchétchène. ... ...  
«La Russie sait parfaitement que l’Iran a les moyens de lui causer de gros problèmes dans la 
région », résume Fedor Loukianov, rédacteur en chef de La Russie dans le monde”. 
Translation : 
“In parallel with its inextricable economic links, Teheran has been playing for decades now a 
rather pacificator role in the old Soviet republics, would it be in Central Asia, and especially in 
Tajikistan, in Armenia or in the Northern Caucasus. Iran, in particular, has always refrained from 
stirring up the Islamic Chechen rebellion. 
As summarized by Fedor Loukianov, chief editor of Russia in the World « Russia is perfectly 
aware that Iran can cause for her big problems in the region »ˮ. 
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 Coopération – USA et Russie promettent de coopérer davantage contre le terrorisme [Cooperation – 
USA and Russia promise to cooperate more against terrorism]. (2010, June 26). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p. 10. 
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 MacFarquhar, N. (2010, March 4). U.S. leads push on draft containing new sanctions for Iran. 
International Herald Tribune, p.4: 
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separately of even more sanctions than provided for in the resolution itself is a clear cut 
reflection of the division of the UNSC members States on the extent of sanctions to be 
imposed. As a matter of fact, this has raised vehement protests from Russia‟s Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergueï Riabkov.
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 By deduction therefore, one may suggest 
that this very fact, coupled with their finally conceding on sanctions (even though with a 
lesser level), may hint that Russians were torn out between interests and security but were 
                                                                                                                                                 
“The proposed measures, already negotiated between the United States, Britain, France and Germany, 
will most likely be diluted in further talks. The initial reaction from Russia was negative, saying the 
measures are too strong, diplomats in the talks said, with one noting, «There is quite a bit that they didn‟t 
like.» Yet Moscow continues to endorse the idea of new sanctions in tandem with negotiations”. 
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compelled at last to give priority to the latter; otherwise, why would they have offered the 
West such a trump card? 
Security is a complex issue; all parties seem to share concerns about it but with probably 
differing extents, and thus more likely with different priorities. As we saw earlier 
Americans were more concerned than Russians about the Iranian nuclear issues from the 
outset; but apparently, it was the other way round with regard to START; as a matter of 
fact, one of the Russian requests was to have the Treaty ratified by the Senate before the 
«Duma». A recent statement from President Obama tends to assert the above suggestion 
and thus give fair credence to the assumption of the occurrence of an Iran/START un-
avowed deal.
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Thus, at this phase of the competition, it becomes normal course for the great actors to try 
each on its side either to secure the maximum advantages or to salvage whatever it can 
from its regional trumps around the world. And this is perfectly understandable if we 
consider the issue within the following equation: 
a. on the Western side, (i) early apprehensions about Iran becoming a nuclear 
power plus (ii) Euro-American dynamics in the post-Soviet space, and 
b. on the Eastern side, (i) Russia‟s concerns about its vital interests in the Gulf 
region, increased by its siding with the West on the issue of sanctioning Iran 
plus (ii) its resistance to Western penetration in the post-Soviet space.
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Op-cit: 
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253 Mandeville, L. (2009, September 28). Obama entame une incertaine marche face à l‟Iran [Obama starts 
an uncertain march in facing Iran]. Le Figaro. Op-cit: 
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Perhaps the above equation may better be illustrated by comparing it to a balance sheet 
where the assets for actors of one side are liabilities for those of the other side and vice-
versa. The present phase of the game over Iran having been suspended (at least 
momentarily and for reasons having reportedly no direct relation with Kosovo), the 
Iranian nuclear issue may be set aside for the moment; but any other unresolved matter 
should remain on the sheet. Some of those other matters – not necessarily all of them, it 
should be emphasized – may be directly related to some others; anyone of them however 
accounts at least for a share of the sum and would logically not be given up by a party for 
free, particularly if the other party is eager about getting it. Thus if there is a direct 
relationship between Kosovo and the oil routes in Europe, the relationship of the former 
with Iran (especially before the last set of sanctions) was only that of two entries 
contributing to the same total that constitutes the respective global positions of the parties, 
it being understood that Kosovo was the spark that has triggered the long time prepared 
Russian comeback after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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 Regarded as such, in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Les sceptiques remarquent que les Russes n‟ont pas intérêt à un rapprochement irano-occidental. «La 
peur d‟un Iran nucléaire est-elle plus grande à Moscou que le désir de nuire aux positions américaines ?», 
s‟interrogeait au printemps un diplomate américain”. 
Translation : 
“Skeptical people note that Russians have no interest in an Iranian-Western rapprochement. An American 
diplomat was wondering in the spring whether «Moscow‟s fear of a nuclear Iran is larger than its desire to 
harm American positions.»ˮ. 
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dispute of the parties over the card of Kosovo, justice would more look like a mean than 
an end in connection with the whole game. It becomes justified therefore, as long as the 
global balance has not stabilized like at the era of the Cold War, to expect either 
supportive or adverse reactions from the parties on each separate issue, with a varying 
degree of influence from the settled outcome on other issues. In other words, any 
settlement in one place may either limit or widen up the maneuvering margin of the 
parties elsewhere, or push them respectively to either stiffen or soften their positions. 
So we are up to this point now, with a geopolitical current deadlock over the conflict 
between Serbia and Kosovo, as Russia was compelled to retract in Iran and has thus now 
increasing reasons to ever oppose Western management of a so sensitive terrain located 
in its old “Balkan private hunting ground”; a remote ground of course, but nevertheless a 
client ground, where – as we saw earlier – the convergence of interest with Serbia has an 
increasing stake.
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
While there is no doubt that the parties were not expecting a binding opinion from the ICJ, 
we can reasonably assume that they nevertheless hoped from the Court an opinion with 
some more commitment than what it actually offered, at least morally. Indeed, as we saw 
earlier, the Court‟s answer did not engage it on whether or not Kosovo qualified for 
statehood and independency; it was rather a kind of returning the ball (i) to the 
belligerents themselves, and (ii) to the rest of the States of the international community, 
leaving to those latter‟s discretion – and at their own risks pertaining to the ensuing 
political consequences for them – the uncomfortable choice of either siding with Serbia 
and the East by the rejection of Kosovo‟s independence or siding with Kosovo and the 
West by the recognition of such independence. It did not offer to anybody a clear cut or 
even a moral way out, because with such a wording the answer of the Court did not cross 
the threshold of commitment that would enable the parties either to assert their anterior 
positions or to retract. To prove the “limitations” of the Court‟s prudent opinion, one only 
needs to observe the effect it has had on the number of additional recognitions of 
Kosovo‟s independence after such opinion was rendered, i.e. the 22nd of July 2010.  As 
we saw earlier indeed, by the 25
th
 of October 2010, thus three months later, they were 
only two and this is certainly not a significant figure enabling any party to assert its 
position. Therefore, neither was there a rush of recognitions favoring Kosovo‟s claim, nor 
was there enough legal ground for a radical invalidation of Serbia‟s theory. The sort of 
“pharisaic” formulation of the Court‟s opinion (with all due respect) by itself hints that 
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the substance of Kosovo‟s claim and Serbia‟s reaction would more likely need to be 
resolved through a political settlement rather than a legal “Ottoman styled firman”; and 
thus it circumvented Serbia‟s direct attempt and the tacit “complicity” of so many other 
states, being evidently short of political solutions as they searched for a legal bypass in 
the referral of the matter to the ICJ.  
But the following question is logically raised here: why then did the Court consider itself 
competent on the matter and thus accepted the case? Dr. Jean-Marie Crouzatier answers 
for us this question by asserting that the Court does normally not reject a request 
addressed to it by an organ of the United Nations.
256
 
So we are back to square one because, in the absence of any helpful judicial contribution, 
the parties still have to decide on how to justify their original stance, ... ... unless they end 
up with an arrangement through a successful negotiation. Therefore, one may reasonably 
conclude that the request for opinion itself bore the watermarks of a political mobile, but 
the Court‟s answer was clever and professional enough to avoid any excessive 
commitment that would unduly serve such mobile. Indeed, right after the ICJ rendered its 
opinion, Bert Barnhoorn, an expert at the Asser Institute for International Law, a policy 
organization in The Hague, pertinently commented that «The court invariably is very 
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 Jean-Marie Crouzatier is a law professor at the University of Toulouse 1 Capitole (France). He 
participated to an international colloquium on the subject « International Justice and/or the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security ». The colloquium was held on the 8
th
 and 9
th
 of December 2010 at the 
Antonine University (Baabda, Lebanon). In his speech on Kosovo, Crouzatier pointed out that: 
“Dans cette affaire, elle ne retient aucun de ces éléments [défavorable à son intervention] ; mais c’est une 
attitude constante : la Cour s’est toujours montrée réticente à refuser de participer à l’action des Nations 
unies lorsqu’elle lui est demandée par l’un de ses organes.” 
Translation : 
“In this matter, it does not uphold any of those elements [unfavorable to its intervention] ; but it is a 
constant attitude : the Court has always showed reticence to reject its participation to the action of the 
United Nations when such action was requested by one of the latter’s organs.ˮ 
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prudent and avoids making political decisions».
257
 Let therefore the international 
community take its part of responsibility in determining whether or not Kosovo is 
qualified to be an independent State.  
Here is precisely where the challenge is lying in wait for the parties; because the 
significance of the Court‟s position is that Kosovo‟s independence needs imperatively a 
global consensus of the concert of nations, expressed in practice by formal recognitions 
of all of the 5 permanent members of the UNSC, concurrently with an appropriate 
number of States to pass chronologically the relevant resolutions by the Security Council 
and by the General Assembly of the United Nations in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the Charter. In the absence of such affirmative consensus, inasmuch as the 
Western interest for Kosovo‟s independence is driven by strategic and security 
considerations, that independence will remain all the more hypothetical; and the West 
will be endemically burdened with taking charge of the newborn and nurse it, as currently 
the case is with the presence of NATO forces in Kosovo.
258
 But in our modest opinion, 
the Kosovars should not content themselves with that much of realization; they definitely 
have to win the support of the Eastern poles of the international system (Russia and 
China). For given past experiences around the world, we have enough grounds to suggest 
that the perpetuation of this kind of situation is risky for them. One of the best examples 
is the abandonment by the West of Chiang Kai-shek‟s Republic of China (the island of 
Taiwan) to the benefit of the Peoples‟ Republic of China (or PRC: the continental China). 
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 Bilefsky, D. (2010, July 22). World Court rules Kosovo declaration was legal. The New York Times. Op-
cit.  
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 Taylor, P. (2010, April 19). Bosnia‟s economic shackles, The New York Times:  
“In the Balkans, only Kosovo – which more than half of the international community does not recognize as 
an independent state – is in a worse economic limbo, and it is even more dependent on a drip-free of 
foreign aid to keep its head above water.” 
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Indeed, when it was time for the West‟s own interests to come to terms with the PRC, an 
end was put to Taiwan‟s 21-year occupation of China‟s permanent seat at the UNSC; that 
was in 1971; and in 1979, the United States recognized the PRC and broke off its 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Ultimately Taiwan was of course compelled to 
ameliorate its relations with the PRC.
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 This example has a double advantage. The first 
is that it evidences once more the predominance of interests over rights in Realpolitik; the 
second is that it makes clear the essence of recognition in legitimating an entity as one of 
the State members of the family of nations and the effects of what Gerhard von Glahn 
reports as being called “derecognition” in international law, supporting his definition by 
the said example of Taiwan.
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 This being said, extrapolating the strict formulation of the 
ICJ‟s opinion on Kosovo, our interpretation of its moral enables us to draw a parallel with 
the second evidence shown by the above example. 
Now the relation between Kosovo and Serbia is certainly of different stake than that 
between Taiwan and the PRC, but this doesn‟t change the merciless rules of reality in the 
still current practice of international relations. Therefore, the risk for the Kosovars does 
exist and it remains like a sword of Damocles if ever their geopolitical location ceases to 
represent any strategic and security imperative or economic interest for the West. And 
consequently, in the absence of Eastern acceptance, Kosovo has no alternative but 
gambling on an everlasting prevalence of Western motivations going along with its claim 
for independence; which is to date a concurrence made evident by the presence of NATO 
forces on its soil, as we saw above. But why would the Russians surrender to this 
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 Von Glahn, G. (1996). Chapter 5: Recognition of States and governments. Law among nations – an 
introduction to public international law. (7
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Western fait accompli forasmuch as they can resist it, or as long as they do not feel 
equally threatened or trade it off against anything of interest for them elsewhere in the 
world? And if there is such a transaction, can anyone make a modicum of inference about 
justice? Also why would the Chinese surrender to such Western fait accompli given their 
concerns about creating a precedent against their policy in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan? 
Ideally of course, the ICJ would have been in a position to solve the dilemma by an 
award which would have safeguarded the rights of the parties and compelled them to 
fulfill their obligations, cutting off the road for the interests of the various actors. But our 
earlier discussion in Chapter 2 goes to show that, as at today, international relations are 
not yet so well legally framed; it does not enable us to hereby conclude that the ICC and 
the ICJ are totally independent of worldwide politics. Indeed, one should imperatively 
consider, on one hand, the fact that the Statute of the ICC has only been partially ratified, 
with notorious abstentions of certain Great Powers, coupled with the fact that the 
infrastructure of the United Nations has enabled powerful States however unbound by the 
Statute of the ICC to use it against other States which are unbound either by such 
Statute.
261
 On the other hand one should consider as well the limitations of the ICJ 
discussed above (Optional Clause and advisory opinions remaining without any positive 
prospect), also coupled with the fact that the permanent members of the UNSC have a 
preponderant vote upon deciding and adopting resolutions via their veto power. All these 
facts are indices of a contingency on political balances and objectives and on 
circumstantial dynamics and motivations of powerful actors in the game of nations in 
getting any international adjudication to move forward.  
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 Please refer to Annex 1 to the present work. 
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Now, despite this flaw, the system is improving because states are very well aware that 
the alternative is an all out anarchy; but it is difficult at this stage to predict how long 
such flaw will ever last. Indeed, there surely is a trend toward standardizing international 
justice among peoples; and the unstoppable dynamics of worldwide globalization 
certainly plays a major role in this sense by the very fact that modernization is 
accelerating the march of the world‟s nations toward global integration and 
interdependence.
262
 This property definitely increases the need for more and more 
international regulations but we still haven‟t got enough retrospect to figure out a 
calendar of advances in this direction. Among other reasons for such lack of retrospect is 
the fact that the present outcome of globalization appears to be more in line with the 
traditional pluralist advocacy and rather distant from the conventional realist 
understanding of sovereignty; while, as we discussed earlier in Chapter 2 herein and 
demonstrated here above in the present conclusion, today‟s international affairs are still 
heavily marked by realism, notwithstanding the extent to which globalization has induced 
a more attentive listening to the pluralist theory.
263
 For example, the 1961 and 1963 
Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations respectively did make an 
appreciable advance in establishing a framework of rules and procedures for the practice 
of interstate diplomacy, but they did not considerably narrow the gap between the 
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 Note: Modernization encompasses the development of technology and of all sectors of communication, 
transportation, industry, banking, finance, trade, inter-societal ties, transnational corporations, interstate 
exchanges and partnerships, etc..., etc... . Also issues of common concern, indirectly related to 
modernization by the fact that they result from industrial development, should add up to interdependence 
factors (like ecological and environmental issues). 
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 See page 279 (Chapter 7: Diplomatic relations) in Slomanson‟s (1995) Fundamental perspectives on 
international law. (2
nd
 ed.). Op-cit.  
Note: this is evidenced by the contemporary reliance of Great Powers on force, notwithstanding the more 
recent worldwide increase of interest for International Law. Slomanson provides in this respect a diversity 
of specific examples (US, China, Canada, etc...) showing that foreign policy still remains to a considerable 
extent mortgaged by realism to the detriment of international law. 
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conceptual views of realists and idealists (thus pluralists as well) regarding the 
importance of international law in the conduct of diplomacy; this was again reflected in 
the 1983 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in Washington 
D.C..
264
 However, with the process of globalization running ahead so fast, if states stick 
to the classical concept of sovereignty, they may very well run the risk of ending up 
isolated from the rest of world or deprived from modernity. In an “n” number of years, 
the old concept of sovereignty – for anyone state stumbling on it – would amount to 
isolation. We may now be at the eve of major changes and achievements in this regard; 
but it is a matter of epoch and we are thus not necessarily at year “n-1”. By such year “n” 
nevertheless, the understanding of sovereignty would hopefully best be approximated by 
the pluralist philosophy and would thus have moved away from the permanent realist 
traits to the same extent that it approached pluralism; and by then at last, pluralists would 
concretely deserve integrating in their family that seventeenth century classical realist 
named Hugo Grotius, for his pioneering the sanctity of treaties; all the more that his 
principle has been finally endorsed by the United Nations (1945) through the express 
wording of Article 2.2 of the Charter and has subsequently been generalized to all treaties 
by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) whose Article 26 
provides that every treaty “is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith”.265 
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 Slomanson, W.R. (1995). Chapter 7: Diplomatic relations. Ibid, (pp.286-287). 
Note: Slomanson provides an example by comparing the cautious optimism of Canada‟s then ambassador 
(Gottlieb) to the United States in expecting a closer relationship between diplomacy and international law 
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did not see much room for international law in the conduct of diplomacy. 
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 Note: 
It is very important here to recall the evolution of the realist philosophy on international law discussed 
earlier: 
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Winding up on all of our discussions in the present work, the current status of 
international law has no absolute leverage on the fact that Kosovo and the Caucasus may 
shortly tend to become the forthcoming East/West geopolitical demarcation line where 
every side tries to advance its own pawns in order to ameliorate its position there, 
notwithstanding the rights, the legitimate aspirations and the obligations of the regional 
populations. Meanwhile, the arm wrestle over the Iranian issue would probably be 
tempered unless the security concerns of any single one of the grand actors are appeased; 
in which case there may either be a trade off or Iran would add up in the balance as part 
of the said demarcation line. 
Given the helplessness of international justice to solve the dilemma of Kosovo‟s 
unilaterally declared independence, and in the absence of an East/West transaction over 
the issue, one possible way out of the stalemate is to convince the parties of the benefits 
of integrating Serbia in the European Union, with Kosovo still as a Serbian province but 
enjoying an as much large autonomy as possible; setting aside the formal recognition of 
Kosovo‟s independence, or adjourning the debate to after integration in the EU if 
Kosovo‟s motivations persist. Kosovo‟s June 2009 adhesion to the International 
                                                                                                                                                 
Firstly, it is imperative to stress on the fact that a stable trait of realism – classical or contemporary – is that 
high politics factors (military security and other economic issues considered as security factors, like safety 
of oil supply) remain a priority over other considerations. 
Secondly, as we saw in discussing Grotius and Carr, realists are not totally insensitive to international law, 
inasmuch as high politics considerations still prevail over the rest. 
Thirdly however, as stated in our conclusion about neorealist philosophers like Waltz, Morgenthau and 
Thompson, those latter assume that international law is only possible if there is a balance of power, but 
they also suggest that the establishment of such regulation does not spare the family of nations the burden 
of maintaining that same equilibrium of forces (BoP) among them. Why? Precisely because of the 
inexistence yet of a central authority, willfully vested by those nations with the power to enforce on anyone 
of them indiscriminately the rules agreed upon. Consequently high politics factors would always be the 
reference. 
The fine distinction with the pluralists on this particular issue is that – without neglecting security 
imperatives – those latter neither subject the establishment of international law to a BoP among States nor 
do they see any necessity for such balance afterwards. By and large as discussed earlier, modernization and 
socioeconomic exchanges take precedence over security concerns in the pluralist thought. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) is an excellent illustration of how such enlarged autonomy could 
be encouraged and expanded to other international organs.
266
 Perhaps this compromise 
would be the best bet for both the Serbs and the Kosovars in order to avoid being caught 
indefinitely in the East/West “fishing lake”, provided there is no ensuing prejudice to the 
Western security measures already established. To be convinced of the relevancy of such 
compromise, one only needs to have a quick glance at a declaration from the EU‟s 
Foreign Policy High Representative, Catherine Ashton; an understatement overloaded 
with significance and further commented on by Misha Glenny of the New York Times.
267
 
And after all, this would be half a success for either one of the parties because 
interdependence is increasing worldwide due to the advance of globalization; and as we 
saw above, the concept of absolute independence and sovereignty is evolving 
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 Crouzatier J-M., Op-cit : 
“... faute de réunir une majorité d‟Etats, la candidature de Pristina auprès des organisations et institutions 
internationale est bloquée (si le Kosovo a pu rejoindre le Fonds monétaire international et la Banque 
mondiale en juin 2009, c‟est parce que le droit de vote des Etats membres de ces institutions est fonction de 
leur importance économique, ce qui donne un avantage décisif aux pays occidentaux, favorables à 
l‟adhésion du Kosovo).ˮ 
Translation : 
“... failing to obtain a favorable majority of States, Pristina‟s candidateship to adhere to international 
organizations and institutions is blocked (if Kosovo was able to join the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank in June 2009, it is because the voting right of State members of these institutions is a 
function of their economical importance; and this provides Western countries with a decisive advantage 
while, at the same time, those latter are favorable to Kosovo‟s adhesion).ˮ 
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 Glenny, M. (2010, July 27). Leave Serbia and Kosovo alone. The New York Times: 
“... ... the court‟s ruling is far from a legal carte blanche. Kosovo and Serbia are in a special situation, and 
both have a particular incentive for resolving their differences – the prospect of E.U. membership. If they 
can resolve their problems the door to Brussels will swing open. 
Catherine Ashton, the E.U. foreign minister, was quick to recognize this. «The E.U. is ready,» she said in a 
statement on the ruling, «to facilitate a process of dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. This dialogue 
would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to Europe and improve the lives of people.» 
Ms. Ashton is too skilled a diplomat to say it, but the implication of her statement should be clear to both 
Belgrade and Pristina. Kosovo must cease looking to secure its future by getting close to Washington, as 
Prime Minister Hashim Thaci appeared to be trying to do last week. And Belgrade must stop clinging to 
Russian objections to Kosovo’s independence. Serbia‟s foreign minister, Vuk Jeremic, sometimes gives the 
impression that this is indeed Belgrade‟s central policy. 
... ... 
Serbia and Kosovo find themselves confronted by the prisoner’s dilemma. Either they cooperate in their 
quest for E.U. membership or they remain outsiders, with disastrous consequences for themselves, the 
region and E.U. diplomacy.” 
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commensurately with such advance. Furthermore, Serbia‟s membership to the EU with 
an un-amputated Kosovo would likely alleviate this latter‟s being prisoner of an all out 
Serbian hegemony, by the only fact that the State‟s central government would have to 
tune its ruling procedures to European standards. It should however be noted that, unlike 
other analyses and regardless of its interest for a peaceful outcome, our proposal here is 
by no means of legal nature; it is a purely political denouement for the Kosovo-Serbian 
ancestral drama. Indeed, the UNGA‟s September 2010 (thus subsequently to the ICJ‟s 
opinion) welcoming of «the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a process of 
dialogue between the parties» is but a proof that under the present circumstances the 
solution is political and not legal, and it confirmed thereby our hypothesis in starting the 
present work that the mobile behind the request for opinion was in reality political. 
Caricaturing the General Assembly‟s terms, one may fairly distort them as follows : 
«Ladies and Gentlemen, now that we are well aware of the Court‟s opinion, please come 
back and sit down around the table to talk; it is not a legal question.» Otherwise, the UN 
would most probably have used another rhetoric and would have left to the Security 
Council (not the General Assembly) the task of forging a muscled resolution in 
accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
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 The need for 
dialogue and the EU‟s potential role in this regard were recalled once more by Lamberto 
                                                 
268
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/298, adopted on the 9
th
 of September 2010: 
“The General Assembly, 
... ... 
Having received with respect the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of the 22 July 2010 
on the Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral declaration of independence in respect of 
Kosovo, and having studied with great care the advisory opinion, including the issues on which it was 
rendered, 
... ... 
2. Welcomes the readiness of the European Union to facilitate a process of dialogue between the 
parties; the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor for peace, security and stability in the 
region, and that dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the 
European Union and improve the lives of people.” 
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Zannier, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon‟s Special Representative in Kosovo, in a press 
release from the UN News Service on the 12
th
 of November 2010. Zannier also disclosed 
that the UN and the EU were working together on the matter.
269
 In reality, far from 
insinuating that it did it on purpose, one has to admit that the specific formulation of the 
ICJ‟s opinion left by itself the door wide open for the negotiation of a political settlement. 
Yes it did. First of all, as already demonstrated, the question itself had a political mobile; 
and to be convinced that the answer had a prudent dosage of diplomacy in its formulation, 
one would only need to perform a reductio ad absurdum by imagining what would have 
happened if the Court had found that Kosovo‟s declaration violated international law: 
goodbye dialogue and goodbye peaceful settlement, hello perpetual presence of NATO 
forces, hello chronic and incurable ethnic disease, etc..., etc... . 
This being said, scholars like Robert Bistolfi have been legally arguing in favor of 
Serbia‟s position given consideration to the principle of borders‟ inviolability; but finally 
coming up also with a political solution.
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 Other analysts like Pyotr Romanov of RIA 
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 United Nations News Center. (2010, November 12). Growing tensions in northern Kosovo highlight 
need for dialogue, says UN envoy. UN News Service: 
“Growing tensions in northern Kosovo and lack of progress on outstanding issues has made dialogue 
between Pristina and Belgrade all the more necessary, a senior United Nations official told the Security 
Council today. 
... ... 
Both the Secretary-General and the General Assembly have welcomed the readiness of the European 
Union (EU) to facilitate a process of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo over the latter‟s unilateral 
declaration of independence in 2008. 
In a resolution adopted in September, the Assembly said «the process of dialogue in itself would be a factor 
for peace, security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would be to promote cooperation, achieve 
progress on the path to the European Union and improve the lives of the people.» 
Mr. Zannier, who also heads the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), noted that 
preparations for the dialogue are under way in Brussels, and the UN is working with the EU to provide 
support and contribute to this important process. 
«Our overall assessment is that the tensions in northern Kosovo and the attempt to scapegoat UNMIK for 
the lack of progress there are reminders of the pressing need for the dialogue called for by the General 
Assembly,» he told the Council.” 
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 Bistolfi, R. (2007-2008, winter). Kosovo – logique du pire ? [Kosovo – the logic of the worst ?]. In 
Confluences Méditerrannée (Eds.), Justice pénale et politique internationale, (64, pp. 114-115).  
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Novosti, find that there is an extent of contradiction between the UN Charter principles of 
self-determination (for Kosovo) and of inviolability of borders (for Serbia); and they 
accuse Westerners of having double-standard policies as they favor Kosovo‟s 
independence but reject the same treatment for Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia.
271
  We do 
not intend for our part to debate on the alleged contradiction in the UN Charter between 
the principles of self-determination (Article 1.2) and inviolability of borders (Article 2.4); 
all the more that, as pertinently pointed out by Bistolfi, unlike other entities of the former 
Yugoslav Federation, Kosovo was not a Federal State; it was (and still is) a province of 
the State of Serbia which is member of the United Nations since the 1
st
 of November 
2000. Notwithstanding Kosovo‟s status or Serbia‟s rights, our attention is rather focused 
on Bistolfi‟s precocious wondering whether the European Union was not a suitable 
structure to host Serbia and Kosovo together as one entity; that was in the winter season 
2007-2008, thus as Kosovo‟s February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence was 
still “cooking up” but “close to be ready for serving”.272 Now that the ICJ has rendered its 
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 Romanov, P. (2006, June 20). Border inviolability versus right to self-determination, RIA Novosti: 
“Even the UN Charter calmly declares two mutually excluding principles – the inviolability of borders and 
the right to self-determination, though this contradiction has sparked many international conflicts and 
claimed hundreds of thousands – if not millions – of lives. 
... ... 
A host of international mediators – mostly lawyers and politicians – buzz around such pockets of tension, 
usually only complicating them. This is logical, because their professions are based on double standards, 
and the decision about which principle to apply to a given case – the inviolability of borders, or the right to 
self-determination – is usually made to suit the self-serving interests of states or international 
organizations. The will of the people in the conflict zone, their passions and legitimate interests, are taken 
into account only when all other interests have been served. 
... ... 
Nobody can honestly tell you why Europe opted to support the self-determination of Kosovo Albanians to 
the detriment of the inviolability of Serbia‟s borders. At the same time, European officials think that similar 
conflicts in the former Soviet states – between Moldova and Transdnestr, or Georgia and Abkhazia and 
Ossetia – should be settled in favor of Moldova and Georgia. 
Like Kosovo Albanians, the people of Transdnestr, Abkhazia and South Ossetia took up arms to defend 
their independence, unwilling to live under the rule of the hated central authorities.” 
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award, our own conclusion asserts the validity of Bistolfi‟s 2-year earlier question and the 
current position of Catherine Ashton in Misha Glenny‟s deciphering. And if nevertheless 
there would remain grounds confirming the legitimacy of such independence despite the 
EU membership, our further proposal would be to reconsider then the matter, evidently 
without transgressing the elementary conditions for the said membership. 
In conclusion, with Kosovo as experimental subject, we were able to determine that it 
was perfectly possible for a party to call upon the ICJ not for the sake of pure justice but 
for political reasons inasmuch as the expected Court‟s rule was hoped to sustain the 
caller‟s bargaining position on one hand and, on the other hand, to help such caller‟s 
original supporters getting out of a stalemating situation in which they got themselves 
trapped. But not only so; because we also established the rendered opinion‟s failure to 
provide a clear cut ideal ground delimiting the rights and obligations of the parties with 
no further need for compromise; indeed, we found the cruel reality of politics standing in 
the way of the search for justice and fairness whereas they would normally be sought 
independently of the benevolence of some key actors that are interested in the situation 
one way or the other. So if Kosovo truly deserves independence as it claims, the Court 
could not be of any help in the absence of Russia‟s crucial cooperation; a cooperation – it 
has to be stressed – which would be to the detriment of its growing convergence of 
interests with Serbia. Conversely, let us suppose that Kosovo does not truly deserve 
independence; here again, the Court could neither be of any help to Serbia in the absence 
of a US acceptance of the fact. The only solution that the Court was thus able to come out 
with was to open the door wide enough for politics by working out accordingly a 
meticulously worded opinion. And this was proved by the subsequent UN‟s call for a 
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resumption of negotiations under the umbrella of the EU as we saw above, which, in all 
likelihood, was emergently alerted to rescue the situation. The Court‟s ruling was in fact 
condemned to be so “sterile” (with all due respect) with a lack of pre-acceptance by the 
parties and their respective supporters of whatever it would command; for they 
apprehended that such order collides with their respective maneuvering margins in 
foreign policy. 
The uncomfortable consequence of the above findings is that – as far as international law 
is concerned – Kosovo is a “stillborn state” if its claim is justified, and conversely that 
Serbia‟s position cannot be asserted if this latter‟s claim is justified. 
Now, let us assume for a moment that all the grand actors were convinced that the Court 
should have been afforded with the power to decide independently of the prevailing 
balance and interests and regardless of any expressional poverty upon the referral of the 
case to it, but that either Serbia or Kosovo would refuse to cooperate depending on the 
substance of the Court‟s award; such assumption raises the question of what to do in a 
similar situation? Well! The answer to this question is available in very simple and clear 
terms in Chapter VII of the UN Charter; an ideal situation of course blocked by the 
reality of the circumstances. 
The moral of Kosovo‟s case lies therefore in its contribution to shed light on the fact that 
the divides between politics and international law are diverging interests, anarchy, 
realism as well as grand and intermediate actors‟ high politics concerns when they are 
raised to the detriment of smaller actors, would the latter even be the own followers and 
bandwagons of the former ones; while the bridges are idealism (or pluralism), 
globalization and converging interests in all fields (socioeconomic matters, transportation, 
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communication, technology, trade, finance, ecological and environmental issues, 
transnational organizations and partnerships, etc...), justice and security needs for all 
actors indiscriminately and excluding grand and intermediate actors‟ logic of high/low 
politics. The number of bridges already built is appreciable, but the world still has a lot 
more to achieve in this respect to reach acceptable results; it being understood that 
nothing will ever be perfect or absolute, all the more that occasionally, where pluralism is 
likely to fail enforcing international justice among peoples, the realist approach to 
international relations may be inevitable, irrespectively of any goodwill.  
======================= 
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Annex 1 
 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and Ad hoc Tribunals in International Law 
Article 5 of the Statute of the Treaty of Rome determines that the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC are the following: (a) The crime of genocide, (b) Crimes against 
humanity, (c) War crimes, and (d) The crime of aggression.
273
 The ICC is a permanent 
court and it is seated in The Hague (The Netherlands). Ad hoc tribunals in international 
law have globally the same object than the ICC, but they have duration and territorial 
limits. Among such ad hoc tribunals, there are (i) those which are under the sole 
operation of the United Nations, like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
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 Note: 
Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provide detailed lists 
determining respectively what crimes are considered as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; 
among others, group killing and various kinds of mass murders and atrocities, forcibly transferring the 
children of a particular society to another one, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, 
forced pregnancy, rape, sexual slavery and any form of sexual violence, persecution, enforced 
disappearance of persons, apartheid, various kinds of unjust treatment of prisoners of war, hostage taking, 
attacking civilians, bombarding towns and villages, using poisoned weapons, conscripting children, 
destroying or seizing properties, pillaging towns and places, etc..., etc... 
With regard to the crime of aggression, the signatories of the1998 Rome Statute did not care, back then, for 
considering a prior definition offered by UNGA resolution number 3314 (XXIX) adopted on the 14
th
 of 
December 1974 whereby: 
“Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 
... ...” 
Thus, Article 5.2 of the Statute reads as follows: 
“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in 
accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under 
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. ... ... ” 
The said Articles 121 and 123 relate to amendments and reviews of the Statute (including amendments and 
reviews of the provisions Article 5). For about 36 years however, nothing new had taken place with regard 
to those 2 Articles in relation with the crime of aggression. Just recently in May/June 2010, at a conference 
held in Kampala, States have convened on the definition provided by UNGA resolution 3314. See the 
following references: 
• Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the ICC held in Kampala and which concluded on the 
11
th
 of June 2010. 
• Scheffer, D. (2010, July 1). Aggression is now a crime. The New York Times.  
At any rate, we are just having here an overview of the areas of competence of the ICC as, for the purpose 
of the present thesis, we are more interested in the conditions and mode of operation of such jurisdiction 
rather than in drawing up an exhaustive inventory of all crimes amenable to it. 
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(ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and (ii) 
those which are called hybrid tribunals for being the result of combinations of 
contributions for each case respectively from the international level, supported by the 
United Nations, on one side, and from a national level on the other side. Examples of 
hybrid tribunals are (i) the UN assisted Cambodian tribunals for the prosecution of still 
alive Red Khmers officials on charges of crimes committed some thirty years ago, and (ii) 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in connection with the February 2005 
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.
 274
  
Just like ICJ, these other two types of jurisdictions are also qualified by Jean-Christophe 
Victor as actors of international relations.
275
  
With regard to the ICC, Victor concludes that it is neither an entirely independent actor, 
nor one which is totally tributary of states. His reasoning is based on the fact that the ICC 
has a partial power since only 110 countries out of the 192 of the international 
community have ratified the July 1998 Treaty of Rome, due to the opposition of Russia, 
China and the United States and to the pressures exerted against an overall ratification.
276
 
In this respect, Slomanson expressly reports about the public dissent of China and of the 
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 References: 
• Slomanson, W.R. (2007). Chapter 9: Arbitration and adjudication. Fundamental perspectives on 
international law, (5
th
 ed.). Op-cit. (pp.399-426).  
• Victor J-C. (2010, July 10, Part 1 of 2) Opcit. 
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 Victor, Ibid 
 
276
 Note : 
However minor a detail it is in comparison with the subject of our research, it would be more accurate to 
precise that according to the Status of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as at the 06
th
 of 
October 2010, out of the 192 member States of the United Nations 139 were signatories of the Statute and 
113 states had ratified it. The information was retrieved on the 06
th
 of October 2010 from the Treaty 
Collection page in the following UN website: http://treaties.un.org/ by clicking successively on “Status of 
Treaties (MTDSG)”, “Chapter XVIII Penal Matters” and “Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court”. Evidently, 3 more member States must have ratified the Statute between the date when Victor 
recorded his TV program and the 06
th
 of October 2010.  
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United States under the Bush Administration in spite of the prior approval of the Clinton 
Administration; moreover, at the request of the United States bilateral treaties were 
signed with a considerable number of countries to avoid that US nationals be extradited 
upon an ICC demand.
 277
 
In fact the UN worked hard on the establishment of the ICC, and there have been several 
UNGA resolutions in this regard since 1992.
278
 But as pointed out by Slomanson, the 
opposition of three permanent members of the UNSC (having thus a veto right) stood in 
the way of rendering the ICC a proper judicial organ of the UN in due form. This gap has 
however been offset by a cooperation agreement between the UN and the ICC.
279
 
The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited in the absolute to the 113 countries having ratified 
the Treaty of Rome and provided the case is not being heard by an involved state.
280
 But 
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 References : 
• Slomanson, W.R. (2007). Chapter 9: Arbitration and adjudication. Fundamental perspectives on 
international law, (5
th
 ed.). Op-cit. (p.423).  
• Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reads as follows: 
“Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender 
4. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the 
Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 
5. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested 
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to 
which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the 
Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of 
consent for the surrender.” 
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 See the November 28
th
 2000  report of the Sixth Committee to the UNGA on the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court submitted on the 55
th
 session of the GA.  
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 International Criminal Court (ICC), Negotiated Relationship between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations, adopted on the 04
th
 of October 2004 and entered into force on the 22
nd
 of July 2004. 
Article 17.1 of such ICC/UN agreement reads as follows: 
“When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides to 
refer to the Prosecutor pursuant to article 13, paragraph (b), of the Statute, a situation in which one or 
more of the crimes referred to in article 5 of the Statute appears to have been committed, the Secretary-
General shall immediately transmit the written decision of the Security Council to the Prosecutor together 
with documents and other materials that may be pertinent to the decision of the Council.” 
 
280
 Either the state where the crime occurred of the state of the nationality of the accused. 
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in extreme situations (like when international peace and security are said to be at stake), 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can refer to the ICC a specific case having 
a connection with a particular country which is not bound by the Treaty of Rome and 
against the will of such country.
281
 The first such instance occurred on the 31
st
 of March 
2005 (UNSC Resolution 1593) and was about Darfur in Sudan.
282
 
This does obviously not render the court a totally independent structure since (i) the 
permanent members of the UNSC have a veto right, (ii) three of them (Russia, China and 
the US) are unbound by the Rome Statute but did use an organ, product of such treaty, 
against another state which is neither bound by it, and (iii) in connection with Article 98 
of the Rome Statute, an important number of bilateral treaties have been signed in order 
to avoid extraditions of US nationals to the ICC. 
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 References: 
• The abovementioned Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute of the ICC reads as follows: 
“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: 
(a) ... ... 
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations; or 
(c) ... ...” 
• And as commonly known, Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with measures (including the 
usage of force) against threats and breaches to international peace and security. Let us just recall 
here an extract of Article 42 and the wording Article 43.1, which both fall under Chapter VII of 
the Charter: 
Article 42 (extract): 
“... ... it [the Security Council] may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. ... ...” 
Article 43.1: 
“All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its and in accordance 
with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights 
of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” 
 
282
 Slomanson, W.R. (2007). Chapter 9: Arbitration and adjudication. Fundamental perspectives on 
international law, (5
th
 ed.). Op-cit. (pp.424-425).  
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Annex 2 
 
 
Namibia’s march to independence from South Africa; a brief history of the case 
• In 1920, South Africa had been entrusted by the predecessor of the United 
Nations (the League of Nations) with a mandate over South-West Africa 
(Namibia today) for a territorial administration of this latter. 
• By resolution number 1514 (XV), adopted on the 14th of December 1960, the 
UNGA affirmed the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to freedom and 
independence.  
• By resolution number 2145 (XXI), adopted on the 27th of October 1966, the 
UNGA has terminated South Africa‟s mandate to administer the territory of 
Namibia because of a material breach on the part of the former.
283
 
• But the breach was disavowed by South Africa; and on the 30th of January 1970, 
after an intense and unfruitful activity at the UN‟s level for more than three years, 
the UNSC had to adopt resolution number 276 declaring that the continued 
presence of South-Africa in Namibia was illegal. 
• On the 29th of July 1970, the UNSC adopted resolution number 284 to seek the 
advisory opinion of the ICJ on “the legal consequences for States on the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council 
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 Note : Among others, South-Africa had extended its apartheid system over Namibia; and cycles of 
violence were taking place concurrently with illegal trials of Namibians notwithstanding numerous 
warnings and protests from the international community; this situation endured up to the 1988 ceasefire 
which preluded Namibia‟s independence as we will see a little further.  
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resolution 276 (1970).” The request was filed by the United Nations‟ Secretary 
General U Thant to the president of the ICJ the very same day.
284
 
• On the 21st of June 1971, the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion which stated, in 
short, that South Africa had to immediately terminate its administration of 
Namibia and that, in dealing with South Africa, States had to act consistently with 
this opinion and had thus to refrain from processing any activity or proceed with 
any prior undertaking which would directly or indirectly support South Africa‟s 
occupation of Namibia.
 285
 But South Africa kept on prevaricating. 
• On the 29th of September 1978, the UNSC adopted resolution number 435 
deciding on a plan for the independence of Namibia.  
• In 1988, after cycles of violence, a ceasefire was reached through an 
Angolan/Cuban mediation which opened the way for the independence of 
Namibia. 
• On the 16th of January 1989, the UNSC adopted resolution number 629 fixing the 
1
st
 of April 1989 as the date on which the implementation of the plan decided by 
UNSC resolution number 435 (1978) would begin.  
• On the 17th of April 1990, the UNSC adopted resolution number 652 
recommending that Namibia be admitted to membership in the United Nations. 
                                                 
284
 An interesting nuance should be noted here : the request was not on the legality of South Africa‟s 
presence in Namibia, but on the consequences for States on such continuous presence. The reason is 
simple : after UNGA Resolution 2145 (1966) and UNSC Resolution 276 (1970), it was unquestionable for 
the United Nations that such presence was illegal; so the question was rather how States should handle this 
situation in order to remain consistent with the UN resolutions on the subject. 
 
285
 Both the request for advisory opinion of the ICJ and the opinion itself are available by clicking on 
“Advisory Opinions” in the following website: http://www.icj-cij.org/. 
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• Namibia integrated the United Nations on the 23rd of April 1990.286 
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 See the list of United Nations Member States available on the following website : 
http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml.  
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Annex 3 
 
The perception of power as viewed by Thucydides 
Thucydides was a kind of qualified realist who lived in the 5
th
 century B.C. and whose 
observation of the course of the Peloponnesian War played a role in his perception of 
power. We may be tempted to describe him as a realist with a reasonable extent of 
idealist qualification for his concern about democracy and about the proper use of power. 
As a general in the Athenian army, he lost a Greek city attacked by the Spartans and was 
thus punished by being exiled for about 20 years. Since then, he spent his time observing 
and analyzing the circumstances of the Peloponnesian war, but most of all, the underlying 
reasons that would generally lead to war. 
Roughly speaking, three levels of analysis may be observed in connection with 
Thucydides' perception of power : (i) at the level of individuals or groups of individuals, 
(ii) at the level of the polis (or the city) and, (iii) at a level involving the city with its 
external environment. 
Thucydides was by far an advocate of the polis holding power for the benefit of its 
subjects, with the condition that democracy brings to rule the right citizen, as he attached 
an importance to the quality of leadership. Quoting a passage of the Funeral Oration of 
Pericles, Dora Pozzi exemplifies Thucydides' perception of the relationship of citizens 
with their polis; an affective relationship which should lead citizens to martyrdom for the 
polis, in particular if parents are still young enough for compensating their loss with other 
births.
287
 For his part, Erich Gruen illustrates how Thucydides viewed Pericles as an ideal 
                                                 
287  Pozzi, D.C. (1983, Feb.-Mar.). Thucydides ii,35-46: A Text of Power Ideology. The Classical Journal. 
78(3). pp. 223 & 226. 
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leader in comparison with his successors whose failures were in large part attributed to 
their rivalries over first place positions while, unlike Pericles, they had not much to offer 
to the community in terms of skill and success.
288
 
Regarded as such, the Funeral Oration of Pericles is like a message recognizing the 
merits of democracy but admitting also its limits when it brings to power the wrong or 
inappropriate citizen.
289
 
Now, once democracy has properly vested power in the right citizen, this latter should 
pay special care to his way of using such power; for – as very well pointed out by A. 
French – Thucydides viewed power as a double-edged sword, whose misuse by the party 
holding it might lead to its self-destruction.
290
 
The Melian Dialogue is an illustration of the misuse of force, where two key elements 
induce the emergence of war, namely : a change in the balance of power (BoP) on one 
side, and the fear (of other parties) generated by such change in the BoP on the other 
side.
291
 These concepts of BoP and fear from the shift in BoP are fundamental in 
complementing and qualifying Thucydides' perception of power.
292
 And as further 
commented on this idea, the weak is always at the mercy of the strong.
293
 
                                                 
288  Gruen, E.S. (1971, winter). Thucydides, His Critiques and Interpreters. Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 1(2), page 335 . 
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  Ibid, p. 336 . 
 
290  French, A. (1980, April). Thucydides and the Power Syndrome. Greece & Rome 2nd Series, 27(1). See 
pp. 28 & 29. 
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Thus at some point in his reasoning, Thucydides' came to the conclusion that morale, 
fairness and justice start having little to do with the matter. A time comes when the 
variables involved in the equation are rather the extent of ambitions of the most powerful 
and the capacity of resistance of the weakest. Nothing else than his interest is in the mind 
of the powerful, and the weakest should not mistakenly bet on resisting beyond his actual 
capacity. And this is what Thucydides portrays through the Melian Dialogue. 
Power by then is at the service of interest and not justice; and the weak will ineluctably 
be accountable for not understanding this given. 
This having been established, any strategy or process leading to the surrender of the weak 
is justified by the strong – who has absolutely no concern about the rights of the former – 
would that even look like blackmail or demoralization.
 294
 
When a weak gets confronted to such a situation, betting on an idealist position (favoring 
the "ought" over the "is") does no longer pay for him. As evident from the Melian 
Dialogue, the Melians lost against the Athenians after having adopted such utopist 
positions to oppose Athens' ambitions of hegemony.
295
 
But is this the end of the story of Thucydides' thought about power ? Rather not if we 
consider that Athens finally lost the Peloponnesian war.  
If we stop the analysis at this stage, the Funeral Oration of Pericles and the Melian 
Dialogue will undoubtedly look as two opposing images of Thucydides' thought. But if 
we go further in the analysis, like until the defeat of Athens, the Melian Dialogue takes 
the shape of a picture of what happens in the cycle after an ideal situation ceases to 
                                                 
294  Ibid, pp. 102 and 104.  
 
295  Ibid page 102.  
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prevail (Pericles : a democracy bringing to power the ideal citizen). Regarded as such, the 
Melian Dialogue is a kind of paradox which complements the Funeral Oration in showing 
the negative aspects of the loss of an ideal situation; this was rightly clarified by Viotti 
and Kauppi who saw in the second half of Thucydides‟ Peloponnesian War « a 
description of the degeneration of Athenian democracy » which was far from his 
advocacy.
296
 The same contrast is also analyzed by Richard Ned Lebow.
297
 
Summarizing therefore, it would not be unreasonable to deduce that Thucydides viewed 
power as an ascendancy over others not only in terms of military standards but also in 
terms of economic, cultural and moral standards, and – by and large – subject to a cycle 
evolving around basically two phases.
298
 In the first phase, the ideal situation would be 
for the citizens of the polis to contribute all together in order to vest power (i) in the polis 
and (ii) under the guidance of the "right" citizen. The worst in this phase would be for the 
citizens to struggle among each other for power to the detriment of the polis or to bring to 
rule an unqualified or unsuitable citizen. 
In the second phase, the challenge would be the proper use for such power vested in the 
polis; and here comes the role of the qualified leader, for any misuse of the power under 
his control would lead to the self-destruction of the polis precipitated by the fear of other 
cities from the growing power and ambitions of hegemony of the polis, would those other 
cities even be allies to the said polis.
299
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Thus in the second phase, the stake is the difficulty for the polis to maintain its standards 
of power without undergoing a fatal loss of control. It is thus dragged down to keep an 
eye on dependent allies or "clients" in order to prevent them from deserting to enemy 
powers, and at the same time to attract "clients" of those enemy powers in the sphere of 
influence of the polis.
300
 The outstanding strategy here is to apply the proper dosage in 
executing this maneuver so that other parties would not be pushed to a point where war 
would be the last resort. Indeed, from the very moment where victory is not guaranteed, a 
party's power leading such party to war becomes a double-edged sword for it. 
In other words, in the second half of the cycle, power is most efficient as long as a party 
still holds it but without being compelled to use force if the outcome is uncertain. 
This conception proves to make sense when one observes that, after having defeated 
Melos, Athens in turn was itself defeated in 413 B.C. by Syracuse and in 404 B.C. by 
Sparta, loosing hence its empire. 
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Annex 4 
 
 
Globalism 
If the aspects of interdependence are positively seen by the pluralists, they nevertheless 
are negatively described by most globalists as aspects of dependence. In terms of 
reference elements of identification for each school, both the pluralist interdependence 
concept and the globalist dependence concept are comparable to the balance of power 
concept in the realist tradition.
301
 For the globalists, the terms of reference in international 
relations are neither the benefits of the exchanges lauded by the pluralists nor the 
East/West equilibrium which is a fundamental criterion for the realists; such terms of 
reference are instead the North/South dependency ratios resulting from the exploitation of 
the poor by the rich.
 302
 Without overlooking the East/West divide in international 
relations, globalists rather focus on a worldwide economic order and denounce the 
capitalist relation of dominance; as pertinently explained by Viotti and Kauppi, they 
attribute the subordination of Third World states and the prevalence of the capitalist 
system to economic factors.
 303
  
In line with the above globalist philosophy, dependency has roots in colonialism and has 
continued long after the end of formal colonization.
304
 And according to globalists, as 
reported by Viotti and Kauppi, the resultant is that less fortunate countries are exploited 
by dominant states and the former remain dependent on the latter. Notwithstanding a 
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 Beavis. Op-cit. See the paragraph “Dependency Theory”. 
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margin of interplay between external and internal factors – whereby transnational class 
coalitions link elites in industrially developed countries with their counterparts in the 
South – dependency theorists primarily attribute the obstacles to autonomous 
development much more to external factors than to internal considerations, as Third 
World countries are kept dependent on First World countries.
305
 
Thus, may we say, globalists are concerned about welfare or socioeconomic issues 
pertaining to less developed countries (LDCs) but they are not as much optimistic as 
pluralists are about the prospects for a peaceful change in this regard. In opposition to 
pluralism, the globalist image is rather influenced by Karl Marx‟s (1818-1883) 
philosophy which emphasizes that, through the dialectical unfolding of historical stages, 
the era of capitalism – dominated by the bourgeoisie – will eventually cease and give way 
to a proletarian class; but such influence is only partial because not all globalists are 
Marxists. The main distinction between globalism and Marxism is in the fact that perhaps 
most Marxists – like Rosa Luxembourg (1870-1919) for example – favor the reliance on 
revolution to change the existing world order, whereas a number of non-Marxists 
globalists would go for reforms as a better way to achieve the same goal. Among the 
globalists however, there is also a minority of reform-minded non-revolutionary scholars, 
like Eduard Bernstein, who nevertheless claim to be Marxists.
306
  
The subject of exploitation of classes or groups of population by another one does not 
only correlate with dependency, but it calls inevitably anyone‟s attention to what is 
known as imperialism. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson have defined 
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imperialism as being “a policy that aims at the overthrow of the status quo, at a reversal 
of the power relations between two or more nations”; clarifying their idea about the 
status quo, they proceed: “A policy seeking only adjustment, leaving the essence of these 
power relations intact, still operates within the general framework of a policy of the 
status quo”.307 In other words, and in opposition to globalists, a foreign policy aiming at 
maintaining an existing status quo between colonial powers and Third World countries or 
dependent societies was seen by Morgenthau and Thompson as conservative rather than 
imperialistic; there had to be an ensuing change in the power ratio, favorable to the First 
World power, for a policy to be qualified by Morgenthau and Thompson as 
imperialistic.
308
 The non-Marxist English economist John A. Hobson (1858-1940) has 
defined imperialism as an outcome of the fact that capitalist societies were faced with a 
threefold problem: “overproduction, under-consumption by workers and other classes, 
and over-savings on the part of capitalists”. 309  The resulting endeavor of industry 
controllers to channel their surplus production in foreign markets and to seek foreign 
investments for their surplus wealth is firmly denounced by Marxists and globalists as 
North/South exploitation, whereas liberals just see in it an aspect of maladjustments in 
the global capitalist system that need to be balanced.
310
 While Marx expected revolutions 
in all capitalist countries, Lenin (1870-1924) contended that, by buying off the European 
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working class, it was imperialism which allowed capitalists a breathing space and 
postponed revolutions in Europe. Unlike Hobson and Joseph Schumpeter, for Lenin 
imperialism was not a matter of choice but of inevitability for the capitalists to save 
themselves and perpetuate their dominance.
311
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Annex 5 
 
Tito’s ruling policy, his succession and the impact of his legacy on Kosovo 
Jozip Broz Tito was very well aware that the ethnic sensitiveness of the puzzle of 
communities of which he inherited the governance at the end of WWII had its roots way 
back in history with the Ottomans‟ occupation of the Balkans and an alternative rivalry 
between the Austro-Hungarian Empire with Germany on one side, and Serbia on the 
other side with the support of France and Britain.
312
 The resulting religious repartition in 
the peninsula which formed the ephemeral Yugoslavia of the 20
th
 century is roughly the 
following : 
• a Catholic Slovenia, 
• a predominantly Catholic Croatia (with Orthodox and Muslim minorities), 
• a predominantly Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina (with Orthodox and Catholic 
minorities), 
• a predominantly Orthodox Serbia (with a small Catholic minority and a Muslim 
minority, like in the province of Kosovo, the status of which relates to the subject 
of our present work), 
• an Orthodox little Montenegro (Serbia‟s darling child which would later desert 
the family), 
• an Orthodox Macedonia (with a Muslim minority). 
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By the end of WWI, only the symptoms (not the essential consequences) of the Turkish 
secular presence had disappeared to uncover on top of it the evidence of a latent 
Serbian/Croatian rivalry having left for history a notorious credit of violence.
313
 
Tito thus governed this volatile societal fabric with a subtle mixture of firmness and 
softness to prevent revolts and the eruption of interethnic violence. 
Therefore, he humored some acute susceptibilities, like that of Serbia which considered 
itself as the “elder girl” of the Balkans, and conceded to the other federal states a 
measured extent of autonomy in an effort to contain any reinvigoration of their national 
feelings by Serbia‟s being favored with a central position. 
Indeed, although he was a Croat Catholic, Tito chose to stay in Belgrade and was thus 
able to attenuate the dissatisfaction of the powerful Serbian Orthodox Church and the 
nostalgic supporters of the Karadjordjević dynasty. 314 Conversely, Tito kept a severe eye 
around on any excessive local nationalist sentiment or activity of separatist inspiration 
which would ultimately lead to revolt or civil war and, by way of consequence, to the 
falling apart of the federal structure. One straightforward example of such ruling policy is 
his 1972 vehement reaction to face the Croatian nationalist movement which was surging 
up since the late sixties; Tito just smothered such movement with a striking brutality. But 
again, in 1974, he had to adjust backward giving up some autonomy to the benefit of 
remote areas, as we will see further in this Annex 5. 
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but with a different philosophy and for different end goals; and on the other hand, there was the Croatian 
Catholic revolutionary organization Ustaša which assassinated the Serbian Orthodox king of Yugoslavia 
Alexander 1
st
 in 1934, and which was supported by the Axis powers in WWII. 
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 It should however importantly be pointed out that Tito was excommunicated by Rome. His ethnic 
heritage was thus apparently not an obstacle for staying “comfortably” in Belgrade. 
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Without ever being encouraged, Church involvement – in order to be kept or brought 
back under control – was taken easy as long as its magnitude would neither shake the 
arduous process of soldering the joints of the ablaze puzzle (the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church in 1945) nor threaten the body once assembled (the Croatian Catholic Church 
after the 1972 purge of Croatia‟s League of Communists).315 
Also every once and a while, Tito had to adapt the Constitution to the circumstances of 
the moment in an effort to constantly keep the situation under control; which he skillfully 
did.
316
 Notwithstanding however the effectiveness and necessity of such maneuver, the 
frequent constitutional changes are but a telling indicator of the fragility of the Yugoslav 
structure and of the critical need for extreme wisdom and caution in governing the whole. 
Furthermore, the very fact that Tito‟s tailor made Constitution vested him with 
immovability in his capacity as Yugoslavia‟s leader and stipulated that his succession 
should be assured collegially was another precursory sign announcing a vacuum of 
central power and struggles for hegemony coming up straight ahead after his departure; it 
also undoubtedly uncovered the volatility of such a synthetic societal fabric. Under such 
circumstances it would have been naïve not to expect claims for independence by the end 
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• Perica, V. (2002). Balkan idols – Religion and nationalism in Yugoslav states. pp.46 & 57. 
 
• Vuckovic, G. (1997). Ethnic cleavages and conflicts : The sources of national cohesions and 
disintegration – The case of Yugoslavia, pp. 118-119. 
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 One example among others is the following: the 1946 Constitution became obsolete after the 1948 
Stalin‟s expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform (international group of communist parties); it was 
thus replaced by the 1953 Constitution which favored economic decentralization and allowed the federal 
republics a greater degree of autonomy (a useful pressure-release valve for multiethnic communities). 
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of Tito‟s era; and on top, the fact is that such claims were energized by the fall of the 
Soviet patron.
317
 
Thus, no matter how clever and skillful is a ruler, the risk for weak points in the structure 
remains; and in any process of adaptation or decision making, whereby one would try to 
satisfy a majority of constituents to consolidate the joints, a discontent minority is left. In 
the case of the Second Yugoslavia, no such discontent entity would ever dare challenging 
Tito‟s authority. And this indeed revealed to be true as the Serbs waited until Tito‟s death 
to show their dissatisfaction with the 1974 constitutional change, as very well explained 
by Vesna Pesic.
318
 This undoubtedly accounted for in the 1989 revision of the 
Constitution by Miloševic to reduce the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina which, in 
turn, accounted for in the 1990 electoral process which chain-developed with a domino 
effect in each of the federal republics and which subsequently led to their independencies 
after cycles of violence.
319
 It also led, by way of ultimate consequence, to the present 
status of Kosovo whose uncomfortable independence is, until further event, 
unconditionally tributary of permanent Western support. 
It merits to be mentioned here that the phenomenon did not result from “newborn” 
circumstances. Serbia and Croatia, as largest ethnic groups of Yugoslavia, had an 
ancestral contention over Serbia‟s hegemony v/s Croatia‟s independence; and Serbia‟s 
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 Pesic, V. (1996, April). Serbian nationalism and the origins of the Yugoslav crisis. Peaceworks.(8).  
Summary p.vi . 
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 Slovenia and Croatia accessed independence and integrated the United Nations in May 1992, and 
Macedonia in April 1993. Bosnia-Herzegovina did access independence and integrate the United Nations in 
1992, but the final socio-ethnic balance characterizing the State was settled by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, 
whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina was a federation between Muslims and Croats on one side and Serbs on the 
other side. The domino process of defections that took place from May 1992 to April 1993 has thus reduced 
Yugoslavia back then to a Federation encompassing the States of Serbia and Montenegro, whereby Serbia 
comprised the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.  
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conduct after Tito‟s death and the fall of the Soviet Union has made nothing else than 
awakening such contention which was only driven underground when Tito was still in 
office.
320
 And just as the national question remained unresolved by the end of the 1
st
 
Yugoslavia, so it did by the end of the 2
nd
 Yugoslavia, affording thus this heterogeneous 
group of populations independence, when the choice between a unified Yugoslavia and 
local nationalisms fell due for the 3
rd
 time in a so short laps of history.
321
 The first time 
was of course upon the creation of the Kingdom at the end of WWI, and the second time 
was upon the creation of the communist federation at the end of WWII; the difference 
between the third time and the past two other occasions being principally in the fact that, 
upon the occurrence of the third, the circumstances had then availed such populations for 
more freedom of choice, given the fact that the international balance was undergoing a 
fundamental change of equilibrium at that time to the detriment of the historically 
hegemonic Serbia.
322
 Consequently, about a decade after Tito‟s departure, when the 3rd 
Yugoslavia was due to be born, it was aborted by the circumstantialities of the moment. 
Indeed, back then, the remains of the Soviet empire were not powerful enough to permit a 
Russian vigorous opposition to a Western management of the Yugoslav terrain. Thus, 
after the 1989 Miloševic revocation of Kosovo‟s constitutional autonomy and the ensuing 
Kosovar rebellion which was brutally repressed by the Serbs, the failure of the February 
1999  Rambouillet (France) talks opened up the way for the March-June 1999 NATO 
bombing of the Serbian army, which was tacitly backed by the UN. It was a tacit support 
of course because, as pertinently pointed out by Christopher Joyner, Russia would have 
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 Pesic, V., Op-cit, summary, pp.v-vi. 
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 Ibid, summary, p. vi. 
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 The collapse of the Soviet Empire. 
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used its veto power to block any formal UNSC resolution proposed under Chapter 7 of 
the UN Charter for a forcible action against Serbia in order to relieve the pressure on 
Kosovo.
323
 Thus, it wasn‟t the UN itself which dealt directly and exclusively with the 
matter; there was rather an international involvement through various international 
bodies.
324
 Among those bodies, the Contact Group had the major role and as relevantly 
noted by Marc Weller, there are enough indices showing that the United Nations 
indirectly supported the use of force against Serbia.
325
 
NATO‟s intervention opened the way subsequently for the adoption of the June 1999 
UNSC resolution number 1244 in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which placed Kosovo under UN administration and which also was a 
kind of post-endorsement of the said intervention.
326
 And here was the beginning of the 
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 Joyner, C.C. (2005). Chapter 8: Use of force law. International law in the 21
st
 century, rules for global 
governance, (p.190). 
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 Weller, M. (1999, April). The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo. International Affairs – Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944. 75( 2), p.212. 
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 United Nations Security Council Resolution number 1244 (1999), adopted on the 10
th
 of June. Annex 2 
to the resolution reads as follows: 
“The Security Council, 
... ... 
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international 
security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of Annex 2 ... ... 
Annex 2 
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis: 
.. ... 
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security 
presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the 
achievement of common objectives. 
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation 
must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment 
for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and 
refugees. 
5. ... ... ” 
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long and determinate march of the Kosovars toward independence (1999-2008).
 327
 
Because, as Stephen Lee Myers of the New York Times made it clear, before the 
conference of Rambouillet in reality, no state of the international community was yet 
ready to consider with resoluteness the option of independence for Kosovo.
328
 This 
specific fact is therefore an all the more valid reason to consider such period of the 
Serbian province‟s history as the starting point for the road which has led to its 
declaration of independence; an independence which is shaky however precisely due to 
its dependence on unconditional Western support as it still lacks Eastern recognition; an 
imperative that the ICJ advisory opinion expectably failed to secure. 
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 Remark: arguably, it may as well be considered that Kosovo‟s march toward independence started in 
1989, when Miloševic revised the constitution to reduce the autonomy of the Serbian province; but this is 
of course a minor detail in comparison with the depth of the subject. 
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 Myers S.L. (1999, June 22). Crisis in the Balkans: NATO to consider letting Kosovars set up new army. 
The New York Times: 
“Before the war with Yugoslavia, the United States and other NATO nations strongly opposed 
independence for Kosovo, but the abortive peace accord negotiated in Rambouillet, France, on the eve of 
the bombing called for an international consideration of the province‟s future within three years. Mr. 
Miloševic rejected that deal, and now with NATO in control of the province, calls for a resolution of 
Kosovo‟s status could well come sooner.” 
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Annex 6 
 
Summary of the failure of the negotiations over Kosovo’s status at the end of the 
process: 
Before its unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008, the 
province of Kosovo had been under UN administration for about 8 years. A year earlier, 
in February 2007, the UN mediator‟s plan for the final status of Kosovo was first 
presented and it pleaded for a multiethnic province of Kosovo, democratically self-
governed.
329
 Without explicit exclusion, the term “independence” was so far carefully 
avoided.
330
 But what was a potential chance for the ones was nothing else than a potential 
risk for the others. Both Russia and Serbia thus foresaw the independence coming up next 
and rejected that first plan. Disregarding the position of Russia and Serbia, on the 26
th
 of 
March 2007, President Ahtisaari presented the final version of his plan which advocated a 
first phase independence under the supervision of the international community, as the 
only viable formula.
331
 Since the beginning of the administration of the province by the 
United Nations, this was the first time the term “independence” was used.332 
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 Back then, the UN mediator was former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari. He had been appointed in 
November 2005 and he exercised this function until March 2007. 
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du Kosovo [Martti Ahtisaari presents his propositions on the status of Kosovo]. UN News Service. 
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Kosovo‟s future status.  
 
• Bolopion, P. (2007, December 9). Kosovo : l‟échec des négociations ouvre la voie à 
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Thus, in August/September 2007 the West attempted to materialize the independence of 
Kosovo, essentially on the basis of the UN backed Ahtisaari plan.
333
 But this was 
postponed by Russia which proposed rather to have talks again until the 10
th
 of December 
2007. The debate revolved around independence on one side (rejected by Belgrade) and 
autonomy under Serbian sovereignty on the other side (rejected by Pristina); about 10 
lengthy and difficult sessions of negotiations took place without opening up however to a 
compromise by the 10
th
 of December deadline.
334
 On the contrary, Russia adopted a 
tough policy of diplomatic confrontation as, on the 12
th
 of December 2007 (just 2 days 
after the deadline), it rather suspended the execution of the Treaty on the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) instead of easing its position on Kosovo, or even showing 
the slightest intention to compromise.
335
 According to Philippe Bolopion, Russia did call 
for a new round of negotiations but the Kosovars turned down the offer with the support 
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 United Nations News Center. (2007, March 26). Kosovo : Martti Ahtisaari recommande l‟indépendance 
sous supervision internationale [Kosovo : Martti Ahtisaari recommends the independence under 
international supervisison ].  
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 Lasserre, I. (2007, October 14). Premiers pourparlers directs entre Serbes et Albanais sur le Kosovo 
[First direct talks between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo]. Le Figaro.  
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 Bolopion P. (2007, December 9). Op-cit. 
 
335
 Abi-Ramia, J. (2008, August 29). Op-cit, pp.43-44: 
“La Russie émet de sérieux doutes sur les termes du Traité sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe 
(FCE), sur l’indépendance de la province serbe de Kosovo et l’éventualité de l’élargissement de l’Otan à 
certains Etats postsoviétiques comme l’Ukraine, de plus en plus atlantiste. 
Face aux changements de la donne géostratégique en Europe, le 12 décembre 2007, la Russie suspend 
l’application du Traité sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe ; ce qui crée un remous au sein de 
l‟Otan et à Washington.” 
Translation : 
“Russia expresses serious doubts on the terms of the Treaty on the conventional forces in Europe (CFE), 
on the independence of the Serbian province of Kosovo and the possibility of enlargement of NATO to 
reach certain post-Soviet States like Ukraine, which is more and more North-Atlantic oriented. Facing 
the geo-strategic changes in Europe, on the 12
th
 of December 2007 Russia suspended the execution of the 
Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe ; a measure which caused a stir within the NATO and in 
Washington.ˮ 
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of the West.
336
 Such offer indeed sprung too late as it was seen by the Kosovars and the 
West like a maneuvering to gain time; its rejection confirmed the imminence of Kosovo‟s 
unilateral declaration of independence and its Western support.  
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Annex 7 
 
Summary of the 2009 / 2010 negotiation process on sanctioning Iran:  
To prevent Iran from fabricating an atomic bomb, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) proposed in October 2009 that the Iranian uranium be enriched in 
another country. The original proposal suggested that Iran sends the largest part of its 
stock of 3.5% rich uranium to Russia for treatment to increase its richness to a little 
below 20%; the material would then be forwarded to France to be conditioned for usage 
as nuclear combustible and finally re-expedited back to Iran.
337
 Americans and Europeans 
had fixed the end of 2009 as a deadline for the Iranians to accept such offer if they 
wanted to avoid being sanctioned.
338
 This was an option for the group of Six and the 
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 Beurdeley, F. (2010, January 8). Téhéran lance un ultimatum aux Occidentaux [Teheran issues an 
ultimatum to the Westerners]. L‟Hebdo Magazine, p.34: 
“... la fameuse offre a été présentée en octobre dernier par l‟Agence internationale de l‟énergie atomique 
(AIEA). Cette proposition suggérait à  l‟Iran d‟envoyer en Russie 70% de ses stocks d‟uranium faiblement 
enrichi (à 3,5%) afin qu‟ils y soient retraités à un peu moins de 20%, pour être ensuite conditionnés en 
France et réexpédiés en Iran sous forme de combustible utilisable par le réacteur de recherche civile de 
Téhéran”. 
Translation : 
“... the famous offer was presented last October by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This 
proposal suggested Iran to sent to Russia 70% of its low level rich uranium (at 3.5%) to be retreated up to 
a little less than 20%, and to be thereafter conditioned in France and re-expedited to Iran under the form 
of usable combustible for the civil research reactor of Teheranˮ. 
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 References: 
 
• La Chine appelle l‟Iran à se joindre à un consensus international [China calls Iran to join an 
international consensus]. (2010, January 5).  L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.10: 
“Alors qu‟Américains et Européens ont fixé à Téhéran la fin 2009 comme date butoir pour 
répondre à leur proposition de faire enrichir l‟uranium à l‟étranger sous l‟égide de l‟IAEA, le 
ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères, Manouchehr Mottaki, leur a posé à son tour samedi 
samedi un « ultimatum  » pour la fin janvier.ˮ 
Translation : 
“While Americans and Europeans had fixed the end of 2009 as a deadline for Teheran to answer 
their proposal to have the uranium enriched abroad under the auspices of the IEAE, the Iranian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manouchehr Mottaki, has in turn  issued an « ultimatum » on 
Saturday with end of January as deadlineˮ. 
 
179 
IAEA to make sure that the level of enrichment stays below the minimum necessary to 
produce the bomb (about 80 to 90%). 
 Iran‟s official position did not oppose the principle 
itself, but the original debate revolved essentially around sending the Iranian uranium for 
enrichment abroad either (i) in one single lot, as requested by the Six, or (ii) in several 
lots, as preferred by Iran. Furthermore, this latter wanted that the exchange of its uranium 
with the 20% enriched uranium takes place simultaneously and preferably in its own 
territory or else either in Brazil, or in Japan, or in Turkey; but the West categorically 
rejected the idea of exchanging the uranium in Iran and was not really in favor of such 
substitutes suggested by the Iranians.
339
 
                                                                                                                                                 
• Téhéran laisse entendre qu‟il va produire de l‟uranium hautement enrichi [Teheran gives to 
understand that it is going to produce high rich uranium]. (2010, January 25). L‟Orient – Le Jour, 
p.10. 
“Les Occidentaux, qui avaient donné de leur côté jusqu‟à fin 2009 aux Iraniens pour accepter la 
proposition des Six, ont entamé mi-janvier des discussions sur un renforcement des sanctions 
internationales contre Téhéranˮ. 
Translation : 
“ Westerners, who had from their side  given Iranians up to end 2009 to accept the proposition of 
the Six, have started mid-January discussions to reinforce international sanctions against Iran. ˮ 
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 References: 
 
• L‟Iran renvoie la balle à l‟Occident [Iran returns the ball to the West]. (2010, January 4). L‟Orient 
– Le Jour, p.10: 
“L‟Iran ... ... a proposé des échanges d‟uranium simultanés et en petites quantités. Téhéran a 
aussi exigé que ces échanges se fassent en Iran, avant de renoncer à cette condition en évoquant 
la possibilité échange au Brésil, au Japon ou en Turquieˮ. 
Translation : 
“Iran has proposed simultaneous exchanges of uranium and in small quantities. Teheran has also 
requested that those exchanges take place in Iran, before renouncing to this condition and evoking 
Brazil, Japan or Turkeyˮ. 
 
• Les USA renforcent les sanctions contre les gardiens de la révolutions [The USA strengthen the 
sanctions against the guards of the revolution]. (2010, February 11). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.11, 
quoting Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi who leads the Iranian Organization for Atomic Energy : 
“Il a toutefois réaffirmé l‟exigence de son pays qu‟un éventuel échange d‟uranium faiblement 
enrichi contre du combustible nucléaire soit simultané et s‟opère sur son territoire, ce que 
refusent les puissances occidentales”. 
Translation : 
“He has however reaffirmed his country‟s request that a possible exchange of low level enriched 
uranium against nuclear combustible be simultaneous and takes place in its own territory; which 
is refused by Western powers”. 
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On the 2
nd
 of January 2010 however, i.e., the very next working day after the deadline set 
by Americans and Europeans, rather than to bother trying any other compromise, the 
Iranians counterattacked by a volte-face maneuver which reversed their bargaining 
position from defensive to offensive, and thus turned back the pressure exerted on them 
toward the opposite side. Indeed, it was then the Iranians themselves who summoned the 
Six to accept their conditions by the end of January 2010, warning these latter that they 
would otherwise perform their own enrichment of uranium.
340
 This Iranian coup de 
théâtre mirrored the then powerlessness of the Six as they were divided over the issue of 
sanctions; it also showed that Iran was betting on the fact that either Russia or China 
would veto any UNSC resolution on imposing such new sanctions at an international 
level.
 341
 The ensuing negotiation balance had therefore relatively twisted favorably to 
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 Note : 
The first written Iranian reaction to the IAEA‟s position, whereby they still offered to negotiate, was issued 
by the Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh,  on the 18
th
 of February 2010; about a 
month and a half hence after Iran‟s own summon : see L‟Orient – Le Jour of the 24th of February 2010, 
p.11 : Téhéran répond officiellement par écrit à l‟offre de l‟AIEA (translation of the title : Teheran 
officially answers by writing the offer of the IAEA).  
Such letter from Ambassador Soltanieh was also subsequent to the Iranians announcement, on the 8
th
 of 
February 2010, that they were proceeding to enrich their uranium themselves. : see (i) L‟Orient – Le Jour 
of the 9
th
 of February 2010, p.11 : L‟Iran lance la production d‟uranium enrichi à 20% malgré les pressions 
(translation of the title : Iran launches the production of 20% enriched uranium despite pressures), (ii) 
L‟Orient – Le Jour of the 11th of February 2010, p.11 : Les USA renforcent les sanctions contre les gardiens 
de la révolutions (translation of the title : The USA strengthen the sanctions against the guards of the 
revolution), and (iii) L‟Orient – Le Jour of the 12th of February 2010, p.11 : Ahmadinejad s‟en prend à 
Obama et l‟accuse de « servir » les intérêts d‟Israël (translation of the title : Ahmadinejad attacks Obama 
and accuses him of « serving » Israel‟s interests). 
The above facts, and particularly their chronology, may hint either an Iranian limitation in capacity and an 
artifice to obtain the maximum  out of the forthcoming negotiations; or conversely, an Iranian stratagem to 
appease the IAEA‟s apprehensions while moving forward in the development of Iran‟s capacities.  
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 References: 
 
• Moscou déplore l‟attitude de Téhéran [Moscow deplores Teheran‟s attitude]. (2010, January 23). 
L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.11: 
“Interrogé sur l‟éventualité de nouvelles sanctions contre l‟Iran, le ministre russe des Affaires 
étrangères, Sergueï Lavrov, a souhaité la poursuite des efforts diplomatiques en vue de régler le 
dossier. « Nous regrettons que l‟Iran, selon toute apparence, ne juge pas possible d‟accepter la 
formule qui lui a été présentée pour la production de combustible nucléaire destiné à son réacteur 
de recherches de Téhéran », a-t-il dit aux journalistes. « Nous sommes persuadés qu’il est 
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Iran until further event since, instead of being sanctioned yet, this latter had indirect talks 
with Washington through Turkey and subsequently Brazil, in their capacity as 
nonpermanent members of the UNSC.
 342
 Other reports referred to a proposal made by 
                                                                                                                                                 
impératif de faire des efforts supplémentaires, à la fois sur ce dossier précis et, plus largement, 
sur la question de la reprise des discussions en vue de résoudre tous les aspects du programme 
nucléaire iranien », ... ... ... . 
Il a précisé que le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies pouvait « bien sûr » discuter d’un 
nouveau train de sanctions contre Téhéran, tout en plaidant pour la retenue et la réflexion. « Si 
notre logique est de punir l’Iran ou si nous adoptons la posture de l’offensé (...), ce ne sera pas 
une approche réfléchie ». « La situation n‟est pas simple et le contexte politique intérieur en Iran 
ne facilite pas les choses », ... ... ˮ. 
Translation : 
“In response to questions about the possibility of new sanctions against Iran, the Russian 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergueï Lavrov, has wished the proceeding of diplomatic efforts in 
order to settle the case. He told reporters : «We regret that Iran, apparently, doesn‟t judge it 
possible to accept the formula which was presented to it for the production of nuclear combustible 
for its research reactor in Teheran. We are convinced that more efforts are imperative, both on 
this matter and, more generally, on the question of resuming discussions in order to settle all 
aspects the Iranian nuclear program », ... ... . 
He made clear that the Security Council of the United Nations could «of course» discuss a new 
set of sanctions against Teheran, while pleading at the same time restraint and reflection. «If 
our logic is to punish Iran or if we adopt the posture of the offended (...), it will not be a 
thoughtful approach ». «The situation is not simple and the internal political context in Iran does 
not facilitate things », ... ...ˮ. 
 
• L‟Iran lance la production d‟uranium enrichi à 20% malgré les pressions [Iran launches the 
production of 20% enriched uranium despite pressures]. (2010, February 9). L‟Orient – Le jour, 
p.11: 
“Qualifiant l‟annonce iranienne de « chantage », le chef de la diplomatie française, Bernard 
Kouchner, a toutefois dit anticiper une «discussion longue » au Conseil de sécurité, notant que la 
France n’avait «pas encore convaincu » la Chine, qui dispose d’un droit de veto.” 
Translation : 
“Describing the Iranian announcement as «blackmail », the head of the French diplomacy, 
Bernard Kouchner, has nevertheless anticipated a «lengthy discussion » at the Security Council, 
noting that France had « not yet convinced » China, who has got a veto rightˮ. 
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 Ahmet Davutoglu (title). (2010, February 19). L‟Hebdo Magazine, p.12: 
“Le ministre turque des Affaires étrangères, a, selon des sources bien informées à Ankara, conduit des 
négociations en coulisses entre le ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères, Manouchehr Mottaki, et 
James Jones, le conseiller pour la sécurité nationale du président américain Barack Obama. Ce contact 
indirect entre Téhéran et Washington a eu lieu en Allemagne durant la première semaine de février, en 
marge de la Conférence de Munich sur la sécurité 2010. Les mêmes sources rapportent que contrairement 
aux déclarations négatives faites en public, les deux camps seraient très proches de la signature d’un 
accord pour échanger l’uranium, ce qui empêcherait Téhéran d‟enrichir la matière première par ses 
propres moyens. Les responsables du gouvernement Erdogan ont même proposé que l‟échange ait lieu en 
Turquie.ˮ 
Translation : 
“The Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister has, according to reliable sources in Ankara, conducted behind the 
scenes negotiations between Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, and James Jones, 
the National Security Counselor of American President Barack Obama. This indirect contact between 
Teheran and Washington took place in Germany during the first week of February, on the fringe of 
182 
Japan (another nonpermanent member of the UNSC) to serve as the go-between for the 
process of enriching Iranian uranium abroad.
343
 
Aside from those indirect talks and from the absence of sanctions at once, the Iranians 
gambled consistently with their ultimatum, as they started enriching themselves their 
uranium up to 20% according to a declaration they made on the 8
th
 of February 2010. 
344
 
This is still way below the 80 to 90% needed to produce a bomb, but there are reports 
about barely veiled Iranian threats to increase enrichment up to significant levels.
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 As a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Munich‟s Conference on the 2010 security. The same sources report that contrary to the negative 
statements made in public, the two sides would be very close to signing an agreement to exchange 
uranium, which would prevent Teheran to enrich the raw material by its own means. officials of the 
Erdogan government have even proposed that the exchange takes place in Turkey.ˮ 
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 References: 
 
• Le Japon propose à l‟Iran d‟enrichir son uranium [Japan proposes to Iran that it enriches its 
uranium]. (2010, February 25). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.11. 
 
• Clinton Compare le nucléaire iranien à crise des fusées de 1962 [Clinton compares the Iranian 
nuclear issue to the missile crisis of 1962].  (2010, February 26). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.11. 
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 L‟Iran lance la production d‟uranium enrichi à 20% malgré les pressions [Iran launches the production 
of 20% enriched uranium despite pressures]. Op-cit: 
“L‟Iran a notifié hier à l‟AIEA sa décision de commencer à produire de l‟uranium hautement enrichi 
malgré les pressions internationales. Le lancement se fera aujourd‟hui, sur le site de Natanz (centre), selon 
le représentant iranien à l‟AIEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh. ... ... 
Cette décision a été prise, selon Téhéran, en raison du blocage des discussions avec les Six ... ... sur la 
fourniture à l‟Iran du combustible enrichi à 20% dont il dit avoir besoin pour un réacteur de recherche 
médicale ˮ. 
Translation : 
“Iran has notified yesterday the IAEA of its decision to start producing high rich uranium despite 
international pressures. The launching will be made today, in the site of Natanz (center), according to 
Iran‟s representative at the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh ... ... . 
This decision has been taken, according to Teheran, due to the stalemating discussions with the Six ... ... on 
providing Iran with  20% enriched combustible, which it says it needs for a medical research reactorˮ. 
 
345
 Ahmadinejad s‟en prend à Obama et l‟accuse de « servir » les intérêts d‟Israël [Ahmadinejad attacks 
Obama and accuses him of « serving » Israel‟s interests]. (2010, February 12). L‟Orient – Le Jour, p.11: 
“Le président iranien Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a défié hier l‟Occident sur le nucléaire à l‟occasion du 31e 
anniversaire de la République islamique. 
... ... 
Il a assuré que l‟Iran était capable d‟enrichir de l‟uranium «à plus de 80% », mais qu‟«il ne le fera pas car 
il n‟en a pas besoin », ... ...”. 
Translation : 
“On the occasion of the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Republic, the Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad has challenged yesterday the West regarding the nuclear issue. 
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matter of fact, persons like former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, R. James 
Woolsey, believe that Iran has nearly done three-quarters of the job to produce a bomb.
346
 
And hence, whatever expectation is closest to reality, Obama administration officials did 
not exclude the possibility for Iran to become a nuclear power in a relatively short period 
of time.
347
 
Nevertheless, the fact is that the sanctions were not applied at once when the Western 
ultimatum expired (31
st
 of December 2009). The reason is simple: 2 of the 5 permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Russia and China, were not 
yet ready to accept the principle of imposing a new set of sanctions against Iran, and 
would have thus vetoed any such resolution.
 
Another difficulty stems from the fact that a 
majority of 9 over 15 votes is needed to pass a UNSC resolution, and this latter condition 
wasn‟t yet guaranteed as well.348 Consequently, as a result of the inability to impose 
sanctions at once, there has been a twofold intense diplomatic activity: the West was still 
                                                                                                                                                 
... ... 
He has assured that Iran was capable of enriching the uranium «up to more than 80% », but that «it will 
not do it because it does not need it», ... ...ˮ. 
 
346
 Woolsey, R.J. (2010, May 7). Too much Mr. Nice Guy on nuclear disarmament. International Herald 
Tribune. p.6: 
“The problem is that if a country enriches uranium up to 3 percent, which is suitable to generate electricity, 
it has done nearly three-quarters of the work needed to move along the road to 90 percent enrichment, 
which is what is required to make a bomb”. 
 
347
 Undisclosed activities by Iran worry U.N. nuclear inspector. (2010, February 19). The International 
Herald Tribune, pp.1&4: 
“The report contains no assessment of how long it would take Iran to produce a nuclear weapon, and as 
recently as early last month, Obama administration officials said they believed it would be a year and a 
half, or maybe significantly longer, before Iran could become a weapons power.” 
 
348
 AFP. (2010, May 20). Sanctions/Iran: majorité en vue à l‟ONU [Sanctions/Iran: a foreseen majority at 
the UNO]. Le Figaro: 
“Une majorité de 9 membres sur les 15 composant le Conseil de sécurité est nécessaire pour l‟adoption 
d‟une nouvelle résolution contre l‟Iran, sans veto de l‟un des cinq membres permanents ... ...” 
Translation : 
“A majority of 9 members over the 15 constituting the Security Council is necessary for the adoption of a 
new resolution against Iran, provided there is no veto from any of the five permanent members.” 
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trying on one side to obtain an acceptable agreement from Iran whereby this latter would 
subcontract the enrichment of its uranium and, on the other side, was endeavoring to 
mobilize preferably all 15 current members of the UNSC, or at least a comfortable 
majority, to vote for a new resolution sanctioning Iran in case of failure of the first option. 
The diplomatic ballet went on all the way thru up to the 17
th
 of May 2010, when the 
abovementioned Turkish-Brazilian mediation gave birth to a tripartite agreement signed 
by Turkey, Brazil and Iran whereby this latter agreed to subcontract the enrichment of 
uranium; essentially, the deal provides for the transfer of 1200 kg of Iranian uranium to 
Turkey against the delivery by France and Russia, within a year, of 120 kg of 20% rich 
uranium, suitable for being used as nuclear fuel for a reactor devoted for medical 
purposes.
349
 But according to Adèle Smith of Le Figaro, quoting a diplomat, the Six were 
upset by the fact that the Turkish-Brazilian initiative was conducted without consulting 
with them.
350
 As a matter of fact, and as inferred by a March 2010 article in the 
International Herald Tribune from Britain‟s Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, there 
were anterior signs of apprehension from the West about the extent of the Turkish-
Brazilian cooperation and its relevancy with the immediate objectives of the international 
community in handling the Iranian nuclear issue.
351
 Furthermore, there were concerns 
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 Vampouille, Th. (2010, May 18). Nucléaire : L‟Iran signe un accord d‟échange d‟uranium [Nuclear 
issue : Iran signs an agreement to exchange uranium]. Le Figaro.  
 
350
 Smith, A. (2010, May 20). ONU : vers une majorité pour des sanctions contre l‟Iran [UNO : toward a 
majority favoring sanctions against Iran]. Le Figaro:  
According to the above article, after the signature of the May 17, 2010 agreement, it was believed that 
Japan, Bosnia, Gabon, Mexico and Austria would go along with the sanctions; Lebanon, Brazil and Turkey 
would not; Nigeria and Uganda were hesitant; China would go along but with restrictions over the extent of 
sanctions and would use its veto right if such “red lines” were crossed.  
 
351
 Miliband, D. (2010, March 27). Averting the Iranian nuclear flashpoint. International Herald Tribune, 
p.4: 
“The U.N. Security Council needs to take seriously its responsibilities, not just countries such as Britain 
and China but non-permanent members such as Brazil and Turkey”. 
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about the fact that, from the 8
th
 of February 2010 (when Iran said it started the 20% 
enrichment process) up to the 17
th
 of May 2010, the Iranian stock of uranium had 
increased to 2400 kg, thus twice the amount that Iran would send abroad for 
enrichment.
352
 To crown it all, Iran elucidated the mystery by declaring that it would keep 
enriching itself part of its uranium and that such fact was not in violation of the May 17 
Agreement. Iran further made clear that if such right was denied to it, or if sanctions were 
imposed, it wouldn‟t be bound by such Agreement and would thus proceed enriching 
itself all of its uranium.
353
 Abiding by the rules and regulations regarding the matter, Iran 
did officially inform the IAEA of the Turkish-Brazilian Agreement within a week after 
signature; but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton immediately objected about numerous 
uncertainties and omissions in the Iranian letter to the IAEA.
354
 There was thus an inborn 
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 Barluet, A. (2010, May 18). Nucléaire iranien : vers de nouvelles sanctions [Iranian nuclear issue : 
toward new sanctions]. Le Figaro: 
“Or, depuis l‟automne dernier, l‟Iran a accru de moitié son stock d‟uranium faiblement enrichi, estimé par 
l‟AIEA à plus de 2400 kg dont il conserverait donc la moitié, aux termes de l‟accord turco-brésilien. Un 
nouvel accord nécessiterait donc une « mise à jour », avait exigé Washington, le mois dernier, pour tenir 
compte des nouveaux stocks et des nouvelles capacités d‟enrichissement de l‟Iran.” 
Translation : 
“But, since last autumn, Iran has increased by half its stock of low enriched uranium, estimated by the 
IAEA to more than 2400 kg of which it would keep one half of it, in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the Turkish-Brazilian Agreement. Washington had thus requested that a new agreement «with 
updates » be concluded, to take into account the new stocks and the new Iranian capacities of enrichment.” 
 
353
 Ibid: 
“... ... la République islamique a réaffirmé ce lundi qu‟elle continuerait de produire de l‟uranium 
hautement enrichi (20%), un processus officiellement lancé en février dernier. ... 
... ... 
... ... un diplomate occidental ... voit dans ce dernier épisode du feuilleton nucléaire un nouvel « écran de 
fumée » mis en place par Téhéran pour esquiver des sanctions.” 
Translation : 
“... ... the Islamic Republic has reasserted this Monday that it would continue producing high enriched 
uranium (20%), a process officially launched last February. ... 
... ... 
... ... a Western diplomat ... sees in this last episode of the nuclear serial a new « smoke screen » set by 
Teheran to avoid sanctions.” 
 
354
 AFP. (2010, May 25). Iran: la lettre à l‟AIEA “pleine de lacunes” [Iran: the letter to the IAEA “full of 
omissions”]. Le Figaro. (Quoting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton): 
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controversy over the interpretation of the Agreement by the international actors involved, 
as to Iran‟s declared intention to continue its own enrichment of uranium. 355 
Consequently, the West kept on the agenda the negotiation process of the package of 
sanctions with the members of the UNSC, in the hope to have them voted during the first 
half of June 2010.
356
 A resolution (1929) was adopted on the 9
th
 of June 2010 imposing 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Nous avons assez longuement discuté des insuffisances de la proposition avancée par l‟Iran dans sa lettre 
à l‟AIEA ... ...  Il y a un certain nombre de lacunes, ce qui ne répond pas aux préoccupations de la 
communauté internationale”. 
Translation : 
“We have discussed lengthily enough the insufficiencies of the proposition put forward by Iran in its letter 
to the IAEA ... ... There is a certain number of omissions, a fact which does not provide answers to the 
questions that are matters of preoccupations for the international community”. 
 
355
 References: 
 
• AFP. (2010, May 22). Uranium/accord: menace de l‟Iran [Uranium/agreement : Iran‟s threat]. Le 
Figaro: 
“Selon Téhéran, cet accord reconnaît le droit de l‟Iran à enrichir l‟uranium à des fins pacifiques. 
L‟accord «nous offre des choses de même qu‟à l‟autre partie. C‟est un cadre logique pour des 
pourparlers » a déclaré M. Larijani.” 
Translation : 
“According to Teheran, this agreement recognizes the right for Iran to enrich uranium for pacific 
purposes. The agreement «offers us things as well as to the other party. This is a logical frame for 
talks » Mr. Larijani declared.” 
 
• Reuters. (2010, May 24). Accord/nucléaire: L‟Iran avise l‟AIEA [Agreement/nuclear : Iran 
advices the IAEA]. Le Figaro: 
“Les puissances occidentales considèrent que l‟accord, qui reprend les grandes lignes d‟un 
compromis accepté il y a plus de six mois puis renié par l‟Iran, est dépassé par les événements, 
Téhéran ayant réaffirmé sa volonté de poursuivre ses activités d‟enrichissement d‟uranium.” 
Translation : 
“Western powers consider that the agreement, which winds up the headlines of a compromise 
accepted and then just denied by Iran more than six months ago, is outdated by developments, 
since Teheran has stated again its intention to keep ongoing the process of its uranium enrichment 
activity.” 
 
356
 References: 
 
• Smith, A. (2010, May 20). ONU : vers une majorité pour des sanctions contre l‟Iran [UNO : 
toward a majority favoring sanctions against Iran]. Op-cit:  
“La représentante de Washington, Susan Rice, proche de Barack Obama, espère obtenir une 
résolution dans la première quinzaine de juin, quitte à faire l‟impasse sur le vote du Brésil et de la 
Turquie, membres non permanents du Conseil.” 
Translation: 
“The representative of Washington [at the UN], Susan Rice, a person close to Barack Obama, 
hoped to obtain a resolution by the first half of June, even at the price of unfavorable votes of 
Brazil and Turkey, who are nonpermanent members of the Council .” 
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softer sanctions than targeted by the West because of Russia and China‟s resistance to a 
broader set of sanctions.
357
  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
• AFP. (2010, May 27). « Grave désaccord » USA-Brésil sur l‟Iran [« Serious disagreement » USA-
Brazil over Iran]. Le Figaro: 
“Malgré cet accord, le Conseil de sécurité de l‟ONU a examiné le 18 mai un nouveau projet de 
sanctions contre l‟Iran, rédigé par les Etats-Unis et approuvé par les autres puissances chargées 
du dossier (Chine, France, Grande-Bretagne, Russie, et Allemagne).” 
Translation : 
“Despite this agreement, the UNO Security Council has examined on the 18th of May a new 
project of sanctions against Iran, drafted by the United States and approved by the other powers 
in charge of the matter (China, France, Great Britain, Russia and Germany).” 
 
357
 Reuters. (2010, May 20). Iran rejects „legitimacy‟ of proposed expanded sanctions. International Herald 
Tribune, p.6: 
“The draft resolution, agreed upon by all five permanent Security Council members after months of 
negotiation, targets Iranian banks and calls for inspection of vessels suspected of carrying cargo related to 
Iran‟s nuclear or missile program. 
... ... 
Western diplomats say the text was the result of a compromise between the United States and its main 
allies in Western Europe – which had pushed for much tougher sanctions against Teheran – and Russia 
and China, which sought to dilute them.” 
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